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Abstract 
After the 1978 policy of reform and opening up, Chinese economy is transiting 
from a planned economy to a market one. Meanwhile, its labour force also became more 
mobile, leading to job turnover and internal migration. In addition, the wage setting 
became more market-oriented rather than centrally administered. Motivated by these 
changes in the post-reform Chinese labour market, this thesis empirically investigates 
job turnover, wage compensation and return migration in China, all of which consider 
the impact of the household registration system.  
Chapter two empirically studies job turnover in China. The 1978 policy of reform 
and opening up brought changes to the Chinese labour market. For example, the number 
of life-long employment was reducing and meanwhile the scale of the non-public sector 
was expanding. Therefore, people have more employment choices than before. Using 
employment histories recorded in the 2008 China General Social Survey, discrete-time 
survival analysis is used to examine the motivations for job turnover. Respondents 
registered in urban and rural areas are considered separately in the analysis. However, 
the results show no significant difference in job turnover between urban and rural 
registered people. 
As bonuses, housing subsidies and social insurances are currently common 
employment benefits in China, chapter three asks whether there is a wage reduction 
when higher benefits are provided to employees, which can be explained by the 
compensating wage differentials hypothesis. Using data from the 2009 Rural-Urban 
Migration in China, both urban employees and migrant workers are included in the 
sample. A wage equation and three benefit equations are estimated simultaneously. 
Instrumental variables are selected to correct for the endogeneity problem of benefit 
variables in the wage equation. The results show that there is no trade-off between 
wages and benefits, meaning that benefits do not have a compensating effect to wages.  
The fourth chapter uses Cox survival analysis to study the return migration in 
China. Previous studies have found that return migration in China is due to the 
XII 
household registration system and the macroeconomic environment both domestically 
and internationally. However, this chapter argues that return migration is more likely to 
be associated with employment and household factors. Employing data from the 2009 
Rural-Urban Migration in China, chapter four considers the heterogeneity in return 
migration between the new and old generation migrants, where the former are taken to 
be born after 1980. The results show that the new generation migrants experience more 
return migration than their old counterparts. This implies that integrating to cities may 
be difficult even if the new generation migrants have a stronger desire to stay in cities 
permanently.  
The thesis concludes that although the Chinese labour market is becoming more 
mobile and wage setting is more flexible, people with different registration status are 
experiencing different outcomes and respond differently to these changes. Therefore, the 
policy implication of this thesis is that the Chinese society as well as its labour market 
should transit from a dual track system to an integrated one.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction to the Thesis 
1.1 Research Background 
The thesis investigates labour market changes in China after the 1978 policy of 
reform and opening up. In particular, this thesis considers the impact of the household 
registration system on the labour market changes.  
The household registration system was established in the 1950s. The initial purpose 
of the household registration system was to collect and manage residential information 
(Cheng and Selden, 1994). Individuals who were born in urban areas were entitled to an 
urban registration (urban residents) while individuals who were born in rural areas were 
entitled to a rural registration (rural residents). Afterwards, newborns had to be 
registered the same as their parents regardless of their actual birth place (Meng et al., 
2013).  
Therefore, Chinese society as well as its labour market were segregated into an 
urban part and a rural part. Before the introduction of the household responsibility 
system in 1982, the incomes of rural residents depended on their collective agricultural 
production. By contrast, in urban areas, the jobs and food were allocated to urban 
residents by government in the planned economy (Zhao, 2005). Meanwhile, the 
household registration system acted as an economic resource allocation mechanism 
before a market economy was formally established in 1992 (Cai, 2011), which 
contributed to the rapid social and economic development in urban areas. Due to an 
imbalance in the development between urban and rural areas, rural people might 
consider migrating to urban areas. However, the household registration system acted as 
a barrier to rural-urban migration until the mid-1980s. There were controls on this 
internal migration not only because of competition for food in urban areas, but also to 
avoid competition for resources such as education and health services in urban areas, as 
well as controlling urban population size (Zhao, 1999; Zhao, 2005). Therefore, rural 
labour was immobile and had to be attached to farm land in pre-reform China.  
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However, since the 1978 policy of reform and opening up, economic reforms were 
associated with changes in the household registration system. Rural economic reforms 
started earlier than those in urban areas. The most remarkable change in rural areas was 
the introduction of the household responsibility system in 1982, which was used to 
replace collective agricultural production in rural China. The new system stimulated 
individual incentives in agricultural production and hence increased the output 
significantly (Cai, 2011). Meanwhile, due to the increase in productivity, less people 
were required to engage in agricultural activities, which generated surplus labour in 
rural areas. Township and village enterprises were established and expanded to create 
job opportunities for the surplus rural labour. In 1980, only 9.2% of rural labour was 
employed in township and village enterprises while the proportion increased to 22% in 
19921. Meanwhile, surplus labour began to migrate to urban areas for non-farming job 
opportunities when the restriction on labour mobility between rural and urban areas was 
abandoned in the mid-1980s.  
In urban China, public ownership was the main feature of the planned economy. In 
particular, 75.1 million urban workers were employed in state-owned enterprises, which 
accounted for 78.3% of urban workforce in 1978. Even in 1992, there were 108.9 
million employed in state-owned enterprises, which accounted for 61% of the urban 
workforce2. Managers in the state-owned enterprises could not make decisions on 
personnel issues such as recruitment or dismissal and production was based on a state 
planning (Cai et al., 2008). The same wage paid to urban workers of the same grade 
whose employment was life-long. Although wages were low for urban workers, food 
prices were also low and fringe benefits such as health care were provided to employees. 
Therefore, the key characteristics of the pre-reform urban labour market were low job 
turnover and administratively determined wages.  
However, since the 1990s, reforms were undertaken to attempt to terminate the 
life-long employment or the “iron rice bowl” in state-owned enterprises in the market 
economy. For example, enterprises obtained more independence on personnel issues 
                                                        
1 Source: 1981 and 1991 China Statistical Yearbook. 
2 Source: 2001 China Statistical Yearbook. 
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with the introduction of a labour contract system (Cai et al., 2008). Meanwhile, in order 
to improve the competitiveness and efficiency of the state-owned enterprises, 21.37 
million state-owned enterprise workers were laid-off in total between 1998 and 20003, 
which was accompanied by the development of the social insurance system.  
In addition, the expansion of the non-state or private enterprises and 
export-oriented economy during the 1990s in urban China required a higher demand for 
labour and this has been met by rural residents migrating to urban areas (Meng et al., 
2013). Those who registered in rural areas but work in urban areas are called migrant 
workers. However, since the early 2000s, some coastal cities in China have experienced 
a migrant labour shortage. This migrant labour shortage is a result of return migration, 
which is from urban to rural areas. The return motivations are not only because of the 
institutional barriers such as the household registration system for migrant workers to 
stay in cities permanently (Meng, 2012), but also some of migrant workers are able to 
find employment opportunities in a small city or town that is near their hometown.  
To summarise, the transition of the Chinese economy from a planned economy to a 
market oriented one had two significant characteristics. Firstly, the labour force changed 
from an immobile to a mobile one. This mobility refers to not only job turnover which 
brings a wider employment opportunity to employees, but also to geographical mobility 
which occurs between rural and urban areas of China. The second remarkable 
characteristic of the changes is the improvement of welfare of employees. The wage 
setting changed from a centrally administered system to a market oriented one. 
Meanwhile, the average annual real wages of those individuals employed in urban 
labour market increased from 615 yuan in 1978 to 9452.12 yuan in 20144, which 
reflects China’s post-reform high productivity growth. Employment benefits are 
continuously provided to workers along with the increase in wage.  
1.2 Contributions and Structure of the Thesis 
                                                        
3 Source: Xinhua News. Retrieved on 28 Oct 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2003-01/24/content 
_702257.htm 
4 Source: the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 1978 is the base year.  
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Motivated by the changes introduced above, this thesis empirically examines 
labour mobility and wages in the Chinese labour market, considering the impact of the 
household registration system particularly. Due to the fact that life-long employment is 
declining in post-reform labour market and employees may have a perception of job 
insecurity, the first research topic aims to identify which factors may motivate job 
turnover in China (chapter two). Previous Chinese studies on job turnover focus on 
either urban people or migrant workers. However, this chapter differentiate to these 
studies by comparing job turnover behaviours between urban and rural residents in 
China. Using detailed employment histories recorded in the 2008 China General Social 
Survey, discrete-time survival analysis is applied in chapter two. In addition, chapter 
two uses Chinese data to examine whether job turnover rate is higher at the beginning of 
the job and whether the probability of job turnover declines with job tenure, both of 
which are found by Farber (1999) with the US data. 
Moreover, motivated by the reforms in wage system and changes in benefits, the 
second research question asks whether the increase in wages is associated with a decline 
in benefits, which can be explained by the compensating wage differentials hypothesis 
(chapter three). Using data from the Chinese part of the 2009 Rural-Urban Migration in 
China, this chapter focuses on urban labour market which includes urban and migrant 
workers. The contributions of this chapter are, firstly, a range of employment benefits is 
identified from the dataset to examine whether they have a substitution effect to wages 
rather than a single benefit which has been examined in the previous Chinese literature. 
The second contribution is to treat benefit variables endogenously in the wage equation 
and select instrumental variables to correct for the endogeneity problems. 
The last research question focuses on migrant workers and asks what factors 
motivate return migration in China (chapter four). Survival analysis is applied to the 
same dataset as in chapter three, using the censoring status of the migration durations to 
distinguish return migrants and migrant workers. Chapter four contributes to the 
literature by considering the heterogeneity in return decisions between the new and old 
generation migrants, where the former are taken to be those born after 1980. Secondly, 
different from previous Chinese studies which emphasise the influence of the household 
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registration system on return migration, chapter four argues that return migration is 
more likely to be influenced by labour supply side factors such as employment and 
household characteristics. Therefore, the control variables in the return decision model 
are selected based on migration theories which are inclined to relate return migration to 
wages, savings and social networks.  
Finally, conclusions and limitations of this thesis are presented in chapter five. In 
addition, policy implications and potential future research are discussed in the final 
chapter as well. 
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Chapter Two 
Job Turnover in the Chinese Labour Market: A Comparison between 
Urban and Rural Residents 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1956, socialism was established in China and a public ownership economy was 
founded at the same time. Since then, China has followed the Soviet Union’s pattern to 
develop a planned economy. However, after experiencing chaos from the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), China began a gradual process of abandoning its planned 
economy and opened up to the world. Subsequently, the policy of reform and opening 
up was introduced in 1978. Meanwhile, a market-oriented economy was gradually 
established in China after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992.  
China introduced a household registration system (known as hukou) in the 1950s 
(Cheng and Selden, 1994). The initial purpose of the household registration system was 
to collect and manage residential information. People were required to register as either 
urban or rural residents. Since then, Chinese society was divided into urban and rural 
areas. However, this system was also used to strictly control mobility from rural to 
urban areas, with a greater proportion of limited resources were prioritised for urban 
development. Although the role of controlling rural-urban mobility gradually was 
abandoned since the 1980s, the household registration system began to act as an 
institutional barrier. For instance, rurally registered people in urban areas may not 
benefit from the same health services and children’s education as urban residents. 
In addition, labour market changes were different in urban and rural areas. In the 
pre-reform urban China, life-long jobs were allocated to the urban residents either from 
local community offices (known as jiedao banshi chu) or educational institutions. 
Employers were mainly in the public sector, which included state-owned and 
collective-owned enterprises, as well as government departments. These employers 
were not allowed to recruit and dismiss staff freely. They were required to follow an 
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employment plan made by the central government (Li, 2013). Similarly, from the 
employees’ side, individuals could not make decisions on job turnover. Therefore, the 
urban labour market was extremely immobile. The most obvious disadvantage of this 
system was that employers and employees might be mismatched and the absence of 
mobility prevented any corrections for this mismatch. Therefore, once mismatch 
occurred, employees might be less motivated in terms of the job itself and human 
capital investment.  
However, reforms after 1978 gradually broke this life-long employment system 
and brought uncertainties to the urban labour market. For example, urban economy 
reforms in the early 1980s aimed to improve production efficiency and reduce surplus 
labour in the public sector (Meng, 2000). The 1990s’ reforms aimed to improve the 
incentives of both managers and workers and to encourage the non-public sector to 
absorb surplus labour from the public sector (Dong and Xu, 2009). In addition, a more 
radical urban economy reform was launched in 1997. Downsizing and reorganisation 
among state-owned enterprises led to huge labour lay-offs (known as xiagang). 
Although policies and assistance were provided to help laid-off workers get reemployed, 
the number of workers in this situation increased from approximately 8.8 million in 
1998 to 9.1 million in 20005. Chinese conventionally regarded employment in the 
state-owned enterprises as the “iron rice bowl” or life-long employment, but reforms in 
the 1990s and after changed this perception.  
In addition, China abolished the policy which used to guarantee university 
graduates a life-long job in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, China expanded undergraduate 
recruitment. Before the undergraduate recruitment expansion, 46.1% of high school 
graduates entered universities in 1998. This number increased significantly to 63.8% in 
1999, when the expansion policy was implemented6. The expansion policy not only 
offered more higher education opportunities, but also alleviated labour market pressures 
by delaying the age for young people to get their first jobs (Liu, 2012). A similar 
expansion policy was applied to research degrees several years later. However, the 
                                                        
5 Source: 1999 and 2001 China Labour Statistical Yearbook. 
6 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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adverse consequence of this policy was that people may become overeducated, which 
creates job market problems.  
Therefore, changes in the post-reform Chinese urban labour market, on the one 
hand, brought more choices for job seekers to decide whether to be employed in the 
public or non-public sector, which made voluntary job turnover possible. On the other 
hand, these changes accelerated the development of the social insurance system. In the 
pre-reform urban labour market, work units (known as danwei) in the public sector had 
their own welfare systems, such as health services and schools for children. 
Unemployment insurance seemed to be unnecessary as employment was life-long and 
pensions were set based on seniority and wage (Giles et al., 2013). However, in the 
post-reform urban labour market, welfare is provided by the social insurance system 
rather than the work units themselves. Employees also have a greater awareness of 
participating in insurance schemes than before.  
The current social insurance system in China includes five different types of 
insurance. These are pension, health, unemployment, work injury and maternity 
(females only) insurances. In addition, there is a housing fund for employees to 
purchase commercial real estate products. However, only pension, health and 
unemployment insurances are in the dataset used in this chapter. 
Pension insurance was the privilege of state-owned enterprises’ employees until 
1991. Since 2003, firms in either the state or non-state sector have been mandated to 
purchase pension insurance for employees. Besides employers and employees 
financially contributing to such insurance, both local and central government 
contributes to the insurance as well. However, a drawback of the current pension 
insurance system is that employers’ contributions are not completely transferable when 
employees change jobs (Li and Wu, 2013).  
Health insurance was not formally introduced until the late 1990s. There are three 
types of health insurance currently. The first is the Basic Health Insurance Scheme, 
which was introduced in 1998. Employers, employees and the government all contribute 
to the insurance payment. The drawback of this scheme is low coverage. Only urban 
employees and retirees in the public sector can benefit from this insurance. Therefore, 
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two more insurance schemes were introduced. One is the 2003 New Cooperate Medical 
Scheme, covering rural residents; another is the 2007 Basic Medical Insurance, 
targeting urban residents without formal employment such as students and unemployed 
urban residents.  
Unemployment insurance is also paid by employers, employees and government. It 
works as protection when employees experience involuntary unemployment. 
Unemployment insurance not only provides living expenses during unemployed periods, 
but also provides some employment assistance.  
Meanwhile, changes in the rural areas have also had an impact on the labour 
market. Before 1978, agricultural production in the rural areas was organised by 
production teams collectively following a work points system. In 1982, this old 
performance measurement system was replaced by a new household responsibility 
system. The new system enabled the allocation of products, income and labour to be 
determined by households themselves. Accordingly, there was an increasing awareness 
of the importance of individual efforts and production efficiency in agricultural 
activities. A surplus of rural labour was created as a result of the increase in productivity 
(Meng, 2000).  
Therefore, many township and privately-owned enterprises were established which 
absorbed the surplus labour (Cai et al., 2008). Meanwhile, surplus labour from rural 
areas began to migrate into urban areas to seek job opportunities, forming a population 
of migrant workers. These rurally registered migrant workers often undertake dirty, 
dangerous and demanding jobs as cheap labour in urban areas (Meng, 2012). Although 
employed in urban areas, migrant workers cannot benefit from the same welfare support, 
such as social insurance, as their urban counterparts. It is difficult for migrant workers 
to stay in cities permanently and hence urban areas are only regarded as a place of work 
by them (Ye and Pan, 2011). For rural residents who do not migrate into urban areas, 
they may be employed in township and privately-owned enterprises. These enterprises 
are small in scale and may lack regulation from the local government. Therefore, 
instability and insecurity are often associated with employment in these enterprises.  
Overall, the main feature of the pre-reform Chinese labour market in both urban 
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and rural areas was immobility (Meng, 2000). However, reforms after 1978 changed 
this situation. Either geographical mobility or job turnover is now common in the 
Chinese labour market. In addition, although household registration no longer restricts 
mobility, it acts as an internal passport system which prevents people from receiving 
equal benefits and welfare from work. For individuals with different types of the 
household registration, their concerns may be different when making the decision to 
change jobs.  
In addition, job turnover is about both labour demand and supply. The demand side 
of labour is about decisions on hiring conditional on capital, labour and product markets 
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 2009). Job turnover from the demand side tends to be 
determined by factors such as employment scale and wages set by employers. Therefore, 
job turnover from the demand side is more likely to lead to an involuntary job loss. By 
contrast, the supply side of labour assumes that workers have already decided to work, 
so now it is a question of which employer to choose. If jobs offered are similar, then the 
choices are made based on the compensations and benefits of the jobs (Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 2009). Therefore, job turnover from the supply side is more likely to be 
voluntary job loss. Employees’ decisions on quitting or staying may be based on 
whether employment benefits can be provided and whether jobs are secure. In fact, 
among those who reported whether they chose voluntary job loss, aproximately 88.24% 
of job turnover records in the sample of this chapter are in this category7.  
According to the background introduced above, this chapter aims to identify and 
examine which factors motivated job turnover between urban and rural residents after 
the 1978 policy of reform and opening up. This chapter contributes to the literature on 
job turnover in three ways. Firstly, unlike previous studies on this topic which only 
focuses on gender differences, this chapter introduces differences in the type of the 
household registration into the analysis. The household registration system is a unique 
characteristic of China. Therefore, when examining job turnover in the Chinese labour 
market, it is necessary to control for both the registration type and gender. The second 
                                                        
7 Voluntary job loss includes voluntary quit and retirement while other situations are treated as involuntary job loss. 
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contribution of this chapter is that a discrete-time survival analysis on job turnover is 
added to the Chinese literature by using employment histories recorded in the 2008 
China General Social Survey (CGSS). In this dataset, a respondent may have 
experienced job turnover more than once and therefore multiple employment records 
are possible, which is different from most of the single spell duration data in the 
literature. Unobserved heterogeneity should be controlled for in the multiple spells 
discrete-time survival analysis. Finally, this chapter is able to use Chinese data to 
examine whether the job turnover rate is high at the beginning of the job and whether 
the probability of job turnover declines with job tenure, both of which are stated and 
examined by Farber (1999) with U.S. data.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews relevant literature and 
Section 2.3 describes the data and methodology. Results from the discrete-time survival 
analysis are presented in Section 2.4 and conclusions are given in Section 2.5.  
2.2 Literature Review 
In this section, studies on job turnover in western countries and China are 
reviewed.  
2.2.1 Job turnover studies in western countries  
Sims (1994) argues that job turnover is due to the break of psychological contracts, 
which are unwritten contracts between employees and employers specifying the beliefs 
and perceptions in terms of the employment relationship. He finds that economic shocks 
such as downsizing and reorganisation lead to short-term employment common in the 
labour market and rare promotion opportunities. Therefore, short-term employment may 
decrease the employees’ commitment to the organisation and increase the frequency of 
job turnover. 
By contrast, Farber (1999) finds that long-term employment is common in the 
labour market. He uncovers three facts regarding job turnover and examines them by 
using the U.S. datasets8 . The three facts are as follows: long-term employment 
                                                        
8 These datasets are 1979-1991 Current Population Survey, 1984-1996 Displaced Workers Surveys and 1979-1991 
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relationships are common, most new jobs end early and the probability of a job ending 
declines with tenure. As firms may expect long-term employment relationships, higher 
wages are paid to those who have longer employment duration, which implies that the 
long-term employment relationship encourages firms to invest in firm-specific capital 
for employees. Therefore, Farber (1999) argues, employment duration can act as a 
proxy measurement for firm-specific capital investment. The implication of this study is 
that using employment duration is a sensible measurement for job turnover. However, as 
information on wages of each specific job is unavailable in the dataset used in this 
chapter, it is not possible to examine the relationship between wages and job turnover.  
Burgess and Rees (1998) use pooled sample from the 1975-1993 General 
Household Survey to study job tenure with the same employer of British employees. 
They notice that all employment durations in the dataset are right-censored at the time 
of the survey and hence unable to get complete durations. In addition, the distribution of 
durations ranged from 4 weeks to 40 years. Both weaknesses of the data add complexity 
to using survival analysis to estimate the hazard of job turnover. Therefore, they use the 
logit model to estimate the probabilities of being with the current employer for less than 
one year and more than five years respectively. Gender is controlled for in the analysis. 
For example, they find that women with children are more likely to have a short 
employment duration compared to men, which suggests a gender difference in job 
tenure. 
Some studies on job turnover build empirical models from the human capital 
perspective. They examine the causality between job turnover and human capital 
investment such as education and training. Royalty (1998) studies the relationship 
between education and job turnover. Using data from the 1979-1994 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), she applies a multinominal probit model to 
compare the probabilities of job-to-job and job-to-unemployment turnovers (each 
turnover acts as the base category in turn). She finds that better educated women have 
similar job turnover behaviour to that for men. In particular, when education attainment 
                                                                                                                                                                  
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.  
13 
levels are beyond high school, women experience no difference in job turnover from 
both well and less educated men.  
In addition, according to the psychological contract theory, although employees 
should be responsible for their own career development, employers need to provide 
training opportunities to assess employees’ performances and update their employability 
for the changing labour market (Cavanaugh and Noe, 1999). Some studies examine the 
causality between job turnover and training as an evaluation of the training programme. 
For example, Gritz (1993) applies the continuous-time survival analysis to estimate the 
influence of training on employment duration with data from the 1979-1991 NLSY. He 
finds that private training received by American women can help to extend employment 
duration and reduce job change frequency. However, this effect is less significant for 
men because the effect of training may diminish rapidly with time. By contrast, 
receiving government training may decrease employment spells for both men and 
women. He attributes this outcome to the small proportion of respondents receiving 
government training.  
Meanwhile, Sieben (2007) uses the data from a seven year consecutive interview 
for Dutch graduates from the academic year of 1990-1991 to examine the intention to 
search for another job after training, which can be regarded as the propensity of job 
turnover. In his logit model, the propensity of job turnover is not only controlled by type 
of training, but also considers the impact of factors such as funding and intensity of 
training (hours of training) on job turnover. Sieben (2007) finds that specific training in 
their own field decreases the probability that females search for another paid job, which 
suggests that training contributes to their human capital accumulation. By contrast, 
training in another field increases males’ job turnover propensity. Meanwhile, 
self-funded training can increase the probability of males undertaking a job search, 
which reduces their commitment to organisations. Finally, longer hours of training are 
associated with a higher job turnover propensity among male employees. 
However, Royalty (1996) believes that an individual’s human capital investment 
will increase if the expected employment duration is also rising. Therefore, the 
predicted probability of staying in a current job and the predicted probability of leaving 
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for a new job (with no job turnover as the base category) are control variables in the 
multinominal probit model which compares the probability of receiving company 
training, off-job training and no training (base category). Using data from the 
1979-1994 NLSY, she finds that training is significantly related to job turnover. In 
particular, males receive 25% more training when job turnover is controlled for in the 
analysis.  
Moreover, some studies argue that job turnover can be reduced if insurance is 
provided. In this case, job turnover reduction seems to be from the labour demand side. 
For example, Mealli and Pudney (1996) argue that pensioned jobs can be attractive for 
employees who prefer stable and secure jobs. On the other hand, pensions may punish 
frequently mobile employees because they may suffer from pension loss if they leave 
jobs. Therefore, they estimate the hazards of transition among pensioned, 
non-pensioned, other employment (part-time or self-employment), unemployment and 
out of labour force. Using the competing risks model and data from the 1988/1989 
British Retirement Survey, Mealli and Pudney (1996) find that a pensioned job is 
associated with longer employment duration.  
Health insurance also has the effect of reducing job turnover. Kim and Philips 
(2010) apply the Weibull survival analysis to examine whether insured construction 
workers in the US have lower probability of job turnover. Using data from the 1996 and 
2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation, shared frailty of multiple spells is 
controlled for with a gamma distribution. They find that both workers with union and 
nonunion employer provided health insurance experience less job turnover than those 
who do not have health insurance.  
By contrast, job turnover can also be reduced from the labour supply side. 
Employees may voluntarily reduce job turnover as a result of insurance provided to 
them. Ellis and Ma (2011) call this adverse job turnover and argue that less healthy 
employees in American firms place more value on health insurance than healthy 
employees and hence they reduce job turnover if health insurance is offered to them. 
2.2.2 Job turnover studies in China 
Labour market reforms since the 1990s facilitate job turnover in China. Appleton et 
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al. (2002) investigate the determinants of being laid-off in the Chinese urban labour 
market since 1992, which is an involuntary job turnover as a result of resolving low 
efficiency among the state-owned enterprises. Using data from the 1999 Chinese 
Academy of Social Science Household Survey, their probit model on whether an 
individual has ever been laid-off reveals that women, middle-aged and unskilled 
workers are more likely to be laid-off, which implies the discriminatory side of lay-off 
policy.  
Using the same dataset, Knight and Yueh (2006) extend their study sample to both 
urban residents and migrant workers in the urban labour market. Empirical evidence 
suggests that even after urban labour market reforms, the fact that urban residents prefer 
to avoid job turnover while migrant workers have a higher job turnover rate does not 
change greatly. Urban residents would consider changing job if they found better 
employment opportunity. By contrast, the frequent job turnover experienced by migrant 
workers may be associated with their rural registration status. Therefore, people with 
different registration status in the same labour market have different concerns regarding 
job turnover.  
Given the impact of the household registration status on job turnover, Zhang (2010) 
compares job turnover among temporary migrant workers, permanent migrant workers 
and local urban residents by using the Cox survival analysis to examine the employment 
and unemployment durations experienced by them. The term “temporary migrant 
worker” refers to those who have not obtained the local registration status in their 
working city, while permanent migrants have. The results reveal that temporary migrant 
workers have longer employment duration and shorter unemployment duration than 
permanent migrant workers and urban residents, which suggests that temporary migrant 
workers experience less job turnover. Institutional barriers associated with registration 
status have led to costly job turnover for temporary migrant workers, which also make 
them less competitive in the urban labour market.  
Overall, the above studies imply that the household registration system creates 
institutional discrimination in the Chinese labour market. People with different types of 
registration may have different job turnover rates and also different concerns about job 
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turnover. Therefore, the type of registration should be an important factor to be 
considered when studying job turnover in China. 
In addition, gender differences in job turnover have also been found in the Chinese 
literature. Cao and Hu (2007) argue that gender differences in job turnover are not only 
as a result of Chinese labour market transition, but also due to family reasons. Data 
from the 1997 Chinese Coastal Survey classifies the reasons for job turnover as 
career-oriented job change, family-oriented job change, reassignment and involuntary 
job termination. The competing risks model results reveal that married women are less 
likely to experience career-oriented job turnover but have a higher propensity to 
experience family-oriented job change and involuntary job termination, which suggests 
that they do not sufficiently take advantage of opportunities in the labour market but pay 
more attention to their family role. However, a limitation of Cao and Hu’s (2007) study 
is that they exclude rural residents from the sample. It might be interesting to compare 
job turnover motivations of rural and urban residents.  
Using data from the 2008 China General Social Survey, Li (2013) examines the 
relationship between the ownership of a company and job turnover in China. To be 
specific, his discrete-time survival analysis results reveal that the non-state sector and 
informally employed employees have a higher hazard of job turnover than state sector 
and formally employed employees, suggesting that the development of the non-state 
sector in China is associated with the creation of informal employment opportunities. In 
terms of the pattern of job turnover, Li (2013) finds that job turnover is most likely to 
occur from non-state to non-state sector or from state to non-state sector, which implies 
that there are barriers for the non-state to state job turnover. However, this study does 
not consider the impact of the registration status on job turnover within or between 
sectors. In addition, the unobserved heterogeneity in the multiple spells duration data is 
only corrected for by reporting robust standard error in the analysis, which is a 
weakness of Li’s (2013) methodology.  
2.2.3 Summary 
Job turnover studies between western countries and China show differences as well 
as similarities. In terms of differences, western countries tend to study job turnover from 
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the human capital perspective and to examine the impact of insurance on job turnover. 
By contrast, job turnover in China is associated with reforms in the state-owned 
enterprises since the 1990s. Meanwhile, urban and rural residents may have different 
concerns about job turnover. However, both studies in western countries and China have 
found gender differences in job turnover. Generally, females experience more job 
turnover than males. In terms of methodology, survival analysis is applied to examining 
job turnover in some of the studies. To be specific, the competing risks model is applied 
to compare different job turnover outcomes while continuous-time survival analysis is 
used to estimate employment duration. Discrete-time survival analysis is also used 
when detailed employment records are available. Therefore, the literature review 
justifies the point that, when studying job turnover in China, it is necessary to control 
for gender and type of household registration in the analysis.  
2.3 Data and Methodology 
In this section, data employed in this chapter, and the discrete-time survival 
analysis methodology, are introduced. Firstly, the reason for employing discrete-time 
survival analysis will be explained followed by a formal presentation of the model. 
Covariates used in the model are defined in the latter part of this section.  
Data employed in this chapter are from the 2008 China General Social Survey 
(CGSS), which is a cross-sectional survey conducted by the National Survey Research 
Center of the Renmin University of China. The aim of the CGSS is to investigate the 
situation of employment and living condition of people from 28 provinces in China 
since the 1978 policy of reform and opening up. The 2008 CGSS randomly sampled 
individuals from 100 cities and counties in China. Then it further selected 600 urban 
communities and rural villages among these cities and counties. Finally, 6,000 
individuals were interviewed in the original sample.  
The questionnaire of the 2008 CGSS has a section asking for details related to the 
employment histories of respondents. To be specific, the questionnaire asks each 
respondent to provide detailed information on a work unit in which the respondent has 
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ever or currently been employed, including the start and end year of each job and some 
other information, such as ownership, type of contract and training record when 
employed in this work unit. The maximum number of employment records a respondent 
could provide is 10. However, the actual highest number of records is 8 in the dataset. 
As the objective of this chapter is to investigate the employment situation after the 1978 
policy of reform and opening up in China, the study time is set between 1978 and 2008.  
Discrete-time survival analysis will be used to analyse the data in this chapter. 
There are two reasons to explain why it is the discrete-time rather than continuous-time 
in survival analysis. Firstly, discrete-time data are common in social science. For the 
case of the 2008 CGSS, the start and end times of each job are only recorded in year 
while specific month or date are unknown. Therefore, job completion is recorded as a 
discrete process. However, Allison (1982) suggests that if the time interval is 
approximately the same as the average spell or sufficiently small, even data which are in 
discrete format, continuous-time survival analysis may still be applicable. In terms of 
the 2008 CGSS, the time interval is one year and the average completed employment 
spell is 6.18 years. Therefore, the treatment suggested by Allison (1982) does not make 
sense for this dataset. This gives another reason to use discrete-time survival analysis. 
The term, analysis time, is used to represent the time scale which starts from 1 at a one 
year time interval.  
Most of the techniques for survival analysis are based on single spell survival data. 
However, as some respondents may have multiple employment records, the data in this 
chapter are multiple spells survival data. Therefore, some transformations should be 
undertaken before introducing the discrete-time survival analysis. The original data are 
recorded as one row per respondent, so it must be firstly reshaped into one row per 
employment record. After reshaping the data, either single or multiple employment 
records are created for each respondent.  
Nonparametric analysis is introduced before presenting the discrete-time survival 
analysis methodology. In it, dependence among different records under the same 
respondent is not considered (Allison, 1982). Nonparametric analysis does not make 
any assumption about the functional form of the hazard function, it is a descriptive 
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analysis. One widely used nonparametric analysis is the Kaplan-Meier survival 
estimation (Kaplan and Meier, 1958). Kaplan-Meier is used to estimate the survival 
function, S(t), which is the product probability of survival at the end of the jth time 
interval. Equation 2-1 gives the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate function, where nj is the 
number of observations at the beginning of the time interval j and dj is the number of 
observations completed at the end of time interval j. The estimated Kaplan-Meier 
survival function is reported graphically to show the product of the survival probability 
at each time interval.  
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For the discrete-time survival analysis, the dependent variable should be a binary 
variable. To estimate a binary dependent variable duration model, a complementary 
log-log model is chosen for two reasons. On the one hand, a complementary log-log 
model is suitable for estimating a model when a dependent variable has a significant 
proportion of either 0 or 1 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In the dataset of this chapter, 0 
accounts for a significant proportion of the dependent variable because job turnover 
may only occur at time j. Therefore, 0 is given to represent the continuous status of that 
job for other j-1 time intervals. On the other hand, the proportional hazard assumption is 
widely applied in the continuous-time survival analysis, which means that the hazard 
given covariates is proportionate in the baseline hazard. In the discrete-time framework, 
only the complementary log-log model can satisfy this assumption, so it is a 
discrete-time proportional hazard model (Jenkins, 1995). Therefore, for grouped data, 
the complementary log-log model gives consistent estimation results as in the 
continuous-time survival model (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978).  
The derivation of the complementary log-log model starts from the definition of 
the continuous-time hazard function. In continuous-time survival analysis, the hazard is 
assumed to be proportional (equation 2-2),  
              )exp()()|( '0 ijij xzhxzh                        (2-2) 
where h(z|xij) is the continuous-time hazard function for subject i in cluster j at time z 
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and h0(z) is the baseline hazard function when all covariates xij are equal to zero.  
When applying the proportional hazard assumption to survival function, it gives 
equation 2-3 
                 )exp(0
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where Zij is the continuous survival time for subject i in cluster j and S0(z) is the baseline 
survival function.  
As it is grouped data, only integer values Tij=t are observed for the time interval 
(zt-1, zt), so the discrete-time hazard is the probability that an event occurs at time zt 
conditional on not having occurred before time zt-1 (equation 2-4) 
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Substituting equation 2-3 to equation 2-4, it gives equation 2-5 
               )exp(
10
0
1
'})(
)({)|(
)|(1 ijx
t
t
ijt
ijt
tij zS
zS
xzS
xzS
h 

                (2-5) 
Taking the natural logarithm to both sides, equation 2-5 becomes equation 2-6 
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A similar process can be undertaken for the duration interval specific parameter, 
 0 1 0ln ln ( ) ln ( )t tS z S z  . Equation 2-6 is a linear function. This duration interval specific 
parameter is assumed to be a cubic polynomial. This assumption is made based on the 
facts that most of new jobs end early and the probability of a job ending declines with 
tenure (Farber, 1999). Therefore, it is sensible to assume that when other covariates are 
not controlled for in the analysis, the probability of job turnover should decline first and 
then increase with duration. Equation 2-6 transforms into equation 2-7,    
               ijijijijtij xseqseqseqh '33322211)}1ln(ln{             (2-7) 
and seqpij represents the time sequence of each employment spell.  
Equation 2-7 is suitable to estimate a single spell duration model. However, the 
survival data in this chapter are multiple spells data. To accommodate dependence 
among different employment records of the same respondent, it is necessary to control 
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for unobserved heterogeneity after adding covariates to the baseline hazard function. 
One simple method to erase the correlated errors and unobserved factors is to cluster 
respondents and then to report robust standard errors (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012; 
Kovacevic and Roberts, 2007). 
Another method to control for unobserved heterogeneity is to include a random 
intercept ζj in equation 2-7 for respondent j (equation 2-8).  
         jijijijijtij xseqseqseqh   '33322211)}1ln(ln{         (2-8) 
where ζj～N(0,ψ) is normally distributed with zero mean and finite variance9. This 
method for controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is employed in this chapter. If the 
null hypothesis of the estimated residual correlation among the latent responses for 
employment records of the same respondent is equal to zero, it cannot be rejected (rho 
in the output), then unobserved heterogeneity becomes insignificant. The standard 
deviation of heterogeneity variance is also reported in the output (sigma_u).  
Employment durations are defined as the difference between the end year of a job 
and the start year. For those who started and ended a job in the same year, the 
employment duration is set to one year. After expanding the data by employment 
duration, a person-period dataset is created. A binary job turnover indicator is generated 
to show whether job turnover occurs in a particular year. It takes the value 1 if the job is 
completed at a given year, and takes the value of 0 if the job is continuous or censored 
at the end of the study time. This job turnover indicator acts as the dependent variable in 
the discrete-time survival model. The advantages of using person-period data to 
undertake discrete-time survival analysis are that, firstly, it can show whether the 
potential event happens in a particular year. Secondly, both censored and uncensored 
information can be appropriately recorded. Finally, the discrete-time survival analysis is 
able to incorporate time-varying covariates in the analysis (Singer and Willett, 1993). 
The explanatory variables can be divided into two groups. One group is the 
demographic variables. Current type of household registration is used to distinguish 
                                                        
9 The Gamma distribution is widely applied to error terms in the discrete-time proportional hazard model, but 
Ondrich and Rhody (1999) suggest that it is complicated to calculate a Gamma distribution model with multiple 
spells. Therefore, the error term here is specified as the normal distribution. 
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whether the respondents are registered in urban or rural areas. In this chapter, people 
registered in urban areas are defined as urban residents while those registered in rural 
areas are rural residents10. The working age is set between 16 and 60 for both males and 
females11. Cohabiting, divorced and widowed are regarded as single while other 
situations are married12. Party membership represents those who joined the Communist 
Party of China, which is the leading party in China. Educational level represents the 
highest educational level obtained whilst in that job. The first education category is 
compulsory education, which includes primary school and junior high school and acts 
as the reference category. The second education category includes senior high school 
and relevant vocational technical education. The third education category is higher 
education, covering undergraduate to postgraduate levels. The final education category 
includes non-degree qualifications, such as MBA, advanced training and Communist 
Party school training. All these demographic variables except gender are time-varying.  
The other group of explanatory variables is job-related. Whether the work unit is 
the public economy is used to represent the ownership of the work unit. To be specific, 
the public economy comprises state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises 
while non-public economy includes private enterprises, foreign invested enterprises and 
jointly invested enterprises. Additionally, a dummy variable is created to represent 
whether a respondent signed a labour contract with the employer when employed in that 
work unit. Employees may receive training during their employment. The conventional 
human capital perspective classifies training as general training and specific training. 
However, as data in this chapter does not provide such detailed classification, only 
training from either external or internal sources can be defined. Internal training refers 
to training from the work unit itself, while external training may be received from either 
                                                        
10 The definition does not concern the actual place of living.  
11 Retirement age in China differs between males and females, set at 60 for males, 55 for females with leadership and 
50 for ordinary female employees. However, in this chapter, the working age is set at the same interval for both males 
and females. 
12 In most of the studies, cohabiting is regarded as married. However, marital status is a time-varying variable in the 
analysis and the 2008 CGSS does not provide information on the start year of cohabiting, which means it cannot 
show the change of cohabiting status in the dataset. Therefore, cohabiting is treated as unmarried in this chapter.  
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government or a third-party organisation. No training is set as the reference category. 
The social insurance dummy equals 1 if a respondent has any pension insurance, health 
insurance or unemployment insurance. All job-related variables are time-constant, 
which means the situation is constant within an employment record but it may vary 
among different records under the same respondent.  
In the parametric analysis part, a model without controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity is estimated in comparison to a model with such a control first. Then 
gender sub-samples and type of registration sub-samples are estimated before they are 
further decomposed to sub-samples of urban males, urban females, rural males and rural 
females. Two points should be clarified before presenting results. Firstly, although 
migrant workers can be identified from the sample based on their registration status and 
living place, this chapter does not study job turnover of migrant workers independently. 
Secondly, the registration status is a time-varying variable, which means the registration 
status may change either at the time when changing the job or during an employment 
period. The problem in the latter case is that an employment record would be 
categorised into different sub-samples. To avoid this, this chapter uses the registration 
status at the beginning of each job to categorise sub-samples. Even after this treatment 
is made, the same respondent may appear in different sub-samples. 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
In this section, descriptive statistics of the data and nonparametric analysis results 
are presented first followed by parametric analysis results.  
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
2,134 respondents comprise the sample of this study, of which 50.09% were males. 
The employment status of these respondents could be any of the following: employed, 
self-employed or farming. As a respondent’s registration status may change during the 
entire employment period, 72.4% of respondents reported being urban registered in 
2008. Table 2-1 illustrates the tabulation of the number of job turnovers respondents had 
experienced. 39.41% of the respondents had never experienced job turnover while 
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44.89% of the respondents had experienced job turnover once. The average number of 
job turnover was 0.82, with a maximum at 7.  
Table 2-1 Number of job turnover 
Num. of turnover Freq. Percent
0 841 39.41 
1 958 44.89 
2 257 12.04 
3 48 2.25 
4 20 0.94 
5 7 0.33 
6 2 0.09 
7 2 0.05 
Total 2,134 100.00 
Mean num. of turnover 0.8201 
Table 2-2 presents at summary of the descriptive statistics. Due to the time-varying 
characteristics of some variables and multiple employment records for some 
respondents, columns 1 to 5 report the mean value at the beginning of the first job (this 
might also be the only job for a respondent). For time-varying variables, mean values at 
2008 from the overall sample are also reported for comparison13. In column 1, the 
average age when respondents started their first job was 21.79 and 61.48% of 
respondents started working after marriage. By contrast, the mean age for the survey 
year is 35.91. In addition, it can be seen from column 1 and 6 that the proportions in 
education categories varied14. For example, the proportions of respondents having a 
university education increased from 21.65% to 26.48%. In terms of work-related 
variables in column 1 of Table 2-2, 59.93% of the respondents’ first job was in the 
public sector. 51.08% of the respondents had contracted job while 64.9% of the 
respondents’ first job had no training. Meanwhile, 54.83% of the respondents’ first job 
                                                        
13 Table 2-2 does not report descriptive statistics of time-constant variables at 2008. The reason is some 
respondents are unemployed (for example, retired) in 2008. They are unable to report employment 
situations. In addition, Table 2-2 does not compare descriptive statistics at 2008 from sub-samples. 
Observations of each sub-sample vary between the beginning of first job and 2008 due to the 
time-varying character of registration status. Therefore, the descriptive statistics of time-varying variables 
at the beginning of first job and at 2008 are incomparable.  
14 38 respondents received education after entering employment.  
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had any of pension insurance, health insurance or unemployment insurance.  
Table 2-2 Summary of descriptive statistics 
  Beginning of first job 2008 
Overall 
 
(1) 
Urban 
Male 
(2) 
Urban 
Female 
(3) 
Rural 
Male 
(4) 
Rural 
female 
(5) 
Overall 
 
(6) 
Demographic              
Age 21.79 21.61 21.42 23.53 21.43 35.91 
Married 0.6148 0.6440 0.6667 0.5443 0.5043 0.7882 
Party membership 0.1007 0.1741 0.0778 0.0721 0.0116 0.1218 
Compulsory education (ref.) 0.3744 0.2304 0.2806 0.6295 0.6638 0.3857 
Senior high school 0.3899 0.4359 0.4500 0.2754 0.2638 0.3477 
University education 0.2165 0.3141 0.2556 0.0656 0.0522 0.2648 
Non-degree qualification 0.0192 0.0196 0.0139 0.0295 0.0203 0.0019 
Work-related             
Public sector 0.5993 0.6885 0.7000 0.4459 0.3275   
Labour contract 0.5108 0.6191 0.6042 0.3279 0.2377   
Internal training 0.3252 0.3626 0.3528 0.2459 0.2551   
External training 0.0258 0.0314 0.0250 0.0361 0.0058   
No Training (ref.) 0.6490 0.6060 0.6222 0.7180 0.7391   
Social insurance 0.5483 0.6885 0.6667 0.2820 0.2261   
Obs. 2,134 764 720 305 345 2,134 
Note: Only age is a continuous variable while others are dummy variables. The minimum age from 
column 1 to 5 is 16 while the maximum age is 60, 55, 53, 60 and 54 respectively. The minimum 
age for column 6 is 18 while the maximum age is 67. 
In terms of a comparison between rural and urban respondents, columns 2 to 5 of 
Table 2-2 shows that urban respondents were better educated than their rural 
counterparts. For example, around 44% of urban respondents had senior high school 
education while around 64% of rural respondents had compulsory education. In addition, 
social insurance participation was significantly higher among urban respondents than 
rural respondents. For example, 68.85% of urban males had social insurance while this 
was only 28.2% for rural males.  
    After reshaping the wide-form dataset into long-form, there are totally 2,987 
employment records or observations in the dataset, which means each row represents 
one or one of employment records of a respondent. In particular, 1,750 of records are 
uncensored and have a complete employment record, with an average duration at 6.18 
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years.  
2.4.2 Nonparametric analysis 
Nonparametric analysis does not make any assumptions about the functional form 
of the hazard, it is a descriptive analysis. Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 present 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimations. A common feature of these figures is that they all 
start from one and monotonically decline to zero, indicating that all the jobs must 
eventually be completed. In Figure 2-1, the left-hand graph illustrates the Kaplan-Meier 
estimates of two sub-samples by gender, aiming to compare gender differences in the 
probability of job turnover. Generally, females have a lower survival probability than 
males, suggesting that females experience more job turnover than males. This gender 
difference in survival probability is not remarkable until the employment duration is 
more than ten years. The right-hand graph in Figure 2-1 compares two sub-samples by 
type of household registration, which illustrates the registration differences in the 
probability of survival. Urban residents have a higher probability of survival, which 
means they have stable jobs and are less likely to change them. In contrast to the gender 
differences, there is a remarkable survival probability difference between urban and 
rural residents, which may imply that urban and rural residents have different job 
turnover probabilities in China.  
 
Figure 2-1 Kaplan-Meier estimates by gender and type of registration 
In addition, Figure 2-2 shows the survival probabilities controlled by gender and 
type of household registration simultaneously. In general, urban males have the highest 
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survival probability, while rural females have the lowest, suggesting that urban males 
have stable jobs compared to other subsamples. This figure shows that different groups 
of people have different behaviours in job turnover. Therefore, it is necessary to control 
for gender and type of household registration simultaneously in the analysis.  
 
Figure 2-2 Kaplan-Meier estimates by gender and registration simultaneously 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimation results support one of the facts stated in Farber’s 
(1999) study that most new jobs end early. Both Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 show that 
survival probabilities decline fastest at the beginning of several years but the trends 
seem to moderate with the increase in employment spells, implying that most Chinese 
employees experience job turnover in their early employment and that job turnover 
probabilities decreases with job tenure.  
2.4.3 Parametric analysis 
Parametric analysis results are presented in this subsection. Table 2-3 presents the 
discrete-time survival analysis results for the overall sample. Hazard ratios are reported 
in the table, which are exponents of the coefficients. To be specific, the first column 
presents the results without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the analysis in 
comparison to the results in the second column which has such a control. The 
observations in this table are not the number of respondents, but the number of rows 
after the dataset expanded into person-period format15. The likelihood ratio test for 
                                                        
15 This explanation applies to other discrete-time survival analysis result tables in this chapter. 
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unobserved heterogeneity reported in the second column is significant at 1% statistics 
level. Therefore, the test result shows that unobserved factors among different 
employment records under the same respondent do exist. 
Table 2-3 Discrete-time survival analysis results on the overall sample 
  1 2 
  Hazard Std. Err Hazard Std. Err 
Baseline         
Sequence  0.9013*** 0.0258 1.0789** 0.0390 
Sequence squared 1.0061** 0.0028 0.9962 0.0031 
Sequence cubed 0.9999 0.0001 1.0001* 0.0001 
Demographic          
Male 0.7997*** 0.0393 0.7938*** 0.0544 
Urban residents 0.5609*** 0.0325 0.4356*** 0.0372 
Age 0.9440*** 0.0051 0.9274*** 0.0067 
Age squared 1.0008*** 0.0001 1.0010*** 0.0002 
Married 0.8800** 0.0528 0.8816* 0.0631 
Party membership 0.6684*** 0.0765 0.5444*** 0.0766 
Senior high school 1.0247 0.0584 1.0565 0.0847 
University education 1.3163*** 0.1077 1.4219*** 0.1530 
Non-degree qualification 1.6530*** 0.2106 1.7760*** 0.3123 
Work-related         
Public sector 0.7457*** 0.0399 0.6954*** 0.0489 
Labour contract 0.7698*** 0.0489 0.6899*** 0.0562 
Internal training 0.9641 0.0561 0.9374 0.0702 
External training 0.7587 0.1316 0.6240** 0.1389 
Social insurance 0.4358*** 0.0300 0.3445*** 0.0312 
sigma-u 0.8781 0.0647 
rho  0.3191 0.0323 
Likelihood ratio test:chibar2 113.58*** 
Obs. 22,957 
*** 1%  ** 5%  * 10% 
The cubic baseline hazard function serves as the intercept term of the model. It can 
be seen that when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, this duration dependence 
switches from being negative (column 1) to positive (column 2). Figure 2-3 plots the 
estimated hazard of the cubic baseline. Consistent with the finding from the 
nonparametric analysis, this figure also shows that the probability of job turnover is 
high at the beginning of the job but declines with job tenure. Meanwhile, this result may 
imply that people are more likely to leave jobs early for unobserved reasons. In addition, 
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Table 2-3 shows that statistically significant hazard ratios are underestimated when 
unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for in the analysis. The estimated residual 
correlation among the latent responses for the records of the same respondent is 0.3191 
(rho in output).  
 
Figure 2-3 Plotted hazard of cubic baseline 
 
Figure 2-4 Quadratic term of age 
In the second column of Table 2-3, when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled 
for, the hazard ratios of both gender and urban registration status are significant at 1% 
statistics level. To be specific, when holding all other covariates constant, being male 
and urban residents have 20.62% and 56.44% lower estimated hazard of job turnover 
than female and rural residents respectively. The quadratic term of age is plotted in 
Figure 2-4. It can be seen that the lowest hazard of job turnover occurs at around 30.  
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Being married and a party member reduce the estimated hazard of job turnover by 
11.84% and 45.56%, respectively. Respondents with university education and 
non-degree qualification experience 42.19% and 77.6% more job turnover respectively 
compared to those who have compulsory education. In terms of work-related covariates, 
employees in the public sector have a 30.46% lower estimated hazard of job turnover 
compared to non-public sector employees. Jobs with a labour contract reduce the 
estimated hazard of job turnover by 31.01%. Meanwhile, respondents who received 
external training have 37.6% lower hazard of job turnover than those who never receive 
training. Jobs with social insurance have 65.55% lower hazard of job turnover.  
Table 2-4 Discrete-time survival analysis results by gender 
  1 2 
  Male Female 
  Hazard Std. Err Hazard Std. Err 
Baseline         
Sequence  1.0952* 0.0596 1.0838* 0.0530 
Sequence squared 0.9939 0.0046 0.9978 0.0041 
Sequence cubed 1.0002 0.0001 1.0001 0.0001 
Demographic          
Urban registration 0.4483*** 0.0567 0.3981*** 0.0484 
Age 0.9155*** 0.0097 0.9234*** 0.0088 
Age squared 1.0012*** 0.0002 1.0010*** 0.0002 
Married 0.6866*** 0.0744 1.1058 0.1094 
Party membership 0.6222*** 0.1066 0.4149*** 0.1130 
Senior high school 1.1561 0.1426 0.9682 0.1046 
University education 1.6205*** 0.2496 1.2513 0.1964 
Non-degree qualification 1.5318 0.3987 2.0266*** 0.5015 
Work-related         
Public sector 0.7841** 0.0828 0.6277*** 0.0605 
Labour contract 0.5524*** 0.0670 0.8605 0.0962 
Internal training 0.8783 0.0992 1.0030 0.1034 
External training 0.6140* 0.1707 0.5882 0.2328 
Social insurance 0.3719*** 0.0493 0.3005*** 0.0382 
sigma_u 0.9487 0.0992 0.8589 0.0887 
rho 0.3536 0.0478 0.3096 0.0441 
Likelihood ratio test: chibar2 59.54*** 62.11*** 
Obs. 11,804 11,153 
*** 1%  ** 5%  * 10% 
Tables 2-4 and 2-5 present the discrete-time survival analysis results by gender and 
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type of registration respectively. In Table 2-4, it can be found that urban males’ hazard 
of job turnover is 55.17% lower than for urban females’, whilst rural males’ hazard of 
job turnover is 60.19% lower than for rural females’. In terms of the quadratic term of 
age between two sub-samples, it can be seen from Figure 2-5 that the lowest hazards 
occur at around 30 for both sub-samples. However, males have a lower hazard of job 
turnover than females at a given age. Being a party member decreases males’ estimated 
hazard of job turnover by 37.78% while it decreases females’ estimated hazard of job 
turnover by 58.51%. In addition, it can be seen from male’s sub-sample in Table 2-4 that 
the estimated hazard of job turnover is 44.76% lower where a labour contract with the 
employer exist. In the female sub-sample, the estimated hazard of job turnover is 
37.23% lower if employed in the public sector. In addition, having social insurance 
decreases the hazard of job turnover for both males and females, at 62.81% and 69.95% 
respectively.  
 
Figure 2-5 Quadratic term of age by gender 
Table 2-5 presents the results when urban and rural residents are estimated 
separately. Urban males’ estimated hazard of job turnover is 18.05% lower than that for 
urban females’, whilst rural males’ estimated hazard of job turnover is 27.23% lower 
compared to rural females. Figure 2-6 plots the quadratic term of age, which shows that 
urban and rural residents have different patterns of job turnover. The hazard of job 
turnover begins to increase after around 30 for urban residents whilst it keeps 
decreasing until around 45 for rural residents. Having social insurance reduces the 
32 
estimated hazard of job turnover by 71.53% for urban residents whilst it reduces the 
hazard of job turnover by 44.7% for rural residents.  
 
Figure 2-6 Quadratic term of age by registration type 
 
Figure 2-7 Quadratic term of age by gender and registration type 
Table 2-6 shows the discrete-time survival analysis results on four sub-samples, 
which are urban males, urban females, rural males and rural females. The likelihood 
ratio tests of four sub-sample models are all statistically significant at 1% level, 
suggesting that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is necessary in the estimation. 
Figure 2-7 plots the quadratic age from four sub-samples. A common feature of these 
figures is that the hazard of job turnover is high at the beginning of a job but it declines 
with age. Meanwhile, the hazards of job turnover are also high when the age approaches 
60, which may imply that people end their jobs due to retirement.  
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Table 2-5 Discrete-time survival analysis results by type of registration 
  1 2 
  Urban Rural 
  Hazard Std. Err Hazard Std. Err
Baseline         
Sequence  1.0726 0.0484 1.1748** 0.0809 
Sequence squared 0.9982 0.0037 0.9891* 0.0065 
Sequence cubed 1.0001 0.0001 1.0003 0.0002 
Demographic          
Male 0.8195** 0.0708 0.7277*** 0.0871 
Age 0.8860*** 0.0092 0.9145*** 0.0107 
Age squared 1.0018*** 0.0002 1.0008*** 0.0003 
Married 0.7745*** 0.0720 1.2622** 0.1473 
Party membership 0.5749*** 0.0918 0.4241*** 0.1378 
Senior high school 1.0214 0.1046 1.1064 0.1483 
University education 1.4590*** 0.1842 1.4647 0.3808 
Non-degree qualification 1.6765** 0.3931 2.0466** 0.5726 
Work-related         
Public sector 0.6270*** 0.0574 0.8643 0.0982 
Labour contract 0.6360*** 0.0653 0.8398 0.1148 
Internal training 0.9089 0.0869 1.0095 0.1276 
External training 0.6466 0.1851 0.5765 0.2146 
Social insurance 0.2847*** 0.0333 0.5530*** 0.0810 
sigma_u 0.8929 0.0878 0.9229 0.1089 
rho 0.3264 0.0433 0.3311 0.0530 
Likelihood ratio test: chibar2 61.29*** 47.29*** 
Obs. 18,708 4,249 
*** 1%  ** 5%  * 10% 
Moreover, Table 2-6 shows that marital status presents different effects on job 
turnover among different sub-samples. Marriage reduces the hazard of job turnover by 
32.37% for urban males, holding all other covariates constant. The conventional view in 
China is that husbands should be responsible for outside work while wives should be 
responsible for domestic work, which means husbands should play the role as bread 
earners in the family and contribute to a significant proportion of household income 
(Chau et al., 2007). Therefore, husbands may try to avoid frequent job changes but 
expect higher earnings from stable jobs. In fact, there is an interactive effect between 
marriage and husbands’ earning (Ahituv and Lerman, 2007). On the one hand, marriage 
encourages husbands to work longer hours and thus accumulate work experience, which
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	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Table 2-6 Discrete-time survival analysis results for sub-samples 
  1 2 3 4 
  Urban males Urban females Rural males Rural females 
  Hazard Std. Err Hazard Std. Err Hazard Std. Err Hazard Std. Err
Baseline                 
Sequence  1.0729 0.0741 1.0920 0.0662 1.1704* 0.1106 1.1906* 0.1266 
Sequence squared 0.9962 0.0057 0.9991 0.0049 0.9881 0.0086 0.9918 0.0110 
Sequence cubed 1.0001 0.0001 1.0000 0.0001 1.0003 0.0002 1.0002 0.0003 
Demographic                  
Age 0.8809*** 0.0127 0.8763*** 0.0130 0.9005*** 0.0152 0.9086*** 0.0156 
Age squared 1.0019*** 0.0003 1.0020*** 0.0003 1.0013*** 0.0004 1.0006 0.0004 
Married 0.6763*** 0.0929 0.9101 0.1186 0.7985 0.1398 1.8789*** 0.3143 
Party membership 0.7002* 0.1345 0.4549*** 0.1349 0.4822** 0.1774 0.2140* 0.1859 
Senior high school 1.1268 0.1712 0.9379 0.1335 1.1697 0.2378 1.0448 0.1967 
University education 1.6748*** 0.2976 1.2870 0.2401 1.5611 0.5516 1.3275 0.5522 
Non-degree qualification 1.3228 0.4280 2.2922** 0.7977 2.0854* 0.9044 1.8236 0.7132 
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Table 2-6 Discrete-time survival analysis results for sub-samples (continued) 
  1 2 3 4 
  Urban males Urban females Rural males Rural females 
  Hazard Std. Err Hazard Std. Err Hazard Std. Err Hazard Std. Err
Work-related                 
Public sector 0.7596** 0.1002 0.5251*** 0.0684 0.8646 0.1469 0.8717 0.1407 
Labour contract 0.5211*** 0.0775 0.7794* 0.1131 0.6729* 0.1366 1.0916 0.2086 
Internal training 0.9428 0.1310 0.8923 0.1205 0.8164 0.1554 1.2533 0.2246 
External training 0.6736 0.2571 0.5736 0.2534 0.5832 0.2415 0.3910 0.4482 
Social insurance 0.2806*** 0.0463 0.2691*** 0.0453 0.7189 0.1535 0.4007*** 0.0854 
sigma_u 0.8467 0.1363 0.9573 0.1182 0.9991 0.1607 0.9271 0.1507 
rho 0.3036 0.0680 0.3578 0.0568 0.3776 0.0756 0.3432 0.0733 
Likelihood ratio test: chibar2 19.71*** 45.37*** 28.80*** 24.95*** 
Obs. 9,443 9,265 2,361 1,888 
*** 1%  ** 5%  * 10% 
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can substantially increase wage rates. On the other hand, the increase in wage rates may 
in turn reduce the probability of divorce and job reallocation. By contrast, the estimated 
result in the third column of Table 2-6 shows that marriage has an insignificant effect on 
job turnover reduction for rural males. This may imply that rural males are the main 
income source in the rural households regardless of their marital status, which is 
consistent with the finding in Zhang and Li (2003).  
However, marriage increases the hazard of job turnover for rural females. To be 
specific, married rural females have 87.89% higher hazard of job turnover than single 
rural females when other covariates remained constant. The results may suggest that 
more household responsibilities are added to rural females, which reduces rural females’ 
working hours and leads to an increase in job turnover (Chang et al., 2011).  
Being a party member has lower hazard of job turnover than non-party members 
(Table 2-6). In particular, the hazards of job turnover are 54.51% lower for urban female 
and 51.78% lower for rural male party members. However, previous studies have found 
that party members are more likely to move into higher positions or better jobs. Party 
members may take the advantage of their social network to find better job opportunities 
and be promoted (Appleton et al., 2009). Therefore, party membership serves the role of 
collecting more information and accessing a wider social network. However, it does not 
necessarily mean the title of party member automatically entitles more political capital 
and economic benefits. Loyalty and political screening are still important for party 
membership recruitment (Bian et al., 2001)16. Only those who are more valuable to the 
political and economic objectives of the party are likely to be party members (Appleton 
et al., 2009).  
    In terms of education, the estimated hazard of job turnover is 67.48% higher for 
urban males with university education compared with compulsory education. Also, 
urban females and rural males with non-degree qualification have higher hazards of job 
turnover. Education can be regarded as an investment in human capital. Therefore, it is 
generally believed that the probability of job turnover is negatively related to education 
                                                        
16 In Bian et al. (2001), detailed party recruitment process is described. 
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(Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981). However, Burgess and Rees (1998) find that 
post-compulsory educated British people have a shorter employment tenure than other 
qualifications, which means they are more likely to experience job turnover.  
In terms of work-related covariates in Table 2-6, when holding all other covariates 
constant, urban males and urban females have 24.04% and 47.49% lower hazards of job 
turnover respectively if employed in the public sector. According to national statistics, 
although the central government set at a policy to develop a multiple ownership 
economy in 1984, the proportion of labour force employed in the public economy 
decreased from 99.6% in 1984 to 58.6% in 200817, which still accounting for a 
significant proportion in the whole economy.  
The non-public sector underwent high speed development after the 1978 policy of 
reform and opening up, which diversified the economy in China and encouraged some 
state-owned enterprises to be more competitive. The non-public sector makes 
significant contribution to absorbing labour in China. In particular, the non-public sector 
provides more job opportunities when the state-owned enterprises reduced their 
employment scale (Dong and Xu, 2009) and it is currently taking more responsibility 
for providing employment opportunities.  
It is not difficult to understand that employment in the non-public sector is unstable. 
On the one hand, after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial 
crisis, some export-oriented factories were closed due to low demand globally (Xu, 
2010). Female workers employed in these factories may have a greater perception of 
insecurity and be more likely to lose jobs than their male counterparts (Dong and 
Pandey, 2012). Therefore, employment stability in some non-public firms is associated 
with the economic environment. On the other hand, the non-public sector requires 
employees to have more specific human capital and determines wages by productivity 
(Appleton et al., 2005). As most of the non-public enterprises are cost-oriented 
enterprises, they may prefer to recruit efficient and highly skilled employees so that 
enterprises can employ fewer people in order to save costs. These less productive 
                                                        
17 Source: 2009 China Labour Statistical Yearbook.  
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workers are more likely to experience job loss when there is a labour demand decline 
(Farber, 1993). However, females may also sacrifice time for specific human capital 
training to child care and domestic work, making them less competitive in non-public 
employment. 
Labour contracts specify the responsibilities and obligations of both employees and 
employers, protecting the rights of both sides. In Table 2-6, urban males with a labour 
contract have a 47.89% lower hazard of job turnover, holding all other covariates 
constant.  
Training received from jobs can be regarded as a post-school human capital 
investment. The implication of Cavanaugh and Noe’s (1999) research is that different 
sources of training may have different functions. On the one hand, internal training may 
provide opportunities for employers to assess employees’ development. On the other 
hand, employees may use external training as ways of updating their skills, which is 
necessary as a result of the changing labour market. However, training does not seem to 
be a significant motivating factor on job turnover among the sub-samples considered in 
this chapter. Only the hazard ratio of external training in the overall sample is 
statistically significant at 5% level (Table 2-3, column 2). To be specific, the hazard of 
job turnover decreases by 37.6% for jobs with external training compared with jobs 
where no training is offered when holding all other covariates constant. This decrease 
effect of external training on job turnover can be explained by the commitment 
perspective of human capital investment. Firstly, external training may contribute to 
employees’ commitment to organisations as it may provide professional skills for 
employees’ career development and increase productivity. If the external training is 
firm-specific, the effect on job turnover reduction is more significant (Munasinghe and 
O'Flaherty, 2005). Secondly, employees are more likely to choose firms that offer 
attractive and practical training opportunities (Green et al. 2000). For these employees, 
the more training opportunities offered, the more likely they will choose to stay. Longer 
employment spells can be regarded as a higher commitment to organisations. Thirdly, 
training involves firms making investment in their workforce. For employees who 
receive external training funded by employers, they may believe that they are playing 
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key roles in the organisation and are valued by their employers (Sieben, 2007). In 
particular, for collectivist organisations in China, employees may have a sense of value 
and security if employers invest in their career development, leading to a decline in job 
search intentions.  
In general, jobs with social insurance decrease the hazard of job turnover, at 
71.94% for urban males, 73.09% for urban females and 59.93% for rural females. All 
these estimation results on insurance covariates are consistent with the findings in Ellis 
and Ma (2011), which show that insurance leads to a lower probability of job turnover. 
The results can also be explained by the search theory, which states that workers always 
try to maximise utility in the job search process as well as expecting benefits and 
welfare from jobs (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2009). However, Mealli and Pudney (1996) 
suggest that insured jobs can attract employees who prefer stable jobs. On the other 
hand, those who prefer to change jobs frequently may take insurance as a shelter to 
protect them against any risks associated with job loss. Therefore, the results on 
insurance should be interpreted cautiously as risk aversion may be another factor 
determining both insurance participation and job turnover. In addition, employees may 
suffer from insurance funding loss if they change jobs. Migrant workers in particular, 
whose insurance may not be transferable when they change employers, may try to avoid 
job turnover in order to maintain their insurance status (Xu et al., 2011).  
2.5 Conclusions 
Job turnover became common when China entered into the market economy. This 
chapter uses discrete-time survival analysis to examine which factors motivate job 
turnover between urban and rural residents. Both non-parametric and parametric 
analysis show that most Chinese employees experience job turnover in their early 
employment and the probability of job turnover declines with job tenure, which is 
consistent with the finding by Farber (1999). In addition, married urban males have a 
lower hazard of job turnover while married rural females have a higher hazard. Urban 
males who have university education have a higher hazard of job turnover.  
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In terms of work-related variables, urban workers employed in the public sector 
have a lower hazard of job turnover than urban workers employed in the non-public 
sector. However, this finding does not apply to rural workers. Employees with social 
insurance have a lower hazard of job turnover. This conclusion can be found among 
urban males, urban females and rural females.  
Since job turnover is common in the Chinese labour market, it may be necessary to 
ask whether this is a good or bad thing. On the one hand, job turnover creates mobility 
in the labour market, making the economy more flexible to adjust to the changing 
environment. More importantly, job turnover may promote individual’s well-being and 
enable a better job match (Wilk and Sackett, 1996). On the other hand, job turnover is 
costly for both employers and employees. For employers, they lose investment in 
human capital, particularly in firm-specific investment, if frequent job turnover occurs 
among their employees. Therefore, firms may have less incentive to make such an 
investment. For employees, the consequences of frequent job turnover are short 
employment length and high emotional strain, which may add to job insecurity 
perceptions of employees (Swaen et al., 2002). 
An implication of this chapter is how employers can design better jobs. In 
particular, insurance should be purchased for employees if employers want to maintain 
a long-term relationship. In addition, the labour contract may reinforce a stable 
employment relationship and training may improve employee’ commitment to 
organisations.  
Another policy implication regards the household registration system reform. This 
system differentiates people from receiving equal benefits and classifies people into 
urban and rural residents. Therefore, the objective of household registration system 
reform should not only to be return the right of free mobility to rural registered people, 
but more importantly to entitle equal rights and benefits to both urban and rural 
residents. In addition, the function of the household registration system should return to 
the role of residential management rather than acting as an institutional barrier.  
A limitation of the dataset used in this chapter is that the occupation of each 
employment record is unavailable, which makes it impossible to know what 
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respondents are actually doing in each job and whether job turnover is associated with a 
change in occupation. This chapter is a general introduction to the Chinese labour 
market and points out the influence of the household registration system. 
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Chapter Three 
How Much is Compensated? Wages and Employment Benefits in 
China 
3.1 Introduction 
Since 2012, there has been a debate on whether employment benefits should be 
reduced as the Chinese government at all levels are trying to cut unnecessary and 
excessive expenses such as travel subsidies and hospitability. For example, moon cakes 
which used to be given to employees at mid-autumn festival are now cancelled18. 
Employees in the public sector complain about this and argue that austerity should not 
necessarily mean cancelling benefits. Therefore, in July 2014, the All-China Federation 
of Labour announced a guideline on offering benefits and stated that benefits should be 
guaranteed for employees.  
Motivated by this debate, it is interesting to examine the relationship between 
wages and employment benefits in China. To be specific, whether there is a trade-off 
between wages and benefits. If the answer is yes, when there is a reduction in benefits, 
wages should be increased in order to keep employees’ welfare unchanged. 
Economically, this can be explained by the theory of compensating wage differentials 
proposed by Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) stated that “The 
whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and 
stock must, in the same neighborhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tending 
to equality”. His hypothesis suggests that wages should be affected by the “advantages 
and disadvantages” of the job, which refers to various aspects of work characteristics. 
An application of this hypothesis in the literature is that when the place of work 
involves risk, higher wages should be paid to compensate the dangerous working 
environment. Meanwhile, this hypothesis can be extended to examine the substitution 
                                                        
18 Xinhua News. Retrieved on 8 November, 2015 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2014-09/09/c_111239 
9679.htm 
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between wages and fringe benefits (Rosen, 1986). These fringe benefits may include 
various aspects such as lunches and social security contributions. Accordingly, this 
chapter intends to examine the compensating wage differentials hypothesis from a 
benefits perspective.  
Historically, low wages but generous fringe benefits were paid to employees in 
China. The low wages could kept prices low and maintained price stability as well as 
preventing rural people from migrating into urban areas (Cooke, 2004). According to 
the statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, both the average annual 
nominal wages and annual real wages of those individuals employed in the urban labour 
market were low compared with those after 2000 (Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2). In 
particular, the average annual real wages increased by approximately 15 times as a 
result of productivity growth, from 615 yuan in 1978 to 9452.12 yuan in 201419. 
However, both the wage system and employment benefits have experienced some 
changes. Initially, a Soviet-style wage system was established in China in 1956. The 
most significant feature of this was that all employees were paid based on a wage 
grading system, which is the basic part of the wage that is determined by different 
grades based on the employee’s professional skills (Zhong, 2011). The disadvantages of 
this wage grading system are obvious. On the one hand, rigid and inflexible wages were 
unable to effectively motivate employees or reflect differences in performance (Chow, 
1992). On the other hand, since wages were compressed and inflexible, returns to 
education were insignificant and barely differentiated amongst employees (Zhong, 
2011). Therefore, a structural wage system was introduced in 1985 to replace this wage 
grading system. The wages in the new system includes a basic wage, positional pay, 
seniority pay and a bonus (Chow, 1992; Cooke, 2004). As in the wage grading system, 
the basic wage was set by the central government and fixed. The bonus, as a floating 
part of pay, was first introduced into the wage system to reward performance and to 
differentiate wages. Therefore, this structural wage system put more emphasis on 
responsibility and performance than on position (Cooke, 2004).  
                                                        
19 Real wages=nominal wage/CPI, setting 1978 as the base year.  
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Figure 3-1 Average annual nominal wages of employed 
 
Figure 3-2 Average annual real wages of employed 
However, generous in-kind subsidies were provided to employees before the 1990s 
(Li and Zhao, 2006). The range of in-kind subsidies varies from food such as meat and 
grains to hygiene products such as soap and toothpaste. The advantages of providing 
in-kind benefits are, on the one hand, it was an effective way to avoid the strict wage 
constraints set by the central government in order to compensate for low wages (Li and 
Zhao, 2006). On the other hand, as the market mechanism did not work well in the 
planned economy before the 1990s, all products were rationed by the central 
government and purchasing was completed with coupons. Therefore, providing in-kind 
subsidies could improve the availability of goods and avoid shortages (Rein et al., 1997). 
In addition, housing could be regarded as an important in-kind benefit in the public 
sector before the 1990s, which was free for employees (Wu, 1996).  
Since the 1990s, the market-oriented economic reforms have accelerated the 
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changes in Chinese society as well as its labour market. For example, millions of 
workers in the state-owned enterprises were laid-off and jobs were not automatically 
allocated to university graduates in the late 1990s. These changes saw the termination of 
the “iron rice bowl” or life-long employment in China. This economic transformation 
also changed the wage system from a centrally-planned system to a market-oriented one 
(Meng et al., 2013). A basic wage plus a bonus is a common type of wage structure 
among non-public enterprises. By contrast, in the public sector, the wage payment was 
divided into a fixed payment and a flexible payment. Particularly, the latter part is 
closely related to the organisation and individual performance (Cooke, 2004).  
Various employment welfare and benefits continuing to be paid to employees but 
the components of benefits are different in the market-oriented economy. For example, 
housing reform, began in 1988, has transformed the centrally planned housing system to 
a market-oriented housing industry. Since then, enterprise-owned houses were either 
resold to sitting tenants at discounted prices or rented to employees at very cheap prices 
instead of free provision (Huang, 2003). However, it was not until 1998 that both public 
and private firms were not allowed to provide subsidised housing. Alternatively, the 
housing construction fund should be converted into monetary subsidies such as a 
housing fund to encourage employees to purchase houses themselves.  
Another significant change in benefits is the provision of social insurances. Under 
the system of life-long employment, a Labour Insurance Scheme was implemented in 
1951 among employees in the public sector, which mainly covered health, work injury 
and pension insurance (Rickne, 2013). These social insurances were financed by each 
enterprise independently and hence employees were not responsible for payment 
contributions, which had a role as income redistribution to some extent (He and Sato, 
2013). However, it was insufficient for social insurance to cover public sector 
employees only. With the development of a non-public sector in the market economy, an 
employer-based social insurance system was established in the late 1990s to cover all 
employees in urban China (Giles et al., 2013)20, which is operated and managed socially 
                                                        
20 The social insurance system covers employed, self-employed and informally employed people in urban China. For 
details of the social insurance system introduction and how each component works, see Giles et al. (2013).  
46 
rather than by enterprises themselves. There are five types of insurance in this system, 
including pension, unemployment, health, work injury and maternity (females only) 
insurance. Both employers and employees need to financially contribute to insurance 
payments except work injury and maternity insurances21. In addition, with a housing 
fund, these five social insurances and one fund have become an important part of 
employment benefits.  
Overall, the above changes in the wage system suggest that the wage payment is 
shifting from being rigid towards more flexibility. Wages are always paid with different 
employment benefits in the Chinese urban labour market. However, the quick growth of 
the non-public sector and export-oriented economy since the 1990s not only brought 
diversity to the urban labour market, but also attracted a large amount of rural people 
into cities to work and live (Meng et al., 2013), forming at population of migrant 
workers. They are engaged in manufacturing, construction and service work in cities, 
making a great contribution to China’s economy development. Therefore, when 
examining the compensating wage differentials hypothesis, migrant workers should also 
be considered as they are an integral part of the workforce in the urban Chinese labour 
market. However, they may have different expectations and concerns about employment 
benefits due to their rural registration status. For example, as a housing benefit, shared 
dormitories are commonly provided to migrant workers (Lin and Zhu, 2010). Moreover, 
as a result of their rural registration status, migrant workers are excluded from many 
economy housing programmes, such as public rental houses (Li and Zhang, 2011; Lin 
and Zhu, 2010). Therefore, shared dormitories are expected by migrant workers and 
provided as an employment benefit. In addition, although migrant workers employed in 
urban areas are encouraged to participate in social insurance, a lack of specific policy 
guidance may result in at low participation rate. Meanwhile, pension and health 
insurances’ funding accumulations may not be transferable when migrant workers move 
to other cities or return to rural hometowns, which may reduce their incentives to 
participate in social insurance as well (Giles et al., 2013). 
                                                        
21 Only employers are required to financially contribute to work injury and maternity insurances.  
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According to the background given above, it can be concluded that Chinese firms 
have the practice of paying both wages and providing employment benefits to 
employees. In particular, generous benefits were paid to employees to compensate for 
low wages before the 1990s, which is consistent with the compensating wage 
differential hypothesis. However, after the 1990s, benefits were still paid to employees 
even if there was an increase in wages. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to 
examine whether benefits still play a compensating role to wages in China, meaning 
whether there is a trade-off between wages and benefits based on the compensating 
wage differentials hypothesis.  
The 2009 Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) dataset provides information 
on wages and benefits of both urban and migrant respondents. It can be employed to 
examine the trade-off between wages and a range of benefits, which includes bonuses, 
housing subsidies and social insurances. Bonuses are an important source of income to 
supplement low wages in China, particularly in sectors such as government where 
wages are controlled or companies where low basic wages are set (Hu et al., 1988; 
Cooke, 2004). Although the payment of housing subsidies is declining among urban 
people, it is still an important benefit for migrant workers. By contrast, social insurances 
are required to provide to all employees. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether 
these benefits are acting as a compensating role to wages.  
The organisation of this chapter is as follow, the next section presents a literature 
review for this topic. Section 3.3 gives the data and methodology while Section 3.4 
shows the results and the discussion for the results. Concluding remarks will be 
presented in the Section 3.5.  
3.2 Literature Review 
This section presents a summary of studies on compensating wage differentials.  
3.2.1 Fundamental studies 
Rosen (1974) develops Smith’s (1776) idea and proposes a hedonic wage model, 
which is an application of the compensating wage differentials hypothesis. In his model, 
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equilibrium is met when an employee’s indifference curve on the probability of risk and 
wage is at a tangent with employer’s isoprofit curve which contains various 
combinations of risk and wages. The risk is positively related to the wages while being 
negatively related to employer’s profit. Therefore, the hedonic wage model suggests that 
higher risk is associated with higher wages. The employers’ goal is to find the optimal 
wage level which compensates for the risk involved in jobs.   
However, empirical studies on compensating wage differentials present 
inconsistent results. Both Brown (1980) and Duncan and Holmlund (1983) emphasise 
the importance of using panel data to examine the wage compensating effect of working 
conditions. They argue that the determinants of earning capacity such as working 
experience may change over time. Therefore, it is necessary to control for both 
time-varying individual and job characteristics in the analysis, which is able to reduce 
the omitted variable bias and provide consistent estimation results. Using a seven year 
panel dataset from the 1966-1971 and 1973 US National Longitudinal Survey young 
men’s section, Brown (1980) fails to find such a trade-off even time-constant individual 
specific variables are controlled for in the analysis. Duncan and Holmlund (1983) 
explain Brown’s (1980) failure to use working condition variables from independent 
sources rather than respondents’ self-reported variables. Therefore, they employ data 
from the 1968 and 1974 Swedish Level of Living Survey to examine the trade-off 
between wages and working conditions, in which the working condition variables are 
self-reported. They find that the wage compensating effect of the dangerous working 
conditions can be found when using two years’ data to undertake a panel analysis while 
not in the cross-sectional estimation. 
3.2.2 Benefits as exogenous variables  
Leibowitz (1982) examines the trade-off between wages and fringe benefits in the 
US. Her descriptive statistics from the 1978 Health Insurance Survey suggest that there 
are gender and race differences in receiving fringe benefits. Leibowitz (1982) further 
estimates a logarithm of hourly wage equation with respect to fringe benefits. These 
benefits include vocation, sick leave, accident insurance, life insurance and health 
insurance. However, a trade-off between wages and fringe benefits is not found. She 
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argues that this is probably because both wages and fringe benefits increase with job 
tenure. Therefore, unobserved employer-specific characteristics which do not change 
over time in this cross-sectional analysis may bias the estimation results.  
Previous studies on the wage and pension trade-off mainly focus on the spot labour 
market, which is to examine the trade-off between annual wages and annual pension. 
However, Montgomery et al. (1992) argue that pension contributions may vary with 
employment tenure. Therefore, they extend the spot model to a life-time model of the 
labour market by examining the expected present values of wages and pension. Using 
data from the 1983 US Survey of Consumer Finances, a trade-off between wages and 
pension is found in both models when applying OLS, but the magnitude of the trade-off 
is larger in the life-time model than in the spot model. In addition, Montgomery et al. 
(1992) employ pension specific and firm specific instruments to correct for the omitted 
variable bias in the OLS estimation22. However, an insignificant pension coefficient is 
obtained, which suggests that OLS estimations may be more efficient.  
Montgomery and Shaw (1997) argue that firm size and union presence may affect 
pension payment to workers. However, as the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances is a 
cross-sectional dataset, using OLS may be unable to capture the omitted variable bias as 
well as unobserved attributes which may affect union selection and income. Therefore, 
they apply the Heckman two-step model to correct for union selection bias. They firstly 
build a multinomial model to compare respondents employed in union firms, non-union 
small firms (base category) and non-union large firms. And then the wage equation 
results show that the wage and pension trade-off is greater in large non-union firms than 
other firms.  
Fringe benefits not only have a wage compensating role, but also have an incentive 
role, which may increase workers’ productivity. Amuedo-Dorantes and Mach (2003) use 
the fixed effect estimation to solve the problem of the non-random assignment of 
workers into jobs providing certain types of benefits. Employing data from the 
1988-1998 US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, their results show that 
                                                        
22 Instrumental variables used in this study are presented in Table 3-1. 
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performance-based pay schemes such as bonuses are associated with higher wages 
while wages are reduced in exchange for fringe benefits such as insurance. In addition, 
gender differences in performance-based pay and fringe benefits are observed, 
suggesting that males and females may have different risk attitudes and preferences 
towards non-wage benefits.  
In addition, providing fringe benefits can reduce job turnover. Employing 
Norwegian data, Dale-Olson (2006) finds that firms offering high wages and generous 
fringe benefits experience a significant reduction in job turnover. A trade-off between 
wage and fringe benefits is not found in this study, which suggests that firms offering 
high wages also offer generous fringe benefits.  
The neoclassical labour market theory implies that employer may adjust fringe 
benefits in response to minimum wage changes. Simon and Kaestner (2004) use the 
1980-2001 US Current Population Survey to study the relationship between the 
minimum wage and fringe benefits. Three different types of insurances (employer 
provided health insurance, family coverage insurance and employer fully paid insurance) 
and a pension are included in the fringe benefits package. Their OLS estimation results 
suggest that the minimum wage has no impact on the provision of fringe benefits among 
different education groups.  
Overall, two conclusions can be drawn from the above literature. Firstly, 
employment benefits not only have the function of compensating the wages, but are also 
able to motivate employees and reduce job turnover. Secondly, in terms of the 
methodology, using OLS may not justify the compensating wage differential hypothesis. 
However, the results approach expectations if panel data analysis is used or the selection 
bias is corrected for in some studies.  
3.2.3 Benefits as endogenous variables 
In this subsection, benefit variables are treated as endogenous variables. 
Instrumental variables are selected to correct for the endogeneity problem. Table 3-1 
lists the instruments used in these studies.  
Perloff (1991) studies the housing condition of American hired agricultural 
workers and the wage compensating effect of free housing. He firstly uses a selection 
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model for the choice of housing and finds that a quarter of hired agricultural workers 
live in rent-free housing. Then, as living in rent-free housing is an endogenous variable 
in the wage equation, two-stage least squares (2SLS) is applied to correct for the 
endogenous variable problem in the wage equation, with the probability of living in 
rent-free housing as an instrument. However, the results show that workers living in 
rent-free housing earn higher wages than others, meaning a trade-off between wages 
and free housing is not found. Perloff (1991) explains this as due to the low quality of 
rent-free housing, so the value of housing itself is insufficient to compensate the wage.  
Table 3-1 Instruments used in the literature 
Authors  IVs 
Artz (2010) 
 
Whether the respondent or respondent's spouse has other sources of 
income besides formal job. 
Bolvig (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manual workers:fraction of white-collar workers interacted with the 
Confederation of Danish Employers (DA), dummy for 4-20 
employees interacted with DA, and dummy for 20-100 employees 
interacted with DA 
White-collar workers: fraction dummy for 20-100 employees 
interacted with DA of white-collar workers interacted with DA, share 
of males interacted with DA, and dummy for 20-100 employees 
interacted with DA 
Daneshvary and 
Clauretie (2007) 
Spouse’s firm size, whether the spouse’s insurance plan covers 
family. 
Jensen and 
Morrisey (2001) 
Other income, spouse employment dummies, spouse health condition 
dummies 
Montgomery et al. 
(1992)  
The wage replacement ratio, vesting status, firm size, 3-digit industry 
capital-labour ratio, tenure. 
Olson (2002) Husband's firm size, husband's union status. 
Perloff (1991) Probability of live in rent free housing. 
Zimmer (2009) 
 
 
Spouse’s firm size, spouse's union status, whether spouse is employed 
in a government job, industry dummies and whether spouse's firm has 
multiple locations. 
Jensen and Morrisey (2001) also emphasise the importance of treating fringe 
benefits as endogenous variables because it depends on both the firms’ profit 
maximisation and workers’ utility maximisation targets. They estimate the magnitude of 
the trade-off between wages and fringe benefits among older American workers using 
the 1994 and 1998 Health and Retirement Survey. They argue that OLS underestimates 
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the wages offset by health insurance. Therefore, Jensen and Morrisey (2001) firstly 
apply OLS to regress each fringe benefit (health insurance, pension plan and vacation 
weeks) with respect to all exogenous variables and spouse’s health condition indicators. 
Then they use 2SLS to correct for the endogenous variable problem in the wage 
equation with spouse’s employment and spouse’s health condition as instruments. They 
find that when taking account of the endogenous variable problem, annual wages for 
older workers would be around 6,300 US dollar lower if health insurance was provided 
to them, which is approximate to their annual health consumption. 
Bolvig (2005) incorporates the concept of corporate social responsibility to 
examine the trade-off between wages and fringe benefits amongst Danish employees. 
An index of concern levels is computed to measure the level of fringe benefit concern. 
Because unobserved factors such as ability and job specifications may affect the 
concern level index, this index should be treated as an endogenous variable in the wage 
equation. To correct for the endogenous variable problem, the predicted value of the 
index is obtained by regressing with exogenous variables and job specific instruments. 
Next the endogenous index variable in the wage equation is replaced by its predicted 
value. The OLS estimation results show that the compensating wage differentials 
hypothesis may not hold for white-collar workers as they get both higher wages and 
better fringe benefits.  
Some studies have focused on the trade-off between wages and health insurance. 
For example, Olson (2002) notices that previous empirical studies on compensating 
wage differentials may give biased results. Therefore, in his study on the trade-off 
between wage and employer provided health insurance among full-time employed 
wives in US, two instruments related to health insurance provision while unrelated to 
unobserved factors affecting wages are introduced. The first instrument is husband’s 
firm size. The argument for choosing this instrument is that smaller firms are less likely 
to purchase health insurance for employees because of the economies of scale. The 
second instrument is the husband’s union status. This is because union members receive 
more fringe benefits compared with other non-union members. 2SLS is applied to 
estimate the logarithm wage equation. The results show that wives receive 20% lower 
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wages in return for employer provided health insurance. Olson (2002) further estimates 
the market value of health insurance and finds that the estimated substitution value 
between the wage and insurance is approximately equal to the health care costs 
consumed by respondents.  
Daneshvary and Clauretie (2007) extend Olson’s (2002) research by examining 
married men and women separately to investigate the differential in employer provided 
health insurance compensation. One of their models is the natural logarithm of annual 
earnings conditional on own health insurance. The other is the probability of having 
own health insurance which depends on the probability of the spouse having health 
insurance. In order to correct for the omitted variable and endogeneity biases of own 
health insurance status in the simultaneous estimation, the spouse’s firm size and 
whether the spouse’s insurance plan covers family are selected as instrumental variables 
in the 2SLS estimation. With data from the 2001 US Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, 
the estimation results show that the wage and health insurance trade-off for married men 
and women are 16.5% and 20% respectively. Therefore, there is a 3.5% gender 
differential for this trade-off and married women are willing to trade-off higher wages in 
return for health insurance.  
In addition, Zimmer (2009) studies the substitution of employer provided health 
insurance among married couples in the US. He firstly examines whether the 
availability of employer provided health insurance affects the probability of spouses 
having the same insurance. In the probit simultaneous estimation, a binary variable of 
respondent’s own insurance status is estimated with respect to spouse’s insurance status 
and demographic variables. The spouse’s firm size, union status and whether employed 
in a government job are used as instrumental variables to correct for the endogenous 
spouse’s insurance status variable. The simultaneous estimation results show that if the 
respondent is insured, the spouse is approximately 6-7% less likely to have health 
insurance. When examining the trade-off between wage and health insurance for 
husbands and wives separately, a binary variable representing whether the husband and 
wife are in a separate insurance plan is added to the wage equation. To correct for the 
endogeneity problem of this binary variable, Zimmer (2009) uses the spouse’s firm size, 
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union status, industry dummies and whether the firm has multiple locations as 
instrumental variables in the estimation. He concludes that wages are substituted if 
insurance is shared by the couple in the household.   
Artz (2010) empirically examines the relationship between fringe benefits 
provision and job satisfaction. Using five waves of the 1996-2004 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, he realizes the endogenous problem of fringe benefit 
variables after conducting pooled cross-sectional and conditional logit estimation. 
Therefore, a recursive bivariate probit model is built to correct for the endogenous 
variable problem. On the one hand, fringe benefits are determinants of job satisfaction. 
On the other hand, fringe benefits are decided by some unique factors, which are called 
instrumental variables. Eight dummy variables representing each specific fringe benefit 
and eight dummies representing the minimum number of fringe benefits are dependent 
variables for the fringe benefit equations respectively. His estimation results show that 
fringe benefits have a positive impact on job satisfaction and the endogeneity may not 
be a problem when using panel data. One limitation of Artz’s (2010) research is that in 
order to have a consistent type of the error terms in the simultaneous estimation, the 
ordinal job satisfaction variable has to be transformed into a binary variable, which 
sacrifices the ordinal characteristic of the job satisfaction variable.  
In conclusion, the implications of the above literature suggest that benefit variables 
should be treated as endogenous variables in the estimation, which may give unbiased 
results compared with treating them as exogenous variables in the wage equation. The 
underlying endogeneity concern is that more productive workers will receive both 
higher wages and higher benefits. Therefore, instrumental variables should be selected 
to correct for the endogenous problem of benefit variables. In particular, spousal 
instrumental variable should be selected as it may only have an impact on a 
respondent’s own benefits but may also be uncorrelated to the respondent’s wages.  
3.2.4 Employment benefits research in China 
Fringe benefits can help to motivate and retain employees. Chiu et al. (2002) use 
two case studies to compare the compensation preferences between employees in Hong 
Kong and mainland China. In terms of retaining employees, those in Hong Kong prefer 
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mortgage loans while employees in China prefer housing provision, both of which can 
satisfy the employees’ basic living and security needs. Meanwhile, employees would be 
motivated if profit sharing and annual leave are provided to Hong Kong employees 
while Chinese employees are motivated by individual bonuses and overtime working 
compensation. These differences are not only attributed to economic and geographic 
differences, but also cultural differences between Hong Kong and mainland China.  
Li and Zhao (2006) present a study on in-kind benefits in China. They analyse 
Chinese household survey data and find that in-kind payments were prevalent in the 
1980s but declined in the 1990s. The explanations for these changes are, on the one 
hand, consumer products have become easier to buy with cash since the 1990s. On the 
other hand, as wage payments in the public sector were strictly regulated by the 
government in the 1990s, a significant proportion of in-kind payments were made to 
employees to compensate for low wages. Li and Zhao (2006) use the logit model with 
the in-kind payment status as the dependent variable and find that workers employed in 
the public sector receive a higher proportion of in-kind payments than other sectors. 
Within the public sector, government officials and enterprise managers receive more 
in-kind payment than other workers, which supports the view that in-kind payments 
supplement wages in the public sector. In addition, the decline in the profitability of 
enterprises may be a reason for a decrease in in-kind payments in the 1990s as well.  
Using 2005 China Urban Labour Survey, Lee (2012) studies wage discrimination 
between urban and migrant workers. He not only uses Oaxaca-Blinder to decompose the 
wages between urban and migrant workers, but also decomposes the total value of a 
compensation package which includes earnings, annual bonus and employers’ 
contribution to insurance. The dependent variables in the two wage equations are the 
logarithm of hourly wage and logarithm of hourly compensation respectively. Lee’s 
(2012) decomposition results suggest that urban workers receive both higher wages and 
compensation compared with migrant workers. In addition, the results show that most 
migrant workers are not fully compensated by social insurances.  
An important piece of empirical research on compensating wage differentials in 
China is conducted by Frijters et al. (2010), employing data from the 2008 Rural-Urban 
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Migration in China (RUMiC). The objective of their study is to compare a remuneration 
package between urban and migrant workers in China. This remuneration package 
includes social insurances for both urban and migrant workers and additional in-kind 
payments (meals and housing) for migrant workers only. Although the questionnaire 
does not ask the specific value of social insurances contribution by employers, Frijters 
et al. (2010) calculate the value of social insurance contributions based on the 
mandatory level of employers’ contributions in respondents’ working cities. However, 
the disadvantage of this approach is that they need to assume that employers have fully 
complied with the social insurance obligations and that there is no reduction in the 
contribution. Their descriptive statistics show that urban workers not only earn higher 
annual and hourly wages compared with migrant workers, but they also get more 
benefits. They use OLS to regress the hourly wage of urban and migrant workers 
respectively with respect to insurance dummies, and find that the trade-off between 
hourly wages and insurances cannot be justified. Their argument for this finding is that 
wages and insurances are proportionally related in China.  
3.2.5 Summary and contributions 
According to the literature summarised above, empirical studies on compensating 
wage differentials are uncommon in the Chinese literature. Most Chinese studies focus 
on the determinants of benefits rather than examining the trade-off between wages and 
benefits. Meanwhile, both Lee (2012) and Frijters et al. (2010) incorporate migrant 
workers into the analysis, which suggests that migrant workers are an integral part of 
the workforce in the Chinese urban labour market. In terms of methodology used in the 
literature, although the importance of using panel data analysis has been argued by the 
literature, it is not commonly used in the empirical studies. Alternatively, 2SLS is 
feasible when benefit variables are endogenous in the wage equation. However, the 
efficiency of 2SLS may be reduced when endogenous variables are in different types. 
An example of this case is Artz (2010). In addition, spousal and firm level instruments 
are used in the literature. In particular, firm level instruments may need to be obtained 
from independent sources rather than the dataset itself.  
The contributions of this chapter to the literature take three main forms. Firstly, a 
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package of employment benefits is identified from the 2009 RUMiC to examine 
whether there is a substitution effect between wages and benefits. This chapter is 
different to Frijters’ et al. (2010) compensating wage differentials research in that it 
considers a package of benefits rather than only insurances. The second contribution is 
that benefit variables are treated endogenously in the wage equation, which could offer 
unbiased estimation results and seems to be absent in the Chinese literature. To correct 
for the endogeneity problem of the benefit variables, instrumental variables are selected. 
The final contribution is that the conditional mixed process estimation is applied to a 
compensating wage differentials study, which is able to accommodate different types of 
dependent variable in the simultaneous estimation and has not been previously applied 
to studies of this topic.  
3.3 Data and Methodology 
Data from the Chinese part of the Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) are 
employed in this chapter. The RUMiC is a collaboration project among the Australian 
National University, Beijing Normal University and the Institute for the Study of Labor 
(IZA). The project is financially supported by the Australian Research Council, the 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Ford Foundation, IZA 
and the Chinese Foundation of Social Sciences. The objective of this joint project is to 
investigate the migrant population in China and its changing labour market. Seven 
consecutive waves of this panel project have been conducted. However, only two waves 
(2008 and 2009) are publicly available when preparing for this chapter.  
One of the sub-surveys used in this chapter is the 2009 Urban Household Survey 
(UHS), where the respondents are registered and living in urban areas at the time of the 
survey. The 2009 UHS includes 5,000 urban households living in 19 Chinese cities23, 
containing detailed information on individual and household characteristics. In 
particular, the questionnaire asked the wage earners what is your average monthly 
                                                        
23 These 19 cities are Anyang, Bengbu, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dongguan, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Hefei, Jiande, 
Leshan, Luoyang, Mianyang, Nanjing, Ningbo, Shanghai, Shenzheng, Wuhan, Wuxi, Zhengzhou.  
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income from current primary job. It further asked how much is the average monthly 
wage and how much is the average monthly bonus for this job. Another sub-survey used 
in this chapter is the 2009 Migrant Household Survey (MHS), where the respondents 
are defined as people who live and work in cities when interviewed but are registered in 
rural China. The MHS interviewed 5,000 migrant households in 15 cities24. The same 
income questions were asked to migrant respondents. However, the 2008 UHS and 
MHS did not ask further questions about wage and bonus values after asking average 
monthly income questions. Therefore, only data from the 2009 UHS and MHS are 
combined for a cross-sectional analysis in this chapter. 
Due to the fact that migrant workers move quite frequently and it is difficult to 
track their movement, interviewers went to the place of work of migrant workers to 
conduct interviews, which may also be the migrant workers’ living place. The most 
common type of accommodation for migrant workers is shared dormitories near their 
place of work provided by employers for free or at low cost as an employment benefit 
(Akgüç et al., 2014). By contrast, urban respondents are less mobile and can be tracked 
by visiting their homes in each interview. Therefore, the MHS sampled respondents 
based on their place of work while the UHS sampled respondents based on an 
individual address (Akgüç et al., 2014).  
Even though the MHS uses this unique sampling method, the attrition problem is 
significant between the 2008 and 2009 waves. To be specific, 58.4% of the respondents 
disappeared after the 2008 interview (Akgüç et al., 2014). Therefore, a significant 
number of migrant workers were newly selected in the sample of 2009 MHS. This 
means that, in the 2009 MHS, a group of individuals were interviewed in both 2008 and 
2009 (old sample) whilst a group of individuals were only interviewed in 2009 (new 
sample). By contrast, the attrition rate is 5.8% for the UHS (Akgüç et al., 2014).  
The value of monthly housing subsidies was asked in both UHS and MHS. In 
addition, the questionnaires provide information on social insurances. For instance, the 
                                                        
24 These 15 cities are Bengbu, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dongguan, Guizhou, Hangzhou, Hefei, Luoyang, Nanjing, 
Ningbo, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Wuhan, Wuxi and Zhengzhou. Akgüç et al. (2014) provide detailed sampling size 
information of this dataset.  
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questionnaires asked all respondents if unemployment insurance was paid by employer, 
respondent or both employer and respondent. Similar questions were asked for pension, 
injury insurance and housing fund. Therefore, bonuses, housing subsidies and social 
insurances are a range of compensations for wages.  
 1543210 lnlnln   InsHouseBonusEmpPerWage   (3-1) 
         23210ln   IVEmpPerBonus          (3-2) 
             33210ln   IVEmpPerHouse           (3-3) 
        43210   IVEmpPerIns              (3-4) 
The average monthly wage asked in the two sub-surveys can be regarded as the 
wage without any additional compensation. Therefore, the natural logarithm of monthly 
wages, lnWage, with respect to three endogenous benefit variables can be built to 
empirically examine the compensating wage differentials hypothesis (equation 3-1). The 
exogenous variables can be put into two groups, one for personal characteristics (Per) 
and the other for employment characteristics (Emp). In the personal characteristics 
group, working age is set at between 16 and 60. For the highest level of education 
respondents completed, it can be categorised into five groups: never been to school 
(base category), elementary school, junior high school, senior high school and higher 
education25. Secondary school is included in the senior high school category while 
polytechnic college is added to the higher education category.   
In the employment characteristics group, job tenure in year is the difference 
between the survey year and current job start year. Primary occupation was asked in 
both sub-surveys but different occupation codes are defined. Generally, primary 
occupation can be put into four categories. The first occupation category is management 
positions, which acts as the base category in the estimation. The second occupation 
category is service personnel while the third category is respondents employed in the 
agriculture and manufacture sectors. Other occupations such as self-employed are 
classified as other occupations. In addition, a binary variable is generated for 
                                                        
25 For the old sample respondents, their highest education level should be obtained from the 2008 wave. 
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employment in the public sector. Firm size is a continuous variable in the UHS while it 
is a categorical variable in the MHS. In order to coordinate the differences between 
these two sub-surveys, firm size is coded as categorical variables. The first category 
represents firms employed less than 5 employees, which is the base category. The 
second category is for firm size between 6 and 50. The third category is for firms 
employing more than 50 employees.  
Coefficients from α3 to α5 in equation 3-1 are for endogenous benefit variables. 
According to the compensating wage differentials hypothesis, wages may be reduced if 
generous benefits are paid to employees, meaning that there is a trade-off between the 
wages and benefits. Therefore, these three coefficients are hypothesised to be negative. 
In order to correct for the endogenous variable problem, some instrumental variables 
should be introduced. These instruments should be highly correlated with each benefit 
variable but uncorrelated with the wage. Therefore, equations 3-2, 3-3 and 3-4 are built 
with respect to each benefit variable as the dependent variable, estimated with all 
exogenous variables and instrumental variables which are represented by IV. 
Equation 3-2 is the bonus equation, where the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of monthly bonus, lnBonus. As 55.85% of respondents who did not benefit 
from bonus were coded as 0 in the dataset, this equation can be estimated by the Tobit 
model with a left censored bonus value.  
The dependent variable of equation 3-3 is the natural logarithm of monthly housing 
subsidies, lnHouse. In the 2009 UHS, the questionnaire directly asked the average 
monthly value of housing provided or subsidised by firms. By contrast, in the 2009 
MHS, more detailed housing questions were asked. In terms of the housing value from 
the migrant sample for this equation, if free accommodation is provided to respondents, 
then the sum of respondents estimated value of accommodation and the additional 
subsidies if applicable are treated as the value of housing. If accommodation is not 
provided but subsidised to respondents, the subsidised value is treated as housing 
compensation. 73.31% of respondents who did not benefit from housing subsidies were 
coded as 0 in the dataset. This equation is appropriate to be estimated using Tobit model 
with a left censored housing value as well. 
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Equation 3-4 is the insurance equation. The number of employer fully paid or 
mutually paid insurances is generated as the dependent variable for this equation, 
Insurance. Both Estrin et al. (1997) and Llius and Abraham (2013) treat the number of 
benefits as an ordered dependent variable and argue that the utility increases with an 
additional benefit. Therefore, equation 3-4 can be estimated by the ordered probit 
model. 
The above simultaneous models are equations with uncensored (equation 3-1), left 
censored (equation 3-2 and equation 3-3) and ordered (equation 3-4) dependent 
variables. Equation 3-1 can be regarded as a structural equation while equations 3-2 to 
3-4 are reduced form where exogenous and instrumental variables are included in the 
right-hand-side of these equations. Therefore, the conditional mixed process (CMP) 
estimator developed by Roodman (2011) can be applied to jointly estimate the four 
equations. CMP’s framework incorporates commonly used econometric models, which 
means it gives flexibility in model construction and can accommodate different types of 
dependent variables in the simultaneous estimation. In the case of this chapter, the 
estimation of CMP is limited-information maximum likelihood.  
Instrumental variables should be selected to correct for the endogenous problem. 
The literature suggests that risk averse people are less likely to take a job with a bonus 
element as bonuses are performance pay and may vary with the job while people who 
like to take risks may prefer jobs with more flexible payments and uncertainty (Bonin et 
al., 2007; Grund & Sliwka, 2010; Cornelissen et al., 2011). Therefore, general risk 
attitude is used as an instrumental variable. Both sub-surveys asked respondents their 
general risk attitudes, ranging from 0 which is never take risks to 10 which is very likely 
to take risks. The consistency and validity of self-reported general risk attitude is 
verified by Dohmen et al. (2011) where a field experiment is undertaken to confirm that 
the subjective risk attitude measurement is highly consistent with risk attitudes obtained 
from a lottery game.  
In terms of the 11-scale risk variable in this chapter, it can be coded into three 
categories. 0 representing a group of respondents who never take risks, which is the 
reference category. Risk attitude levels from 1 to 3 are coded as the second category, 
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which can be regarded as respondents who have low level of risk attitude26. Finally, risk 
levels from 4 to 10 are coded as the high risk attitude group27.  
Another instrument is a binary variable for whether the respondent has no more 
than one child, which could be either zero or one child28. Ebenstein and Leung (2010) 
study the son preference in rural China and find that parents without sons wish to 
participate in pension programmes and have higher savings. This suggests that sons take 
the responsibility of taking care of elderly parents in rural China. In addition, Song 
(2014) conducts case studies on pension participation among families who lost their 
only child in urban China, which finds that having a pension is an important financial 
income source for parents who have lost children. Therefore, both studies suggest that 
having children may be a significant factor encouraging adults to participate in social 
insurance. In particular for China, the one-child policy allows each couple to have only 
one child. If this only child is lost, it is disastrous for the family. 
Taking advantage of the household characteristics of the RUMiC, a spousal 
instrumental variable can be generated, that is whether spouses have experienced 
involuntary job loss before. The purpose of setting up unemployment insurance is to aid 
those who are temporarily unemployed and need financial support. If spouses have 
experienced involuntary job loss before, respondents may have a greater incentive to 
participate in social insurance. For single respondents, their spousal instruments are set 
to 0.  
To test the validity of the instruments, Table 3-2 presents the OLS regression on 
wage with respect to instruments. If the coefficient of an instrument is statistically 
insignificant, this instrument may be identified as a valid instrument. It can be seen that 
coefficients of risk variables are statistically significant whilst the other two coefficients 
                                                        
26 The mean value of this 11-scale risk attitude measurement is around 3. Therefore, risk attitude levels above 3 are 
treated as high risk attitude.  
27 This 11-scale risk variable can be categorised in different ways. Likelihood-ratio tests have been conducted to 
compare the model fitness of different coding. In general, fewer risk categories are preferred than more. For detailed 
likelihood-ratio tests results, see Table 3-11 in Appendix.  
28 Children in this variable can be either a household member or not. Therefore, this variable is generated from the 
number of children respondent have.  
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of instruments are not. However, evidence from previous literature can be used to argue 
that an individual’s risk attitude may have an influence on bonuses. Therefore, risk 
variables should be selected as instruments. In addition, weak instrument tests are 
undertaken as well. Table 3-3 shows the F statistic for the joint significance of 
instruments when regressing endogenous benefit variables on exogenous and 
instrumental variables. Based on a rule of thumb provided by Staiger and Stock (1997), 
the instruments are weak if the F statistic is less than 10. However, instruments seem to 
be weak in the bonus equation. Pairwise correlations of each endogenous variable and 
instruments are reported in Table 3-4, Table 3-5 and Table 3-6 as another weak 
instrument test. It can be seen from these tables that the correlations are not low.  
Table 3-2 OLS regression on wage and instruments 
 Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Personal      
Male 0.1743*** 0.0130 
Age  0.0373*** 0.0043 
Age squared -0.0005*** 0.0001 
Primary school -0.1196 0.0778 
Junior high school -0.0355 0.0750 
Senior high school -0.0162 0.0752 
Higher education 0.2463*** 0.0774 
Employment     
Job tenure 0.0101*** 0.0011 
Service workers -0.1929*** 0.0181 
Agricultural and manufacturing workers -0.1696*** 0.0217 
Other occupations -0.2481*** 0.0440 
Public sector -0.0279* 0.0158 
Firm size between 6 and 50 0.0457* 0.0266 
Firm size more than 51 0.0809*** 0.0274 
Instruments     
Low risk 0.0465** 0.0193 
High risk 0.0712*** 0.0182 
No more than one child -0.0330 0.0237 
Spouse involuntary job loss -0.0349 0.0236 
_cons 6.4889*** 0.1101 
Obs 5,864 
***1%  ** 5%  * 10% 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly wage 
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Table 3-3 F statistic of the instruments 
  Bonus Housing Insurance
F Statistic 5.87 10.48 19.93 
Prob>F 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 3-4 Pairwise correlation of instruments in bonus equation 
  Bonus Low risk High risk Child Involuntary 
Bonus 1         
Low risk 0.0018 1       
High risk 0.0346 -0.6683 1     
Child 0.1052 -0.0126 0.0853 1   
Involuntary -0.0183 0.0411 -0.1004 0.0043 1 
Bonus-natural logarithm of monthly bonus 
Child-no more than one child  Involuntary-spouse involuntary job loss 
Table 3-5 Pairwise correlation of instruments in housing equation 
  Housing Low risk High risk Child Involuntary 
Housing 1         
Low risk -0.0454 1       
High risk 0.1221 -0.6683 1     
Child -0.0362 -0.0126 0.0853 1   
Involuntary -0.1315 0.0411 -0.1004 0.0043 1 
Housing-natural logarithm of monthly housing subsidies 
Child-no more than one child  Involuntary-spouse involuntary job loss 
Table 3-6 Pairwise correlation of instruments in insurance equation 
  Insurance Low risk High risk Child Involuntary 
Insurance 1         
Low risk 0.0455 1       
High risk -0.1119 -0.6683 1     
Child 0.1313 -0.0126 0.0853 1   
Involuntary 0.0900 0.0411 -0.1004 0.0043 1 
Insurance-number of insurance 
Child-no more than one child  Involuntary-spouse involuntary job loss 
In summary, risk attitude, one child and spouse involuntary job loss are selected as 
instruments. Therefore, equation 3-1 is overidentified as there are three endogenous 
variables and four instruments29.  
                                                        
29 Other instruments have considered and tested are being a smoker and years of smoking, both of which 
represent respondent’s risk attitude. Also, whether spouse receive housing benefit, dummies for spouse’s 
number of insurances are considered as well.  
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3.4 Results and Discussion 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics  
There are 5,864 observations in the sample, of which urban respondents account 
for 46.69% while migrant respondents account for 53.31%. Table 3-7 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the overall sample as well as for two sub-samples. For the 
dependent variables of the four equations without taking the natural logarithm, the 
average monthly wage for the overall sample is 1623.82 yuan. The average monthly 
bonus and monthly housing subsidies are 316.58 yuan and 58.34 yuan respectively. 
Meanwhile, the average number of insurances in the overall sample is 1.54 with a 
maximum at 4. Compared with the migrant respondents, urban respondents have a 
higher average monthly wage (1940.1 yuan) and monthly bonus (499.91 yuan) as well 
as a higher number of social insurances (2.48). By contrast, migrant respondents have 
higher average monthly housing subsidies (101.36 yuan) than urban respondents (9.22 
yuan).  
For the personal characteristics in Table 3-7, male respondents account for 51.65% 
of the overall sample. The average age of respondents is 34.08 in the overall sample, 
with the minimum age of 16 and the maximum of 60. However, the average age is 41.49 
for the urban sample while it is 27.59 for the migrant sample. In terms of the highest 
education level, 44.34% of the urban respondents have completed higher education 
while 48.11% of the migrant respondents have completed junior high school education, 
which are the highest proportions among all education categories in the two subsamples.  
In terms of the employment characteristics in Table 3-7, the average job tenure for 
the overall sample is 7.82 years. However, the average job tenure for the migrant sample 
is only 2.92 years. For occupations, 57.71% of the urban respondents are in 
management position while 63.76% of the migrant respondents are service workers. In 
addition, only 39.7% of the respondents are employed in the public sector. In particular, 
67.02% and 15.77% of respondents are employed in the public sector for the urban and 
migrant samples respectively, which suggests that migrant workers are mostly absorbed 
by the non-public sector. Finally, firms with more than 50 employees are common
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Table 3-7 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Overall Urban Migrant 
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Benefits                   
Monthly wage 1623.82 1 30000 1940.1 1 30000 1346.81 100 8000
Natural logarithm of monthly wage 7.24     7.37     7.12     
Monthly bonus  316.58 0 17000 499.91 0 17000 156.00 0 8000
Natural logarithm of monthly bonus 2.62     3.27     2.06     
Monthly housing subsidies 58.34 0 3000 9.22 0 3000 101.36 0 2500
Natural logarithm of monthly housing subsidies 1.34     0.16     2.38     
Number of social insurances 1.54 0 4 2.48 0 4 0.7236 0 4 
Personal                   
Male 0.5165 0 1 0.4072 0 1 0.6123 0 1 
Age  34.08 16 60 41.49 23 60 27.59 16 60 
Never been to school (ref.) 0.0073 0 1 0.0029 0 1 0.0112 0 1 
Primary school 0.0479 0 1 0.1899 0 1 0.0733 0 1 
Junior high school 0.3336 0 1 0.1651 0 1 0.4811 0 1 
Senior high school 0.3576 0 1 0.3696 0 1 0.3471 0 1 
Higher education 0.2536 0 1 0.4434 0 1 0.0873 0 1 
Employment                    
Job tenure in year 7.82 1 43 13.41 1 43 2.92 1 34 
Management position (ref.) 0.3320 0 1 0.5771 0 1 0.1174 0 1 
Service workers 0.4425 0 1 0.2199 0 1 0.6376 0 1 
Agricultural and manufacturing workers 0.1907 0 1 0.1362 0 1 0.2383 0 1 
Other occupations 0.0348 0 1 0.0668 0 1 0.0067 0 1 
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Table 3-7 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Variables Overall Urban Migrant 
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Public sector 0.3970 0 1 0.6702 0 1 0.1577 0 1 
Firm size no more than 5 (ref.) 0.0834 0 1 0.0504 0 1 0.1123 0 1 
Firm size between 6 and 50 0.3578 0 1 0.3371 0 1 0.3759 0 1 
Firm size more than 51 0.5588 0 1 0.6125 0 1 0.5118 0 1 
Instruments                    
Never take risk (ref.) 0.1876 0 1 0.2714 0 1 0.1142 0 1 
Low risk attitude 0.2896 0 1 0.3342 0 1 0.2505 0 1 
High risk attitude 0.5229 0 1 0.3944 0 1 0.6353 0 1 
No more than one child 0.9142 0 1 0.9518 0 1 0.8813 0 1 
Spouse experienced involuntary job loss 0.0813 0 1 0.1556 0 1 0.0163 0 1 
Obs. 5,864 2,738 3,126 
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among three samples, at 55.88%, 61.25% and 51.18% respectively for the overall, urban 
and migrant samples.  
The descriptive statistics of instruments in Table 3-7 shows that 18.76% of the 
respondents from the overall sample never take risk while 52.29% of the respondents 
are in the high risk attitude group. In addition, 91.42% of the respondents reported that 
they have no more than one child. In particular, 95.18% of the urban respondents have 
one or zero children while 88.13% of the migrant respondents have no more than one 
child30. 8.13% of the total respondents’ spouses have experienced involuntary job loss. 
In addition to the descriptive statistics, Figures 3-3 and 3-4 show the average value 
of wages and benefits of the overall sample by firm size. In general, higher wages and 
more benefits are paid to employees in larger firms except for the housing benefit. 
Furthermore, when comparing the mean values of benefit variables between urban and 
migrant sub-samples (Figures 3-5 and 3-6), it can be seen that the finding from the 
overall sample can be also applied to the migrant subsample. However, it can be seen 
from Figure 3-5 that the average monthly housing subsidies for the urban sub-sample is 
much lower compared with the counterpart firm size categories in the migrant 
sub-sample, which suggests that housing subsidies are not a common benefit among 
urban employees. Generally, these figures support Oi and Idson’s (1999) finding that 
larger firms tend to pay higher wages and offer more benefits than smaller firms. 
3.4.2 Empirical results and discussion 
OLS results of the wage equation (equation 3-1) for the full sample are presented 
in Table 3-8. To be specific, being male means 18.28% higher monthly wages than 
being female when holding all other variables constant. The monthly wages are 23.44%  
                                                        
30 In fact, the average number of children parental respondents have is 1.16 (3,635 observations), which is generally 
consistent with the one-child policy in China. In addition, the average number of children migrant parental 
respondents have is 1.41 (1,046 observations) in comparison with 1.05 of that for the urban parental respondents 
(2,589 observations). In addition, this chapter also further calculates the average number of children in the parental 
households. To be specific, the average is 0.7 (3,635 observations). The average number of children in the migrant 
parental households is 0.48 (1,046 observations) while it is 0.79 (2,589 observations) for the urban parental 
households. The significant difference between the average number of children migrant parental respondents have 
and the average number of children in the migrant parental households (1.41 and 0.48) suggests that children of 
migrant workers may be left-behind in rural hometowns.  
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Figure 3-3 Means of benefit values by firm size 
 
Figure 3-4 Means of number insurance by firm size 
 
Figure 3-5 Means of benefit values by firm size over samples 
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Figure 3- 6 Mean number of insurances by firm size over samples 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Table 3-8 OLS results of the wage equation 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Personal      
Male 0.1828*** 0.013 
Age  0.0353*** 0.0042 
Age squared -0.0005*** 0.0001 
Primary school -0.1294* 0.0785 
Junior high school -0.0519 0.0744 
Senior high school -0.0025 0.0746 
Higher education 0.2344*** 0.0761 
Employment     
Job tenure 0.0099*** 0.001 
Service workers -0.1925*** 0.0181 
Agricultural and manufacturing workers -0.1765*** 0.0209 
Other occupations -0.2555*** 0.0361 
Public sector -0.0372** 0.0158 
Firm size between 6 and 50 0.0471* 0.0244 
Firm size more than 51 0.0830*** 0.0248 
Benefits     
Natural logarithm of monthly bonus -0.0094*** 0.0022 
Natural logarithm of monthly housing subsidies -0.0003 0.0031 
Number of social insurances 0.0128** 0.0051 
_cons 6.5802*** 0.1827 
Obs 5,864 
***1%  ** 5%  * 10% 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of monthly wage 
higher for those who attended higher education than those who have never been to 
school. Meanwhile, the monthly wages are 3.72% lower if employed in the public sector. 
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Compared with firm size of less than 5, the monthly wages are 8.3% higher if employed 
in a firm with more than 51 employees. The key hypothesis made for this equation is the 
trade-off among benefits and wages. Although the trade-off can be found in bonus and 
housing subsidies variables, the coefficient for the housing subsidies variable is 
statistically insignificant at 10% level. Therefore, there is only a trade-off between 
bonuses and wages. To be specific, if the monthly bonus increases by 1%, the wages 
will be reduced by approximately 0.94% when holding all other variables constant. By 
contrast, a trade-off cannot be found between social insurances and wages. If an 
additional insurance is provided to a respondent, the wage will increase by 
approximately 1.28% when other variables are constant.  
As the OLS may bias the estimation results due to the endogenous benefit variables, 
the CMP estimation is applied to correct for the endogenous variable bias and estimate 
the wage equation in addition to three benefit equations simultaneously. Results from 
the CMP are presented in Table 3-9 and Table 3-10, in which Table 3-9 presents the 
results when four equations are estimated simultaneously while Table 3-10 presents the 
average marginal effect of the ordered probit model. The first column of Table 3-9 
shows the results from the wage equation. It can be seen that the compensating wage 
differentials hypothesis cannot be justified as the coefficients of both bonus and housing 
variables are positive. Meanwhile, the coefficient for the insurance variable is not 
statistically significant at 10% level. When holding all other variables constant, if the 
value of the monthly bonus increases by 1%, 11.88% more wages will be paid to 
respondents. Similarly, if the value of monthly housing subsidies increases by 1%, the 
monthly wage will increase by 12.33%. For other coefficients in this equation, when 
holding all other variables constant, the wages for male respondents are approximately 
7.58% higher compared with that for females. An additional year of job tenure increases 
the wage by 0.63%. Compared with management position, those who are employed as 
service workers, manufacturing workers and others have 15.09%, 10.67% and 13.69% 
lower wages respectively. However, firm size does not seem to be a determining factor 
for wages in the first column of Table 3-9. 
In terms of the discussion for a specific benefit in the wage equation, bonuses can
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Table 3-9 CMP results 
  Wage Bonus Housing Insurances 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Personal                  
Male 0.0758** 0.0372 0.2557*** 0.0766 0.5556*** 0.0537 0.0491 0.0326 
Age  0.0587*** 0.0124 0.0607** 0.0246 -0.2429*** 0.0173 0.1623*** 0.0111 
Age squared -0.0007*** 0.0001 -0.0012*** 0.0003 0.0026*** 0.0002 -0.0020*** 0.0002 
Primary school -0.0742 0.1083 -0.0633 0.4661 -0.3194 0.3269 0.2576 0.2545 
Junior high school 0.0117 0.1049 0.0302 0.4425 -0.4498 0.3103 0.6203** 0.2429 
Senior high school 0.0396 0.1136 0.5431 0.4439 -0.7876** 0.3113 1.0858*** 0.2429 
Higher education 0.2395* 0.1286 1.0868** 0.4522 -1.0894*** 0.3171 1.2817*** 0.2452 
Employment                  
Job tenure in year 0.0063** 0.0026 0.0460*** 0.0058 -0.0179*** 0.0041 0.0307*** 0.0024 
Service workers -0.1509*** 0.0370 -0.5692*** 0.1071 0.2310*** 0.0751 -0.2350*** 0.0441 
Agricultural and manufacturing workers -0.1067** 0.0477 -0.7980*** 0.1236 0.2562*** 0.0867 0.1506*** 0.0511 
Other occupations -0.1369** 0.0622 -0.6934*** 0.2141 -0.2189 0.1502 -0.1313 0.0870 
Public sector -0.0526* 0.0284 0.3634*** 0.0931 -0.1919*** 0.0653 0.3868*** 0.0374 
Firm size between 6 and 50 -0.0235 0.0422 0.5518*** 0.1443 0.0048 0.1012 0.5017*** 0.0757 
Firm size more than 51 -0.0868 0.0690 1.2268*** 0.1445 0.1209 0.1014 0.9732*** 0.0749 
Benefits                 
Natural logarithm of monthly bonus 0.1188** 0.0473             
Natural logarithm of monthly housing subsidies 0.1233** 0.0485             
Number of social insurances 0.0093 0.0146             
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Table 3-9 CMP results (continued) 
  Wage Bonus Housing Insurances 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Instruments                 
Low risk attitude                               0.3480*** 0.1016  0.0514 0.0747 -0.0277 0.0459 
High risk attitude     0.4790*** 0.1007  0.0640 0.0740 -0.1073** 0.0438 
No more than one child     0.2907** 0.1395  -0.5320*** 0.0985 0.4471*** 0.0633 
Spouse experienced involuntary job loss     -0.0097 0.1248  -0.3414*** 0.0954 0.1466** 0.0577 
_cons 5.6442*** 0.3569 -0.1096 0.6483 7.1869*** 0.4552     
cut_1             5.1255*** 0.3304 
cut_2             5.4843*** 0.3312 
cut_3             5.8356*** 0.3319 
cut_4             6.4353*** 0.3328 
Obs. 5,864 
***1%  **5%  *10% 
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be regarded as performance pay in the compensating package, which may fluctuate with 
an individual’s performance and the firm’s profitability. A positive relationship between 
bonuses and wages is also found in Ewing (1996). He concludes that there is a 4% wage 
premium in the US if the performance pay is based on bonus. In fact, the roles of 
performance and incentive pay of bonus seem to be lost in some sectors in China. 
Bonuses may not be paid based on performance but on a given grade which depends on 
responsibility roles in an organisation (Cooke, 2004). Therefore, the positive 
relationship between bonuses and wages in the first column of Table 3-9 may imply that 
the payment of bonuses is not for compensating purposes in China, but may be 
associated with wages and position. Meanwhile, more profitable firms may offer both 
higher wages and generous benefits. This rent-sharing may apply to both bonus and 
housing subsidies, indicating a positive relationship between wages and benefits.  
In addition, the trade-off between wages and insurance is also not found. Although 
previous empirical research on the compensating wage differentials hypothesis can 
justify the trade-off between wages and a single insurance (Montgomery et al., 1992; 
Olson, 2002), these results should be interpreted cautiously as a single benefit may 
correlate with other benefits which are not considered in the analysis (Miller, 2004; 
Llius and Abraham, 2013). Meanwhile, using the 2002 and 2003 Chinese firm level data, 
Nielsen and Smyth (2008) find that Chinese employers are less likely to transfer the 
costs of social insurances to employees in the form of low wages, which implies that 
wages are less likely to be reduced if insurance is provided to employees. A positive 
relationship between insurances and wages is also found by Frijters’ et al. (2010). Their 
explanation for this positive relationship is that Chinese employers are required to 
financially contribute some percentage of total wages to social insurance. For example, 
employers in the public sector are required to contribute 20% of their total wages to 
pension31. Therefore, employers’ insurance contributions are positively related to wages, 
suggesting a positive relationship between insurances and wages.  
The other three columns of Table 3-9 give the estimation results using each 
                                                        
31 Source: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China. Retrieved on 20 September 2015 from 
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/yanglaobxs/YLBXSzhengcewenjian/201505/t20150528_162022.htm 
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endogenous benefit variable as the dependent variable. The second column of Table 3-9 
gives the estimation results for the bonus equation. To be specific, for the instrumental 
variables, when holding all other variables constant, if respondents have a low risk 
attitude, the average monthly bonus will rise by 34.8% compared with those who never 
take risks. Similarly, the average monthly bonus will rise by 47.9% if respondents have 
a high risk attitude compared with those who never take risks. Therefore, it can be 
clearly found that higher risk attitude is associated with a higher bonus payment. This is 
consistent with the literature which indicates that people who prefer to take risks are 
more likely to be selected to jobs with flexible pay and higher performance pay (Bonin 
et al., 2007; Grund and Sliwka, 2010; Cornelissen et al., 2011). 
For other exogenous variables in the bonus equation, male respondents have 
25.57% higher bonuses compared with females. Respondents with higher education 
have 108.68% higher bonuses than respondents who have never been to school. In terms 
of employment characteristics variables, an additional year of job tenure increases 
bonuses by 4.6%. Compared with respondents in management positions, bonuses are 
56.92%, 79.8% and 69.34% lower for service workers, agriculture and manufacture 
workers as well as other occupations respectively. Public sector employees have 36.34% 
higher bonuses. Finally, 55.18% and 122.68% higher bonuses are paid to employees in 
firms employing 6 to 50 and more than 50 employees respectively in comparison to 
firms with less than 5 employees.  
The third column of Table 3-9 presents the results from the housing equation. Two 
dummy instruments, namely no more than one child and spouse involuntary job loss, 
show negative relationship to housing subsidies. Male respondents have 55.56% higher 
housing subsidies than females. However, other exogenous variables present 
inconsistent results with column 2.  
The fourth column of Table 3-9 shows the estimation results from the ordered 
probit insurance equation. Most of the coefficients are statistically significant and have 
the expected signs. In particular, for instrumental variables, the latent number of 
insurances variable increases if respondents have no more than one child and spouses 
have experienced involuntary job loss. In addition, the probabilities of getting an 
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Table 3-10 Average marginal effect of the insurance equation 
1 2 3 4 5 
  Zero Insurance One Insurance Two Insurances Three Insurances Four Insurances 
  dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
Personal                      
Male -0.0136 0.0090 0.0002 0.0001 0.0009 0.0006 0.0026 0.0018 0.0098 0.0065 
Age  -0.0072*** 0.0006 0.0014*** 0.0001 0.0016*** 0.0001 0.0025*** 0.0002 0.0016*** 0.0004 
Primary school -0.0713 0.0704 0.0011 0.0011 0.0046 0.0046 0.0139 0.0137 0.0517 0.0510 
Junior high school -0.1716** 0.0671 0.0027** 0.0012 0.0112** 0.0044 0.0334** 0.0131 0.1244** 0.0488 
Senior high school -0.3004*** 0.0669 0.0047*** 0.0014 0.0195*** 0.0044 0.0584*** 0.0131 0.2177*** 0.0488 
Higher education -0.3546*** 0.0675 0.0055*** 0.0016 0.0231*** 0.0045 0.0689*** 0.0133 0.2570*** 0.0493 
Employment                    
Job tenure in year -0.0085*** 0.0007 0.0001*** 0.00003 0.0006*** 0.0001 0.0017*** 0.0001 0.0062*** 0.0005 
Service workers 0.0650*** 0.0121 -0.0010*** 0.0003 -0.0042*** 0.0008 -0.0126*** 0.0024 -0.0471*** 0.0089 
Agricultural and manufacturing workers -0.0417*** 0.0141 0.0007** 0.0003 0.0027*** 0.0009 0.0081*** 0.0028 0.0302*** 0.0103 
Other occupations 0.0363 0.0241 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0024 0.0016 -0.0071 0.0047 -0.0263 0.0174 
Public sector -0.1070*** 0.0102 0.0017*** 0.0004 0.0070*** 0.0008 0.0208*** 0.0021 0.0776*** 0.0074 
Firm size between 6 and 50 -0.1388*** 0.0207 0.0022*** 0.0005 0.0090*** 0.0014 0.0270*** 0.0041 0.1006*** 0.0153 
Firm size more than 51 -0.2692*** 0.0199 0.0042*** 0.0009 0.0175*** 0.0015 0.0524*** 0.0042 0.1952*** 0.0152 
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Table 3-10 Average marginal effect of the insurance equation (continued) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Zero Insurance One Insurance Two Insurances Three Insurances Four Insurances 
dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
Instrument                   
Low risk attitude 0.0076 0.0127 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0015 0.0025 -0.0055 0.0092 
High risk attitude 0.0297** 0.0121 -0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0019** 0.0008 -0.0058** 0.0024 -0.0215** 0.0088 
No more than one child -0.1237*** 0.0174 0.0019*** 0.0005 0.0080*** 0.0012 0.0240*** 0.0035 0.0896*** 0.0127 
Spouse experienced involuntary job loss -0.0406** 0.0159 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0026** 0.0011 0.0079** 0.0031 0.0294** 0.0116 
Obs. 5,864 
*** 1%  ** 5%  * 10% 
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additional insurance increase with educational level, employed in the public sector and 
firm size.  
The average marginal effect of the insurance equation is presented in Table 3-10. 
The marginal effects present consistent signs from outcome 1 to 4 (column 2 to 5). For 
example, the instrumental variables in column 5 show that having no more than one 
child leads to a 8.96 percentage points higher probability of having four insurances, 
which suggests that children are a significant determinant of parental adults’ 
participation in a social insurance programme. This is not only due to the fact that in the 
Chinese culture it is children’s responsibility to take care of the elderly parents, but also 
a result of the impact of the one-child policy in China. Therefore, social insurance 
seems to be a reliable source of financial income when experiencing unexpected events 
in life rather than solely relying on children. Meanwhile, if spouses experienced 
involuntary job loss, the probability of having four insurances is 2.94 percentage points 
higher. Spouses’ involuntary job loss experience can influence respondents’ insurances 
participation, which suggests that respondents want to take precautions against 
unexpected events within households.  
For the marginal effect of other exogenous variables in column 5, the probability of 
having four insurances is 0.16 percentage points higher with an additional year of age. 
The probabilities of having four insurances are 21.77 percentage points and 25.7 
percentage points higher if respondents have attended senior high school and higher 
education respectively compared with those who have never been to school. In addition, 
the probability of having four insurances is 0.62 percentage points higher with an 
additional year of job tenure. Compared with occupation in management positions, the 
probabilities of having four insurances are 4.71 percentage points lower and 3.02 
percentage points higher if occupations are service workers and manufacturing workers 
respectively. The probability of having four insurances is 7.76 percentage points higher 
if employed in the public sector. Finally, the probabilities of having four insurances are 
10.06 percentage points and 19.52 percentage points higher if the firm sizes are between 
5 and 50 and more than 50 respectively compared with firm employing less than 5 
people.  
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3.5 Conclusions 
The fact that employment benefits are associated with wage payments has not 
changed since the wage reforms in China. Employing data from the 2009 RUMiC, this 
chapter empirically examines whether benefits are paid to compensate for wages. To be 
specific, this chapter examines the compensating wage differentials hypothesis in China.  
A package of benefits which includes bonuses, housing subsidies and social 
insurances is selected to examine the substitution effect between wages and benefits for 
both urban and migrant workers. According to the literature, the results of the trade-off 
between wages and benefits may be biased if the endogeneity problem of benefit 
variables in the wage equation is neglected. To correct for the endogenous problem of 
benefit variables, instrumental variables which determine benefits but not wages are 
selected. The CMP method is used to estimate the simultaneous models as it is able to 
accommodate different types of the dependent variables in the four equations.  
However, the CMP results on the wage equation show that the compensating wage 
differentials hypothesis cannot be justified with the Chinese data. To be specific, the 
bonus and housing variables are positively related to the wages, which does not support 
the compensating role of benefits. Also, the coefficient of the insurance variable is 
statistically insignificant in the wage equation. These results show that, on the one hand, 
bonus payment and housing subsidies may reflect rent-sharing in China, which implies 
that profitable firms are more likely to pay higher benefits. On the other hand, Chinese 
employers are less likely to transfer the costs of insurance to wages but pay insurance 
proportionately to wages as a compulsory part. Therefore, according to 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Mach (2003), the positive coefficients of benefit variables may 
suggest that Chinese employers pay additional benefits to encourage and motivate 
employees.  
A crucial part of this chapter is to find instrumental variables for three endogenous 
benefits variables. It can be seen that a higher risk attitude is associated with higher 
bonuses. In addition, both the number of children respondents has and spouse’s 
involuntary job loss experiences have an influence on housing and insurance variables.  
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Some data problems may have contributed to the failure to examine the 
compensating wage differentials hypothesis in this chapter. According to Smith and 
Ehrenberg (1982), data on the actual costs of employer provided benefits should be 
available when examining the hypothesis. In terms of this chapter, the value of housing 
subsidies are partly based on respondents’ own estimations, which are not the exact 
employers’ costs. Meanwhile, as the actual costs of an employer’s contribution to 
insurance are unavailable from the dataset, the ordered number of the insurance variable 
has to be used in the estimation. Therefore, the actual costs of some of the employer 
provided benefits are absent from the dataset used in this chapter, which may not enable 
the compensating wage differentials hypothesis to be properly examined. In addition, 
the relationship between wages and benefits should be clearly identified in the 
estimation. However, an employer’s insurance contribution is proportionate to wages in 
China, which may have a function between wages and insurance contribution and hence 
bias the trade-off between insurances and wages.  
However, the compensating wage differentials theory itself may not stand in the 
Chinese context. The assumptions of utility maximisation and perfect mobility for the 
theory may be too strong (Brown, 1980). For instance, even when workers are aware of 
better employment benefits in other firms, barriers such as the household registration 
may impede job turnover in China. Therefore, for future empirical research on 
compensating wage differentials in China, it is better to use panel data analysis to 
capture the time-varying characteristics of both employers and employees’ information 
in order to correct for the omitted variable bias (Elliott and Sandy, 1998). 
3.6 Appendix  
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Table 3-11 Likelihood-ratio tests on 11-scale risk variable categories  
LR1: 0, 1-5, 6-10 
LR2: 0, 1-3, 4-10 
LR3: 0, 1-3, 4-6, 7-10 
LR4: 0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-10 
LR5: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-10 
LR6: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
LR Chi2 
Prob>chi2 
LR1 LR2 LR3 LR4 LR5 
LR3 -0.61 0.06    
1.0000 0.8012    
LR4 1.27 1.94 1.88   
0.5299 0.3784 0.1703   
LR5 3.36 4.03 3.97 2.09  
0.6452 0.5451 0.4105 0.5546  
LR6 7.33 8.01 7.94 6.06 3.98 
0.5010 0.4327 0.3375 0.4160 0.2638 
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Chapter Four 
Return to Hometown or Stay in City: A Survival Analysis on Return 
Migration in China 
4.1 Introduction 
Large scale rural-urban migration did not begin in China until the mid-1980s. 
Before that, due to the household registration system, rural people were not allowed to 
move into cities to live and work. The main motivation for this internal migration in 
China is the income difference between rural and urban areas, and amongst the regions 
(Shen, 2002; Zhao, 2005; Lee and Meng, 2010). For example, rural people in the 
western and central parts of China may prefer to migrate to the eastern or coastal 
provinces where incomes are higher. Table 4-1 illustrates the number of migrant 
workers in China from 2009 to 2014, which shows how the migrant population is 
increasing. The statistics also show the number of local migrants and non-local migrants, 
where local migrants refer to migrant workers who work in their registration city or 
town while non-local migrants work outside their registration place.  
Table 4-1 Number of migrant workers by year                                                              
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total 229.78 242.23 252.78 262.61 268.94 273.95 
Local migrants 84.45 88.88 94.15 99.25 102.84 105.74 
Non-local migrants 145.33 153.35 158.63 163.36 166.1 168.21 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (in million) 
Note: local migrants refer to migrant workers who work in their registration city or town 
while non-local migrants work outside their registration places. 
Return migration became a new trend in China from around 2000 (Meng, 2012), 
which means migration from urban areas such as large cities to rural areas. Although 
official statistics on the scale of return migrants are not yet available, research on return 
migration has attracted attention from both academic and policy sides. Therefore, the 
objective of this chapter is to examine and identify those factors which motivate return 
migration in China. In contrast to previous Chinese studies which tend to emphasise 
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either the household registration system or the macroeconomic environment as 
motivations for return migration, this chapter examines the relationships between hourly 
wage, household savings, social networks and return migration. In addition, 
heterogeneity between the new and old generation of migrants is considered.  
Previous studies found that the household registration system is an important factor 
which motivates return migration in China. Migrant workers in cities do not share the 
same opportunities as their urban counterparts. For example, they may be discriminated 
against in some job opportunities due to their rural registration status (Meng and Zhang, 
2001). Additionally, they have disadvantages in human capital and education and so 
migrant workers in cities are commonly employed as cheap labour. Meanwhile, migrant 
workers are excluded from most social insurance schemes. Not only because of their 
low awareness of participating in social insurance, but also due to a lack of specific 
guidelines on migrant workers’ social insurance participation which makes insurance 
funding difficult to transfer after they return to rural areas (Giles et al., 2013).  
In addition, most of the migrant workers migrate to cities without their children 
and spouses. These left-behind children have been found to suffer from health and 
emotional problems, undertaking long hours of farm and household work in their rural 
homes, as well as tending to show poor educational performance (Ye and Pan, 2011; 
Murphy et al., 2015). Even for those migrant workers taking their children to the cities, 
schools in cities are unable to accept migrant children when they reach school age due 
to the children’s rural registration status (Wang and Fan, 2006). However, housing 
should be a priority area if migrant workers want to stay in cities permanently. They 
cannot afford high housing costs in cities. Moreover, housing schemes which offer 
cheap or economy housing to low income people in cities are not open to rural 
registered people (Li and Zhang, 2011). Therefore, cheaply shared dormitories provided 
by employers are common amongst migrant workers in cities (Akgüç, 2014). Under 
such living conditions, migrant workers typically either leave their spouses in rural 
hometowns or live separately with spouses in the migration cities. However, being 
separated from spouses may lead to an unstable marriage, which is costly for the 
personal development of migrant workers (Zhao, 1999). 
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The above facts suggest that the rural registration status of the migrant workers is a 
key factor which contributes to temporary migration in China. Migrant workers’ return 
decisions involve personal as well as household factors such as those associated with 
institutional barriers. Therefore, analysis of the return decision can be made from the 
migrant workers’ own labour supply side.  
However, the return decision can also be analysed from the labour demand side. 
Economic development is increasingly moving to the central and western parts rather 
than clustering in coastal regions such as the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta and 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region (Liang et al., 2014). For example, the Western 
Development Project starting in 2000 aimed to stimulate economic development in 
Western China and narrow the income disparity between the West and the East. A 
similar plan, the “Raising of Central China”, was proposed in 2006 to stimulate the 
economic development of the central area. Capital, which was invested in the coastal 
regions, is now transferring to inland China. Local employment opportunities attract 
rural people who may otherwise migrate to the coastal provinces to return to their own 
provinces. Therefore, return migration has occurred due to the demand for labour in 
inland China (Zhan and Huang, 2013). The phenomenon of migrant shortage since the 
early 2000s can be seen as evidence of the impact of these policies.  
Meanwhile, the 2008 global financial crisis may have impacted on return migration 
as well. The export-oriented economy in China was affected significantly by the low 
demand globally. Some labour-intensive factories in the coastal cities were closed, 
making migrant workers unemployed and prompting a return to hometowns (Xu, 2010). 
During that time, governments in some coastal cities promoted a policy of transferring 
labour-intensive industries into capital-intensive ones, which required less migrant 
workers and thus may have been a factor in return migration (Liang et al., 2014).  
Overall, based on the evidence from both the institutional and macroeconomic 
environments, it can be argued that return migration in China is not only a decision 
made from the individual and household perspective, but has also been influenced by 
policy and economic environment changes. 
In addition, having noticed that both the age structure of the migrant population 
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and the purposes of migration are changing in China, the 2010 No.1 Central 
Government Document defined migrant workers who were born after 1980 as new 
generation migrants. These migrants are generally considered to be better educated, 
more likely to undertake manufacturing work, preferring to migrate to the eastern 
provinces or large cities, as well as consuming migration savings in migration 
destinations (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014). There were 84.87 million 
new generation migrants in 2009, which accounts for 58.4% of the non-local migrant 
workers (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). In terms of their return 
migration preference, almost half of the new generation migrants have the intention to 
be permanent migrants in cities. As most of the new generation migrants have no 
experience of undertaking farm work, they are less likely to return to the rural areas for 
farming even though there are unfavourable employment situations in cities for them.  
This chapter contributes to the return migration literature in three ways. Firstly, it 
uses a nationwide Chinese dataset to provide general and representative findings on 
return migration. Data from the Chinese part of the 2009 Rural-Urban Migration in 
China (RUMiC) is employed in this chapter, in which the rural sub-survey covers 
around 8,000 rural households in 9 migration origin provinces32 while the migrant 
sub-survey covers 5,000 migrant households in 15 migration destination cities33 . 
Typically, previous return migration studies in China used data collected in one city. 
However, those findings may not be representative as the return decision may be 
influenced by the local economic and employment environment in the migration 
destination city or the origin place. In addition, the dataset used in this chapter could 
provide unbiased migration information as return migrants were interviewed in their 
rural hometowns while migrant workers were interviewed in the migration cities.  
Secondly, the Cox survival analysis is used in this chapter, which is distinct from 
the methodologies employed in previous Chinese literature. Taking advantage of the 
durations recorded in the dataset, this econometric technique not only enables return 
                                                        
32 These 9 provinces are Anhui, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Sichuan and Zhejiang. 
33 These 15 cities are Bengbu, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dongguan, Guizhou, Hangzhou, Hefei, Luoyang, Nanjing, 
Ningbo, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Wuhan, Wuxi and Zhengzhou.  
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migrants and migrant workers to be distinguished by the censoring status of the 
durations, but is also able to examine the magnitude of variables on the length of stay 
(Hare, 1999). The third contribution of this chapter is to incorporate heterogeneity 
between the new and old generation migrants into the return decision modeling, where 
the former are taken to be those born after 1980.  
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Hypotheses to be tested are made in 
the next section. Section 4.3 provides a literature review on return migration. Section 
4.4 describes the data and methodology of this chapter while Section 4.5 presents the 
results and discussion. Conclusions are given in Section 4.6.  
4.2 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses  
Neoclassical economics (NE) states that migration is a cost-benefit decision 
(Sjastaad, 1962; Todaro, 1969). Potential migrants compare the costs and benefits 
before migration. For example, they compare the wage differentials and unemployment 
rates between the origin and destination areas before deciding whether to migrate. 
However, return migration may occur if the expected lifetime earnings are not met or 
utility is not maximised in the migration destination. In addition, return may also occur 
if human capital can get a higher return in the migration origin than in the destination. 
Therefore, the NE emphasises permanent migration. Migrants may choose to migrate 
with family members. Return is due to failure or unrealised expectations in the 
destination area.  
By contrast, the new economics of labour migration (NELM) views migration as 
temporary (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Massey et al., 1993). For example, once the 
earnings target is achieved in the migration destination, return migration would occur. 
Therefore, return is due to success or realised expectations in the destination area. In 
addition, migration is a household strategy rather than an individual’s own decision 
according to this theory. For instance, spouses and children left behind can be a factor to 
motivate return migration. Although many theories are applied to international 
migration, it is equally relevant to internal migration such as in China (Stark and Bloom, 
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1985). In addition, two theories can be used simultaneously in a return migration study 
(Massey et al., 1993). 
Empirical studies in the return migration literature tend to build models based on 
the NELM. Given the probability of return, migrants work harder to achieve their 
earning target than native workers (Galor and Stark, 1991). If wages are higher, it will 
enable migrants to take less time to achieve this earning target before return (Constant 
and Massey, 2002). Therefore, wages are negatively related to migration duration and 
can be used as a measurement of work effort. Meanwhile, given the probability of return 
migration, migrants save more than native workers (Galor and Stark, 1990; Islam et al., 
2013). Remitting their savings to left behind family members, which thus diversifies 
and improves household income (Zhu, 2007; Kilic et al., 2009) as well as being for 
investment or self-employment purpose after return (Thomas, 2012). Hence, once the 
earnings or savings target is achieved in the destination, return migration occurs. In 
addition, the return migration decision can also be made as a result of the purchasing 
power parity between the host and home regions’ currencies (Kirdar, 2009). Migrants 
believe that the purchasing power of the host region’s currency is higher in their own 
region where prices are lower. They may choose to remit and consume their migration 
savings after their return to the home region (Constant and Massey, 2002). Therefore, 
savings are positively related to the probability of return. Overall, two hypotheses can 
be made based on the NELM and previous literature, which intend to be justified 
through the use of Chinese data in this chapter. 
Hypothesis 1: according to the NELM, if migrants have higher hourly wage, they 
are more likely to return. 
Hypothesis 2: according to the NELM, if migrants have a higher annual household 
savings, they are more likely to return.  
Moreover, the network theory argues that the migrant social network is able to 
reduce the costs and risks behind the migration and hence increase the probability of 
migration (Massey et al., 1993). Therefore, a larger social network may extend the 
migration duration as well as increasing migrants’ attachment to the destination. A 
hypothesis can be made in terms of the social network. 
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Hypothesis 3: according the network theory, if migrants know more people in the 
migration destination, they are less likely to return. 
However, higher hourly wages and household savings seem to have a competing 
effect on return migration (Kirdar, 2009). Higher hourly wages and household savings 
are able to accelerate the return process based on the NELM. On the other hand, return 
is associated with an opportunity cost of staying in cities longer to get higher earnings 
and savings. Motivated by this finding and given the fact that the new generation 
migrants are more willing to stay in cities permanently than the old generation migrants 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011), it is sensible to assume that the new 
generation migrants prefer to stay in cities longer when there are higher hourly wages 
and savings there. Return migration is associated with an opportunity cost and hence 
they are reluctant to return. By contrast, the old generation migrants are believed to have 
lower expectations about staying in cities permanently. Their behaviour is more 
consistent with what the NELM states and they prefer to return when their earnings and 
savings targets are achieved. Therefore, when there are increases in wages and savings, 
the hazard of return would reduce for the new generation migrants whilst it would 
increase for the old generation migrants. The two generations respond differently to 
these changes. Hypotheses 1 and 2 can be extended and applied to examine 
heterogeneity across the two generations.  
Hypothesis 4: when there is an increase in hourly wages, the hazard of return 
increases when changing generation from the new to old.  
Hypothesis 5: when there is an increase in the annual household saving, the hazard 
of return increases when changing generation from the new to old.  
In addition, as the social network is important for migration, knowing more people 
in cities seems to be more important for the new generation migrants given their 
willingness to stay in cities permanently. Therefore, the marginal effect of an additional 
friend should be higher for the new generation migrants than for their old counterparts.  
Hypothesis 6: when there is an increase in the number of friends in cities, the 
hazard of return increases when changing generation from the new to old.  
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4.3 Literature Review 
In this section, studies on international and internal return migration are introduced. 
Studies on modeling the return decision and return intention are also discussed in each 
subsection. In return decision studies, return migrants were directly interviewed and 
asked their return motivations, which means return migration has occurred. By contrast, 
in return intention studies, the expected migration duration or the likelihood of return in 
the future was asked to migrants. For example, the German Social-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) survey asked immigrants whether they intended to stay in Germany 
permanently in each wave. If the answer was no, then it further asked the number of 
years they would like to stay before returning. Although respondents reporting return 
intention do not necessarily mean return migration has occurred or will occur, it can still 
identify factors which may have an impact on the future return decision.  
4.3.1 International return migration studies 
Return migration can be motivated by at preference for consuming in the origin 
country, differences in purchasing power parity (PPP) between countries and the high 
return of human capital in the origin country (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007). For example, 
savings of immigrants can be a factor determining their migration duration. Dustmann 
(1997) builds models on this issue and emphasises that migrants accumulate 
precautionary savings to avoid labour market risk and instabilities whilst abroad.  
In empirical research, Kirdar (2009) argues that immigrants would return when 
they have accumulated savings in the host country and prefer to consume them in the 
lower price home country. Using data from the 1984-2000 GSOEP which interviewed 
immigrants from Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and former Yugoslavia to Germany, he 
applies the discrete-time survival analysis to examine the return motivations. The results 
show that the higher purchasing power of the host country’s savings in the origin 
countries induce older immigrants to return as they are able to realise the value of the 
savings in the origin country. However, younger immigrants are reluctant to return even 
if there is a high purchasing power of their savings at home. For them, return increases 
the opportunity cost of accumulating more savings in the host country. In terms of the 
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effects of unemployment spells and retirement on the return decision, Kirdar (2009) 
finds that return is more likely to occur when the unemployment spell is less than three 
years and the retirement spell less than one year.  
In addition, household and social factors may induce return migration as well. 
Constant and Massey (2002) firstly compare the NE and NELM approaches and then 
design empirical models based on these theories to examine whether household and 
social factors impact on the return decision. Discrete-time survival analysis with data 
from the 1984-1997 GSOEP is applied to estimate the return probabilities. The results 
suggest that immigrants that have weak employment and social attachments to Germany 
but strong attachments to the home country are more likely to return. However, wages 
and occupation do not have a significant impact on the likelihood of return. In addition, 
the discrete-time survival analysis shows that migrants who send money home behave 
consistently with the NELM and are more likely to return once the presence of the 
spouse is controlled for. Similar findings are seen in Constant and Massey (2003), 
where the discrete-time survival analysis is applied to the same dataset to compare the 
return probabilities among immigrants who intend to stay in Germany, return migrants 
and those who are uncertain about whether to stay or return.  
Meanwhile, Azzarri and Carletto (2009) use data from the 2005 Albanian Living 
Standard Measurement Survey (ALSMS) to study the impact of household and social 
factors on return migration from Greece and Italy to Albania. They focus on respondents 
who have migration experience in the sample and use the censoring status of the 
migration duration at the time of the survey to distinguish migrants and return migrants. 
Their survival analysis results suggest that the return decision should take into account 
both the household members’ age structure and social networks in the destination 
countries.  
Employing the same dataset, Vadean and Piracha (2010) use the multinominal logit 
model to distinguish the socio-economic characteristics of non-migrants, permanent 
migrants, return migrants and circular migrants in Albania. The term, circular migrants, 
refers to those migrants who repeatedly move between the home country and one or 
more host countries. They find that gender, age, education and household ties 
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significantly have a significant impact on migration decisions. In addition, Vadean and 
Piracha (2010) examine the probability of returnees’ re-migration after their first trip by 
using a probit model. The results suggest that circular migrants are more likely to be 
males, and more likely to originate from rural and less developed areas. The return 
decision is highly influenced by household reasons, failure in the destination country as 
well as whether the saving target has been achieved.  
Saarela and Finnas (2013) argue that international migration and return migration 
should be a household decision rather than an individual one, and particularly in 
countries such as Sweden and Finland where gender equality is highly developed, the 
wives’ education should be independent to the families’ migration decision. Using 
registration data from Finland, Saarela and Finnas (2013) find that if the wife has 
vocational education, the emigration probability of the Swedish speaking population is 
lower than if the wife only has basic educational attainment. However, this probability 
is higher if the wife has higher education. In terms of return migration, controlling for 
the husband’s education, both vocationally and higher educated wives have higher 
return probabilities than a basically educated wife. This study also finds that both a 
spouse’s educational level can influence the return decision.  
The above studies focus on the international return decision. However, studies on 
return intention can also be found in the literature. Dustmann (1999) hypothesises that 
the intended immigration duration would be longer if the return to the destination 
country’s specific human capital is higher in the destination country than that in the 
origin country’s labour market. Employing data from the 1984 GSOEP and using the 
destination country’s language fluency as the specific human capital investment, he 
builds a probit language fluency model with respect to the intended immigration 
duration. When this duration variable is treated either exogenously or endogenously in 
the language equation34, he finds that immigrants who are able to speak German well or 
very well would have a higher intention of staying in Germany.  
Dustmann (2003a) also argues that there are two effects of the increasing economic 
                                                        
34 The instrumental variable used to correct for the endogenous duration variable is whether parent lives in Germany. 
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disparity between origin and destination countries. On the one hand, immigrants would 
stay longer in the host country to benefit from high wages. On the other hand, the 
marginal utility of wealth may decrease if staying abroad for a long period which may 
induce return migration. Therefore, Dustmann (2003a) hypothesises that immigration 
duration may decrease if there is a rise in the wage differential between the origin and 
destination country. His argument is that immigrants shorten migration duration if they 
can achieve earning targets quickly. Using 14 years of panel data from the GSOEP 
(1985-1997), he examines the changes between the intended immigration duration and 
wages using least squares. The results suggest that the expected immigration duration is 
negatively associated with wage differentials, which is consistent with his hypothesis.  
Pinger (2010) uses survey data from the Republic of Moldova to study the return 
intention of Moldovan migrants and their remittance behaviour. The probit return 
intention model suggests that both social (such as family ties and network) and 
economic (such as wage differentials) connections with the host and origin countries are 
motivations for the return migration. In addition, Pinger (2010) finds that emigrants 
who intend to return remit approximately 30% more of their savings home than those 
who intend to stay abroad permanently.  
4.3.2 Internal return migration studies 
Internal return migration studies mainly focus on African and Asian countries. For 
example, Falkingham et al. (2012) study the urban-rural migration of elderly people 
(over 50) living in the slum community in Nairobi (Kenya). Using destination-based 
panel data from the 2006-2009 Urbanisation Poverty and Health Dynamic Programme, 
Cox survival analysis is applied to estimate the duration of living in the slum, which is 
able to incorporate time-varying variables in the analysis. The findings show that the 
return intention declines with the duration time for living in the slum. In addition, older 
people who left their children in the rural areas are more likely to return while spousal 
separation does not induce return. However, Falkingham et al. (2012) acknowledge that 
the return migration in their study may not be permanent as circular migration may 
occur. Therefore, long panel data are expected to be used in order to consider the case of 
circular migration in future research.  
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Hirvonen and Lilleor (2015) use data from the Kagera Health and Development 
Survey to study return migration in Tanzania, which is a 19 year panel survey (1990s, 
2004 and 2010). In this survey, respondents migrated either within the Kagera region or 
to other places in Tanzania and Uganda. A probit model is used to distinguish between 
return migrants and others (including migrants or non-migrants). They find that the 
return decision is mainly based on failure reasons, such as the lower educational level of 
respondents and lower levels of household consumption or asset holding. In addition, 
males who are financially supported by their families and females who have close 
attachments to family members and communities are more likely to return.  
In addition, Piotrowski and Tong (2010) employ longitudinal data from the Nang 
Rong Project (1984, 1994 and 2000) to investigate the return migration from Bangkok 
to the Nang Rong region of Thailand. This longitudinal survey is origin based, asking 
migrants’ family members to provide proxy information on migrants. Their probit return 
model established on the pooled sample shows that return can be attributed to failure in 
the destination area. For example, lower educated migrants are more likely to return. In 
terms of non-economic reasons, the presence of children and parents significantly 
motivate return.  
Junge et al. (2015) compare internal return migration in Thailand and Vietnam and 
make a distinction between local return migrants and regional return migrants. The local 
return migrants refer to those who return to their home villages while the regional return 
migrants are those who return to other places within their provinces. Using panel 
household data collected in the two countries (2007, 2008 and 2010), a multinominal 
logit model is applied to estimate the return decision model which compares migrants, 
local return migrants and regional return migrants. They find that lower educated 
respondents tend to be local return migrants.  
In the literature, return migration studies have been undertaken using Chinese data 
as well. Hare (1999) studies migration and return migration in China. Using rural 
household data collected in the Xiayi County (Henan province) in 1995, a probit 
migration decision model is built with respect to individual, household and community 
level variables. The results suggest that the migration decision is determined by the 
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demand side of the labour market such as years of schooling rather than household 
factors. When examining the return decision model, the number of migration days is 
estimated by a Weibull duration model. The Weibull duration model results show that 
the return decision is not due to failure in cities, but it is influenced by household factors 
such as undertaking farm work which “pull” migrants to return to their rural hometowns. 
However, Hare (1999) acknowledges that due to the small sample size (117 migrants), 
unobserved heterogeneity in the Weibull model is unable to be tested in the analysis.  
Employing the 1999 rural household survey conducted in six Chinese provinces, 
Zhao (2002) examines the causes of return migration. He uses the logit model in his 
study, where both migrants and return migrants are in the sample. Zhao (2002) finds that 
the return decision is a combination of both pull and push factors. To be specific, a low 
return to education and human capital in cities push migrants to return to rural 
hometowns while spousal separation and non-farm employment opportunities in rural 
hometowns pull them to return.  
Wang and Fan (2006) argue that adopting a success-failure framework may be 
inadequate for explaining return migration in China, in which successful migrants are 
those who contribute to their hometowns’ economic development while failed migrants 
do not have the propensity to make such a contribution. Using data from the 1999 rural 
survey conducted in the Sichuan and Anhui provinces in China, they use multinominal 
logit model to compare the human capital and household characteristics among migrants, 
non-migrants and return migrants. The results suggest that the return decision made is 
not due to their success in cities or having potential contributions to their hometown 
development after return. When categorising return reasons by success, failure and 
family, Wang and Fan’s (2006) descriptive statistics show that household reasons, such 
as marriage and caring for family members, motivate migrants to return. Therefore, they 
conclude that the success-failure framework may be inadequate for explaining the return 
migration in China and household reasons may motivate return migration to a greater 
extent. 
Chunyu et al. (2013) employ the 1995 China 1% Population Sample Survey and 
2000 China Population Census to study return migration in China. Individuals from the 
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Sichuan province migrating to other provinces, return migrants to Sichuan and 
non-migrants in Sichuan are identified from the surveys. Logit models are used to 
estimate the return propensities between migrants and return migrants. Chunyu et al. 
(2013) find that, on the one hand, the rate of return migration varies by province. In 
particular, the return rate from the Guangdong province to Sichuan is the highest. They 
argue that this return rate is strongly associated with the global economic downturn. On 
the other hand, older, married and better educated migrants are more likely to return. 
However, migrants who migrated at an older age are less likely to return.  
In terms of the studies on return intention in China, Yue et al. (2010) interviewed 
migrant workers in Shenzhen in 2005 to investigate their return intentions. The potential 
choice for migrants is to stay in the city, or return for non-farm and farm jobs. They use 
birth years ranging from 1970 to 1980 to divide the sample into new and old generation 
migrants. Descriptive statistics on return intentions with respect to different generation 
definitions show that younger migrants are more willing to stay in cities and undertake 
non-farm jobs. In addition, when using 1975 to distinguish between the two generations 
of migrants and estimate the intentions of two generations separately, the multinominal 
logit models on these choices show that the new generation migrants have a strong 
intention to seek non-farm jobs upon return. Their explanation for this finding is that the 
new generation migrants regard migration as an investment in human and social capital. 
Therefore, their return motivation is due to the social and economic conditions at the 
origin rather than household responsibilities.  
Zhu and Chen (2010) use migration data collected in the Fujian province in 2002 
and 2006 to examine the return intentions of migrants. Migrant workers’ settlement 
intentions in cities are modelled by a logit regression. They find that the settlement 
intentions of the migrant workers are not only influenced by their own household 
registration status and place of origin, but also related to household income and the 
housing condition in the destination.  
Piotrowski and Tong (2013) use a migrant survey in the Guangdong province to 
study return intentions. The intention to stay ranges from within 1 year, 3 years, 5 years 
to never return. Their ordered probit model takes into account both economic and 
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non-economic factors on the return intention. They conclude that in terms of the 
economic factors, the return probability is high once the migrants’ earning target is 
achieved. This suggests that migration is a household strategy and therefore the return 
intention is associated with the family’s economic condition. By contrast, in terms of 
non-economic reasons, children left in the origin province accelerate the return process 
whilst migrants who have more than 30% of their peers from the same village and are 
living with friends decelerate the return process, which is arguably a network effect.  
Cao et al. (2015) argue that self-employed migrants are less likely to return due to 
their economic and social attachment to cities as well as their initial investment in cities. 
They examine the causality between self-employment and settlement intention of 
migrant workers. Using a migrant survey data collected in 12 Chinese cities in 2009, 
they apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) to correct for the endogeneity problem of 
self-employed variable. Self-employment experience before migration and household 
social class are selected as instruments. The results justify their hypothesis that being 
self-employed is more likely to mean the individual will settle in cities. In addition, Cao 
et al. (2015) also find that self-employed migrants are more likely to migrate with their 
spouse, live with family members, purchase houses in cities and be better integrated to 
city lives.  
4.3.3 Activities after return  
The literature in this sub-section focuses on the return activities after migrants have 
returned. Hu and Wu (2012) study the impact of the village leaders’ migration 
experience on rural economic development in China. Using data from the 2005 China 
General Social Survey (CGSS), the impacts are measured by villages’ per capita net 
income and the number of collective or private enterprises in the village. They conclude 
that village leaders’ migration experiences have a positive impact on rural economic 
development.  
In addition, return migrants are more likely to be engaged in self-employment 
activities. For example, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) emphasise the importance of 
estimating the migration duration and after return activity choices simultaneously. Using 
data from the 1984, 1986 and 1988 interviews for Turkish return migrants who used to 
97 
migrate to Germany, they find that better educated immigrants have shorter migration 
durations but are more likely to be self-employed or wage-employed.  
Mesnard (2004) argues that temporary migration could help migrants from poor 
countries to alleviate borrowing constraints. Using the 1986 survey data on return 
migrants and non-migrants in Tunisia, he investigates the relationship between being 
self-employed and savings accumulated abroad. Whether the individual migrated before 
1974 and a quadratic in age at return are selected as instrumental variables to correct for 
the potential endogeneity of savings in the probit self-employment choice model. 
Mesnard (2004) finds that savings have a positive effect on choosing self-employment 
activity. 
Piracha and Vadean (2010) employ the 2005 ALSMS to study the occupation 
choice between Albanian return migrants and non-migrants. Using a multinominal logit 
model, they find that past migration experience has a significant effect on 
self-employment choice. Meanwhile, Junge et al. (2015) use a multinominal logit model 
to examine the after return activity among non-migrants, local return migrants and 
regional return migrants in Thailand and Vietnam. The findings suggest that regional 
return migrants are more likely to undertake non-farm jobs after return in both countries, 
while only Vietnamese local return migrants are more likely to undertake non-farm jobs 
after return.  
In terms of Chinese studies on the occupation choices, Zhao (2002) finds that 
return migrants not only purchase more durable goods and build more houses than 
migrants and non-migrants, but they also invest more into farm machinery. The latter 
finding may explain why return migrants are more likely to be engaged in farm work 
than non-migrants. By contrast, Chunyu et al. (2013) conclude that return migrants are 
more likely to be engaged in nonfarm jobs. 
Demurger and Xu (2011) conduct a rural survey in the Wuwei County (in the 
Anhui province) in 2008, where there are active policies to attract return migration from 
other cities. In their survey, they compare the self-employment activities between 
non-migrants and return migrants. The probit model with endogenous return migration 
status shows that return migrants are more likely to be self-employed than 
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non-migrants35. When further concentrating on the return migrants’ sample, Demurger 
and Xu (2011) find that accumulated savings and job changing experience during the 
migration are determinants for return migrants to be self-employed. In addition, the 
economic development in Wuwei influences the likelihood that return migrants are 
self-employed. However, Wang and Yang (2013) use the 2006 CGSS to examine the 
occupation choices between return migrants and non-migrants. They find that migration 
experience may not be a factor in affecting the probability of being self-employed or 
wage-employed after return. 
Meanwhile, return migrants are more likely to experience occupational mobility. 
Cobo et al. (2010) compare the occupational mobility of return migrants from the US to 
four Latin America countries and non-migrants in these countries by using a 
multinominal logit model. They find that upward occupational mobility is more likely to 
happen if individuals migrate before the age at 25. However, return migrants in Costa 
Rica and Guatemala are more likely to experience upward occupational mobility while 
return migrants in Mexico and Puerto Rico are more likely to experience downward 
occupational mobility, which suggests that both economic and social differences exist in 
these Latin America countries.  
Similarly, Carletto and Kilic (2011) compare the occupational mobility of Albanian 
emigrants to Italy and Greece as well as non-migrants. The ordered probit model is used 
to estimate whether an individual has experienced upward or downward occupational 
mobility. When taking account of the endogenous nature of the migration experience 
and return decision36, they conclude that past migration experience has a positive impact 
on upward occupational mobility. However, this impact is more significant if migrate to 
Italy but not to Greece. This is because migrants to Greece are typically undertaking 
low-skilled jobs.  
4.3.4 Summary 
Three points can be derived from the literature summarised above. The first is 
                                                        
35 The instrumental variable is the proportion of adult male migrants to total adult males in community.  
36 The instrumental variables for the endogenous variables are whether the individual speaks Greek or Italian in 1990 
and number of children upon return.  
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related to the data used in the literature. The GSOEP and ALSMS are two datasets used 
to study return migration in Europe, where the former is a destination based survey 
while the latter is an origin based survey. Both surveys may provide biased migration 
information on either return migrants or migrants. To be specific, the GSOEP may ask 
immigrants in Germany to provide information on return migrants who are not in 
Germany. Similarly, the ALSMS may have asked one of the family members to provide 
information on emigrants who are in a migration country. The same problems can be 
seen among Chinese datasets used in the literature. In addition, some studies argue that 
the number of return migrants in the GSOEP may be over-identified as those migrants 
who disappeared from the panel survey are also identified as return migrants (Constant 
and Massey, 2002 & 2003; Kirdar, 2009). By contrast, in terms of the dataset used in 
this chapter, return migrants were interviewed in their place of origin while migrant 
workers were interviewed in migration destinations, which best avoids providing biased 
migration information for analysis.  
Secondly, discrete choice models are commonly used in the literature, where return 
migration status is usually represented by a dummy variable. Migration duration 
variable should be endogenous when examining the relationship between migration 
duration and return status. However, the continuous-time survival analysis not only uses 
the censoring status of migration duration to identify return migrants, but it can also 
avoid using instruments to correct for the endogenous duration variable.  
The third conclusion from the literature is the factors that motivate international 
and internal return migrations are similar. For example, family separation may induce 
return migration which can be seen in both the international and the internal return 
migration literature. Therefore, the migration theories which explain international return 
migration can also be applied to internal return migration. 
4.4 Data and Methodology 
4.4.1 Data 
Data from the Chinese part of the Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) are 
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employed in this chapter. The RUMiC is a collaborative project among the Australian 
National University, Beijing Normal University and the Institute for the Study of Labor 
(IZA). The objective of this project is to investigate migration in China and the role of 
the changing labour market. The rural household survey (RHS) and migrant household 
survey (MHS) are two of the sub-surveys of this project.  
In the 2009 RHS, respondents were asked have you ever migrated out for work. If 
the answer was yes, then the questionnaire further asked when did you first migrate out 
to work (year) and when was the last time you stayed in your home village continuously 
for more than three months (year). If all three questions were answered, this respondent 
could be identified as a return migrant. In order to compare the return decision made by 
the return migrants, migrant workers are added to the sample, which are a group of 
people who are still in migration. They are identified from the 2009 MHS, where 
respondents were asked when did you first migrate out for work (year).  
Migrant workers can also be identified from the RHS if respondents in that survey 
did not report a return year. However, this chapter does not include migrant workers 
from the RHS survey. Respondents with a missing return year may not actually be 
migrant workers as they might have forgotten to report their return year. Meanwhile, 
migrant workers in the RHS were not interviewed in the migration city, which may 
record biased information about their migration experience. Therefore, this chapter 
takes advantage of the origin based RHS and destination based MHS to study return 
migration in China. 
The migration duration can be obtained from both sub-surveys, which acts as the 
dependent variable of the return decision model. For the return migrants, their migration 
durations are the difference between the year of return to the home village and the first 
migration year, which are complete durations. However, as the migrant workers are still 
working in cities when surveyed, they do not need to report the return years. Their 
migration durations are the difference between the survey year (that is 2009) and the 
first migration year, which are incomplete or right-censored durations. In addition, 
taking advantage of the longitudinal nature of the survey, return migrants’ before return 
information can be obtained from the 2008 RHS if they answered relevant questions.  
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The selection of the independent variables is based on the theory of new economics 
of labour migration (NELM). The first group of the controls are personal characteristics. 
A dummy variable for males is generated. Age at first migration is used in the analysis. 
Since migrants who start migration at an older age may spend less time in the 
destination location (Dustmann, 2003b). The older the first migration age, the shorter 
the migration duration tends to be. In terms of this chapter, as some migrants aged over 
60 are still working in cities, they may also come to cities at an age over 60. Therefore, 
the maximum first migration age is not set, only those whose first migration age is more 
than 16 are kept in the sample. In addition, years of formal schooling is used to 
represent respondents’ educational levels.  
The second group of controls are employment variables. Past migration 
occupations are generated for the return migrants whilst current occupation is generated 
for migrant workers. The occupation categories are management personnel (reference 
group), service workers, construction workers, manufacturing workers and other 
occupations (including agricultural workers and self-employed), which are common 
occupations among migrants. In addition, the natural logarithm of the hourly wage is 
generated, where it is the past migration hourly wage for the return migrants. Therefore, 
real hourly wages for return migrants are used in the analysis, which is based on 2009 
prices. The hourly wage variable is used to test hypothesis 1, that higher hourly wages 
reduce migration duration.  
For the household variables, the number of children at the return year is generated 
for return migrants. By contrast, the number of children at the survey year is generated 
for migrant workers. Although past migration information should be used consistently 
for the return migrants’ variables coding, this is not possible due to lack of data 
availability. Table 4-2 tabulates the return duration of the return migrants, which is the 
duration between return year and the survey year. It can be seen that 70.07% of return 
migration occurred less than one year to the time of the survey and 91.69% of return 
migration occurred within three years, both of which imply that most return migration 
occurred between 2006 and 2009. Therefore, it is sensible to assume that some 
household situations do not change significantly within these three years. For example, 
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as farm land cannot be transferred or contracted privately in China, the size of the 
household’s holding (in mu)37 should be constant before and after the return. The 
natural logarithm of annual household savings is generated to test hypothesis 2, which 
states that return migration occurs if migrants have realised their savings target at the 
destination. Although the amount of household savings is the value at the time of the 
survey for return migrants, it is sensible to believe that return migrants would not 
consume all their migration savings shortly after their return. Meanwhile, it is also 
sensible to assume that household savings would not increase significantly shortly after 
return unless return migration is due to being able to receive a higher income on return.  
Table 4-2 Tabulation of the return duration 
Return 
Duration Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 191 11.42 11.42 
1 985 58.91 70.33 
2 227 13.58 83.91 
3 130 7.78 91.69 
4 49 2.93 94.62 
5 27 1.61 96.23 
6 17 1.02 97.25 
7 6 0.36 97.61 
8 8 0.48 98.09 
9 8 0.48 98.56 
10 5 0.30 98.86 
11 2 0.12 98.98 
12 9 0.54 99.52 
13 4 0.24 99.76 
14 2 0.12 99.88 
19 1 0.06 99.94 
21 1 0.06 100.00 
Total 1,672 100.00 
Note: return duration is the difference between the 
survey year and return year 
The final group of controls are the network variables. The number of other migrant 
workers in the household is generated. In particular, this variable is coded as the number 
of other migrant workers at the return year for return migrants. Moreover, both the 2009 
                                                        
37 1 mu≈666.67 m2 
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MHS and RHS asked respondents during the 2009 Chinese New Year, the number of 
greetings they sent to people living in cities, in order to give approximate numbers of 
friends they know in cities. For return migrants, although the number may have been 
different to that when they were migrant workers, it is sensible to assume that the 
number of people they know in cities does not change significantly after they return. 
The number of friends variable can be used to test hypothesis 3, which states that a 
larger social network is associated with a longer migration duration.  
New generation migrants are defined as those who were born after 1980. To find 
whether there are return decision differences between the new and old generation 
migrants, interaction terms can be generated to explore the differences between the two 
groups. To be specific, a binary variable representing whether the individual is a new 
generation migrant is interacted with the natural logarithm of hourly wage, natural 
logarithm of annual household saving and number of friends respectively.  
4.4.2 Methodology 
Continuous-time survival analysis is applied to the pooled sample of migrant 
workers and return migrants in this chapter. Although binary choice models are able to 
distinguish between migrant workers and return migrants in the analysis and have been 
used in the previous literature, they do not account for the right-censoring characteristic 
of migration duration and the impact of length of duration on return decision. Therefore, 
continuous-time survival analysis is used in this chapter to examine and identify return 
motivations in China.  
                         )exp()()|( 0 ii xthxth                      (4-1) 
The introduction to the survival analysis starts from the hazard function, which is 
the instantaneous rate of failure (Cleves et al., 2010). Equation 4-1 gives the expression 
for the hazard function, where coefficients β are to be estimated from the regression and 
t is the duration. xi are covariates used in the regression. A crucial part of the survival 
analysis is to find a distribution for the baseline hazard (h0(t)), which is the hazard that 
every respondent faces and can be either a specific shape or flexible in shape.  
Figure 4-1 illustrates the smoothed hazard function, which is a nonparametric 
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analysis derived from the duration data. It can be seen that the hazard increases with 
migration duration but a local minimum is observed at around 30. However, the shape 
of the hazard does not monotonically increase, which implies that commonly used 
hazard distributions in the survival analysis may not match the hazard shape in this 
chapter. In addition, there is a lack of theoretical support for any particular shape 
between return migration probability and migration duration, which means that it is not 
possible to argue that a specific hazard distribution can best fit the survival data in this 
chapter. Therefore, the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) is estimated, which 
leaves the baseline hazard part unspecified and allows the shape of the hazard to be 
flexible.  
 
Figure 4-1 Smoothed hazard function 
To justify whether the Cox model is able to provide consistent results, a 
semiparametric approach is used for comparison purposes. This involves splitting the 
migration duration into several intervals and assuming that the baseline hazard is 
constant in each interval. The definition of the intervals in this chapter is based on the 
average migration duration of the sample. The average migration duration of the overall 
sample is 7.27 years while it is 6.48 years for the return migrants, which suggests that 
the migration duration at around 7 years should be a peak time for completing migration. 
Therefore, the first interval is defined as [1, 7]. Afterwards, the intervals are defined 
using 10-year as the band until to the maximum analysis time. The other intervals are [8, 
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17], [18, 27], [28, 37], [38, 44]. The first interval, [1, 7], acts as the reference category 
in the regression while other intervals are included in the baseline hazard of the 
exponential model.  
However, it has been argued that it is important to consider unobserved 
heterogeneity in survival analysis (Lancaster, 1979; Heckman and Singer, 1984) as 
some migrant workers return earlier than others due to unobserved factors. Therefore, a 
semiparametric approach is used in this chapter following Meyer (1990) and Appleton 
et al. (2002) to consider the unobserved heterogeneity. Equation 4-1 now becomes,  
            )exp()(),|( 554433220i iij xddddhxdth            (4-2) 
where di (i=2, 3, 4, 5) is one of the interval dummies. θi captures unobserved 
heterogeneity with a gamma distribution (mean 1 and variance σ2). By contrast, as the 
Cox model only considers shared frailty, unobserved heterogeneity does not apply to the 
single spell duration data in this chapter.  
As Table 4-1 divides the migrant population into local and non-local migrants, it is 
also interesting to control for being a local migrant in the analysis. According to the 
2008 RHS, if a return migrant’s past working location was in a rural area of the local 
county, towns of the local county or the local county seat, this return migrant can be 
identified as a local migrant. By contrast, from the 2009 MHS, if a migrant worker 
reported being registered in local areas, then this migrant worker can be identified as a 
local migrant. Being a local migrant means the migration distance is shorter than a 
non-local migrant.  
4.5 Results and Discussion  
In this section, descriptive statistics on the data are presented first; then, the results 
from the Cox model are interpreted and discussed. 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 4-3 presents detailed information on the number of observations and average 
durations. There are 4,830 observations in total in the full sample, of which 1,672 are 
return migrants while 3,158 are migrant workers. 2,294 of the total observations are the 
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new generation migrants, which accounts for 47.49% of the total observations. In 
addition, the average migration duration of the full sample is 7.27 years, with the 
minimum at 1 year and the maximum at 44 years. However, return migrants have 
complete migration durations with an average at 6.48 years. In particular, the new 
generation return migrants have an average duration at 3.48 years while it is 8.41 years 
for the old generation return migrants.  
Table 4-3 Observations and migration durations 
Duration (year) Old Generation New Generation Total Obs. Ave. Min Max Ave. Min Max Obs. Ave. Min Max Obs. 
Full 7.27 1 44 10.28 1 44 2,536 3.95 1 13 2,294 4,830 
Migrant workers 7.70 1 44 11.54 1 44 1,519 4.13 1 13 1,639 3,158 
Return migrants 6.48 1 41 8.41 1 41 1,017 3.48 1 13 655 1,672 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Survival function derived from the life table 
Nonparametric analysis presents the survival data without assumptions about the 
functional form of the hazard. Figure 4-2 illustrates the survival function from the life 
table graphically, where each dot represents the probability of survival past time t 
(migration duration). The estimation of survival probabilities uses the Kaplan-Meier 
method, which is the product of the probability of survival at each time interval 
(equation 4-3). nj is the number of observations at the beginning of time interval j and dj 
is the number of observations which failed at the end of time interval j. It can be seen 
from Figure 4-2 that survival probability declines with duration, meaning that all
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Table 4-4 Descriptive statistics 
  Full Old Generation New Generation Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Personal 
Male 0.6443 0 1 0.6802 0 1 0.6046 0 1 
Age at survey year 31.53 17 66 38.83 30 66 23.47 17 29 
Age at migration 23.69 16 61 27.79 16 61 19.17 16 28 
Years of schooling 9.08 0 20 8.34 0 16 9.90 2 20 
Employment 
Management personnel (ref.) 0.0967 0 1 0.0875 0 1 0.1068 0 1 
Service worker 0.4389 0 1 0.3963 0 1 0.4861 0 1 
Construction worker 0.1418 0 1 0.1991 0 1 0.0785 0 1 
Manufacturing worker 0.2433 0 1 0.2098 0 1 0.2803 0 1 
Agricultural & self-employed* 0.0793 0 1 0.1073 0 1 0.0484 0 1 
Natural log of hourly wage 1.85 -5.08 5.29 1.86 -5.08 5.29 1.85 -3.19 4.72 
Household 
Number of children 0.7242 0 4 1.16 0 4 0.2454 0 3 
Size of farm land 4.36 0 75 4.11 0 45 4.63 0 75 
Natural log of annual saving 4.99 0 12.90 5.42 0 12.90 4.52 0 11.61
Network 
Number of other migrants 0.4224 0 5 0.54 0 5 0.2934 0 4 
Number of friends in cities 9.22 0 180 8.17 0 150 10.37 0 180 
Location  
Local migrant 0.1896 0 1 0.2240 0 1 0.1517 0 1 
Obs. 4,830 2,536 2,294 
* 6.83% of respondents in the overall sample are self-employed. 9.78% of the old generation migrants and 
3.57% of the new generation migrants are self-employed. 
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migrants should return eventually. In addition, more than half of the observations have 
migration durations of less than 20 years.  
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Table 4-5 Years of schooling 
Years of 
Schooling 
Full Old Generation New Generation 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
0 1 0.02 1 0.04 0 0 
1 6 0.12 6 0.24 0 0 
2 17 0.35 16 0.63 1 0.04 
3 66 1.37 53 2.09 13 0.57 
4 46 0.95 39 1.54 7 0.31 
5 284 5.88 251 9.90 33 1.44 
6 193 4.00 144 5.68 49 2.14 
7 257 5.32 178 7.02 79 3.44 
8 900 18.63 529 20.86 371 16.17 
9 1,649 34.14 870 34.31 779 33.96 
10 133 2.75 45 1.77 88 3.84 
11 349 7.23 122 4.81 227 9.90 
12 671 13.89 209 8.24 462 20.14 
13 23 0.48 9 0.35 14 0.61 
14 54 1.12 10 0.39 44 1.92 
15 155 3.21 50 1.97 105 4.58 
16 22 0.46 4 0.16 18 0.78 
17 2 0.04 0 0 2 0.09 
19 1 0.02 0 0 1 0.04 
20 1 0.02 0 0 1 0.04 
Total 4,830 100.00 2,536 100.00 2,294 100.00 
Source: 2008 and 2009 RUMiC 
Table 4-4 presents the descriptive statistics of all the covariates. These are 
separated by generations in order to compare the differences between them. Male 
respondents account for 64.43% of the total observations. The average number of years 
of schooling for the full sample is 9.08 years. China has a nine-year compulsory 
education system, which includes six-year elementary school education and three-year 
junior high school education. All children and teenagers at the appropriate schooling age 
are required to attend compulsory education, funded by the government. After 
completing compulsory education, teenagers may continue attending senior high school, 
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start technical school or work. Therefore, the average years of schooling in the full 
sample suggests that most of the respondents start work after completing compulsory 
education. When the years of schooling are tabulated (Table 4-5), it can be seen that 
52.77% of the respondents in the full sample have 8 or 9 years of schooling. By contrast, 
13.89% of them have 12 years of schooling, which is equal to having completed senior 
high school. Meanwhile, Table 4-4 shows that the old generation migrants have 8.34 
average years of schooling while it is 9.9 years for the new generation migrants, which 
supports the view that the new generation migrants are better educated than their old 
counterparts and close to the aggregate levels at 8.8 and 9.8 years of schooling 
respectively (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). In addition, Table 4-5 also 
shows that the percentage of the new generation migrants (20.14%) having 12 years of 
schooling is considerably higher than that for the old generation migrants (8.24%).  
Table 4-6 Tabulation of age intervals 
Age at Migration 
(%) Full 
Old 
Generation
New 
Generation 
16-20 46.04 20.98 73.76 
21-30 36.52 45.82 26.24 
31-40 13.64 25.99 0 
41-50 3.17 6.03 0 
>51 0.62 1.18 0 
Obs. 4,830 2,536 2,294 
Source: 2009 RUMiC 
In Table 4-4, the average first migration age of the full sample is 23.69. In addition, 
the average first migration age of the old generation migrants is 27.79 while it is 19.17 
for the new generation migrants38. Table 4-6 provides frequencies for each age interval. 
It can be seen that 46.05% of the respondents in the full sample migrated at an age 
between 16 and 20. Meanwhile, 73.76% of the new generation migrants started 
migration between 16 and 20. By contrast, 45.82% of the old generation migrants 
started migration between 21 and 30. In order to give information on the age of the 
sample, Table 4-4 also reports the age at the survey year. However, this variable will not 
                                                        
38 According to the report from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011), the average first migration age of 
the migrants was 26 in 2009. In particular, it is 33.7 for the old generation migrants and 20.6 for the new generation 
migrants. 
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be included in the analysis. To be specific, the average age at the survey year is 31.53 in 
the full sample. It is 38.83 and 23.47 for the old and new generation migrants 
respectively.  
In terms of the employment situation in Table 4-4, 6.83% of respondents are 
self-employed, which is included in the agricultural and self-employed category. Service 
worker and manufacturing worker are common occupations among the respondents, 
which account for 43.89% and 24.33% of observations in the full sample respectively. 
However, the proportion of the new generation migrants undertaking construction work 
(7.85%) is much lower than that for the old generation migrants (19.91%), which is 
approximate to the aggregate statistics that only 9.8% of the new generation migrants 
are undertaking construction work in 2009 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2011). In addition, the old generation migrants have higher natural logarithm hourly 
wages (at 1.86) than their new generation counterparts (at 1.85).  
For the household variables in Table 4-4, the average number of children in the full 
sample is 0.72, with the maximum number at 4. In particular, the average number of 
children among the old generation migrants is 1.16, which is much higher than the 0.25 
for the new generation migrants. The average size of farm land in the full sample is 4.36 
mu. Compared with the new generation migrants, the old generation migrants have 
higher natural logarithm annual household savings, at 4.52 and 5.42 for the new and old 
generation migrants respectively. In terms of the network variables in the full sample, 
the average number of other migrants in the household is 0.42. By contrast, the average 
number of friends in cities is 9.22. Finally, 19% of the respondents are local migrants.  
4.5.2 Parametric analysis results 
Table 4-7 shows the results when personal, employment, household and social 
network variables are controlled for simultaneously in the analysis. Hazard ratios are 
reported in the table, which are exponentials of the coefficients. The first column of this 
table presents the results from the Cox model. The hazard ratio of the natural logarithm 
of hourly wage shows that a 100% increase in hourly wages reduces the hazard of return 
by about 14.64%, which does not support hypothesis 1 that migrant workers are more 
likely to return when there is an increase in the hourly wage. The negative relationship 
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Table 4-7 Results of Cox and semiparametric models 
  Cox (1) Semiparametric (2) Haz.Ratio Std.Err. Haz.Ratio Std.Err. 
Interval 
[8, 17] 1.3888*** 0.1066 
[18, 27] 1.9407*** 0.3027 
[28, 37] 3.9551*** 1.5687 
[38, 44] 10.6982*** 7.4957 
Personal         
Male 0.7929*** 0.0456 0.7734*** 0.0479 
Age at migration 1.0629*** 0.0186 1.0714*** 0.0211 
Age at migration squared 0.9997 0.0003 0.9996 0.0003 
Years of schooling 1.1521** 0.0610 1.1714*** 0.0667 
Years of schooling squared 0.9902*** 0.0031 0.9889*** 0.0033 
Employment         
Service worker 0.5039*** 0.0494 0.4700*** 0.0497 
Construction worker 0.8987 0.0876 0.8713 0.0922 
Manufacturing worker 1.5012*** 0.1359 1.5975*** 0.1581 
Agricultural & self-employed 0.6928** 0.1033 0.6642*** 0.1042 
Natural log of hourly wage 0.8536*** 0.0310 0.8265*** 0.0359 
Household         
Number of children 0.8790*** 0.0297 0.8359*** 0.0345 
Size of farm land 1.0300*** 0.0051 1.0347*** 0.0058 
Natural log of annual saving 1.0993*** 0.0073 1.1101*** 0.0082 
Network         
Number of other migrants in household 0.2563*** 0.0202 0.2338*** 0.0193 
Number of friends in cities 0.9891*** 0.0027 0.9877*** 0.0029 
Constant 0.0113*** 0.0044 
Gamma variance 0.1456*** 0.0586 
Number of respondents  4,830 
***1%  **5%  *10% 
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between wage and return is also found in Dustmann (2003b) who studies the return 
intentions of immigrants in Germany. By contrast, migrants from the Republic of 
Moldova are unwilling to return if higher wages are paid in the migration destination 
countries (Pinger, 2010). Hourly wage is used to measure work effort in this chapter. 
Although Chinese migrant workers generally work longer hours, they are also lower 
paid, so unlikely to be able to cover living costs in cities (Yue et al., 2010). This fact 
suggests that even when there is an increase in the hourly wage, it may not reduce 
migrant workers’ working hours significantly and can accelerate the return. Therefore, 
the hypothesis made based on the NELM may not apply to the Chinese context.  
In terms of hypothesis 2, the hazard ratio of the natural logarithm of annual 
household saving shows that a 100% increase in the annual household savings would 
increase the hazard of return by 9.93%, which is consistent with this hypothesis. On the 
one hand, according to the NELM, migration is a life-cycle decision. Accumulating 
savings is one of the motivations for migration. Once the savings target is achieved, 
migrants return and consume their savings in their place of origin. Empirical evidence 
from both the UK and Germany supports this argument (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007; 
Kirdar, 2009). On the other hand, return migrants may use their migration savings to 
start a business after return, which potentially generates job opportunities if they employ 
other individuals (Piracha and Vadean, 2010). In this case, they view migration as a 
capital accumulating process. In China, migrant workers remit savings to rural 
hometowns for purposes such as building new houses or supporting left-behind family 
members (Zhu et al. 2012).  
When the number of friends in cities increases by 1, the first column of Table 4-7 
shows that the hazard of return reduces by 1.09%, which accepts the statement in 
hypothesis 3. This negative relationship between friends in cities and return migration 
shows that networks act as ties among migrant workers (Massey, 1990).  
In terms of other hazard ratios in the first column of Table 4-7, males experience 
20.71% less return migration than females. With an additional year of the first migration 
age, the hazard of return increases by 6.29%. However, this finding is inconsistent with 
Chunyu et al. (2013) who find that the first migration age is negatively related to the 
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probability of return in China. They argue that older migrants can make more informed 
decision about whether to return.  
Figure 4-3 plots the quadratic term of years of schooling. It can be seen that the 
hazard of return decreases with the increase in year of schooling. However, there are 
mixed findings on the impact of education on return migration in the previous Chinese 
literature. On the one hand, Zhao (2002) finds that better educated migrants are more 
willing to return while Wang and Fan (2006) draw the opposite conclusion. On the other 
hand, evidence from the 1995 and 2000 Chinese census data suggests that better 
educated migrants have been more willing to return since the 1990s due to the rapid 
development in western parts of China and local policies to attract return migration 
(Chunyu et al., 2013). Therefore, the pattern in Figure 4-3 may imply that better 
educated migrants find it easier to stay in cities due to their human capital.  
 
Figure 4-3 Quadratic term of year of schooling 
For the employment covariates in the first column of Table 4-7, service workers 
and agricultural or self-employed workers experience 49.61% and 30.72% less return 
migration respectively compared with management personnel. By contrast, being a 
manufacturing worker has a 50.12% higher hazard of return than management personnel. 
The hazard ratio for the construction worker is insignificant at the 10% level. According 
to statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the industry structural 
adjustment after the 2008 financial crisis resulted in the proportion of migrant workers 
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undertaking manufacturing work to decline, from 37.2% in 2008 to 31.3% in 2014. 
Therefore, manufacturing workers became unemployed when there was a low demand 
globally and thus were less likely to settle down in cities permanently (Wang, 2000; Zhu 
and Chen, 2010; Liang et al., 2014). By contrast, the developing service industry has a 
high demand for migrant workers, which may bring stable jobs to migrant workers 
employed in that industry. 
For control variables in the household group, an additional child reduces the hazard 
of return by 12.1%. This finding is counter to the view that return decision should take 
into account the well-being of children (Dustmann, 2003b; Piotrowski and Tong, 2013). 
Particularly in China, where there are 58 million rural left-behind children in 200939. 
Parents’ migration status significantly impact on school performance, confidence and 
health of the left-behind children (Murphy et al., 2015).  
Farm land in the rural hometowns motivates migrant workers to return. To be 
specific, an additional mu of farm land increases the hazard of return by 3%. This result 
is similar to Hare (1999) who finds that an additional mu of farm land decreases the 
migration duration by about 27% in China. Farm land has an attachment effect on rural 
people. It is one of the assets of rural people in China. Rejecting rural household 
registration status also means losing the right to hold farm land. Therefore, in order to 
keep farm land, some migrant workers may reject the opportunity to get urban 
household registration status and eventually return to their hometowns (Zhu, 2007). 
Meanwhile, tax reductions or exemptions, as well as price increases in agricultural 
products since 2000, may increase the incentives for agricultural production and 
motivate migrant workers to return in order to undertake farm work (Liang et al., 2014).  
In the network control group, when the number of other migrant workers in the 
household increases by 1, the hazard of return decreases by 74.37%. This result supports 
the view of the NELM that migration is a household decision. Other migrant workers 
from the same household are able to share the risk in the migration. Therefore, having 
friends or closer relatives in cities can delay return migration.  
                                                        
39 Xinhua News, retrieved on August 11, 2015 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2009-05/26/content_1143 
8529.htm 
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The second column of Table 4-7 presents the results from the semiparametric 
model. The likelihood ratio test suggests statistically significant unobserved 
heterogeneity. It can be seen from Figure 4-4 that the baseline hazard is increasing. For 
example, the hazard of return for the second interval, [8, 17], is 38.88% higher than that 
of the reference interval [1, 7]. The hazard ratios of covariates in this column are 
approximate to those in the first column, which suggest that two models are able to 
present consistent results when the shape of the baseline hazard is either flexible or 
specified.  
 
Figure 4-4 Baseline hazard of the semiparametric model 
Table 4-8 presents the results when interaction terms are included in the analysis. 
The hazard ratios of the covariates show consistent directions with Table 4-7 expect the 
hazard ratio for children, which shows an additional child increase the hazard of return 
by 12.14%.  
In terms of the interaction terms in the Cox model (first column), a 100% increase 
in hourly wage reduces the hazard of return by 29.12% when changing the migrant 
generation from the new to old. This finding suggests that the new generation migrants 
are more willing to return when there is an increase in the hourly wage, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis 4. Meanwhile, a 100% increase in annual household 
savings increases the hazard of return by 2.48% when changing the migrant generation 
from the new to old. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 5 which suggests that the 
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Table 4-8 Results of Cox and semiparametric models include interaction terms 
  Cox (1) Semiparametric (2) Haz.Ratio Std.Err. Haz.Ratio Std.Err. 
Interval 
[8, 17] 2.0950*** 0.1311 
[18, 27] 3.8853*** 0.4916 
[28, 37] 8.1224*** 2.6669 
[38, 44] 22.4775*** 13.3188 
Personal         
Male 0.8624** 0.0506 0.8632** 0.0506 
Age at migration 1.3190*** 0.0281 1.3252*** 0.0282 
Age at migration squared 0.9971*** 0.0003 0.9971*** 0.0003 
Years of schooling 1.1255** 0.0603 1.1378** 0.0613 
Years of schooling squared 0.9896*** 0.0031 0.9885*** 0.0031 
New generation migrants 13.07*** 2.4301 13.54*** 2.5156 
Employment         
Service worker 0.5134*** 0.0503 0.4962*** 0.0486 
Construction worker 0.9808 0.0955 0.9763 0.0953 
Manufacturing worker 1.4080*** 0.1278 1.4126*** 0.1284 
Agricultural & self-employed 0.7314** 0.1088 0.7244** 0.1079 
Natural log of hourly wage 1.0432 0.0543 1.0508 0.0550 
Natural log of hourly wage*new generation 0.7088*** 0.0519 0.6891*** 0.0510 
Household         
Number of children 1.1214*** 0.0394 1.1258*** 0.0395 
Size of farm land 1.0190*** 0.0053 1.0198*** 0.0053 
Natural log of annual saving 1.0966*** 0.0097 1.1009*** 0.0097 
Natural log of annual saving*new generation 1.0248* 0.0137 1.0287** 0.0138 
Network         
Number of other migrants in household 0.2671*** 0.0208 0.2557*** 0.0199 
Number of friends in cities 0.9944* 0.0033 0.9943* 0.0033 
Number of friends in cities*new generation 0.9887** 0.0055 0.9877** 0.0055 
Constant 0.0001*** 0.00003 
Number of respondents 4, 830 
***1%  **5%  *10% 
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new generation migrants are less willing to return than their old generation counterpart 
when there is an annual household savings rise. Finally, an additional friend in cities 
reduces the hazard of return by 1.13% when changing generation from the new to old, 
which suggests that the new generation migrants are more willing to return than the old 
generation migrants even when they know more people in cities. Therefore, this finding 
is inconsistent with hypothesis 6. However, the likelihood ratio test suggests that 
unobserved heterogeneity is statistically insignificant in the semiparametric model. 
Therefore, results from the semiparametric approach without controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity are reported in the second column of Table 4-8. Although consistent 
results can be found in this column compared to the first column, these should be 
interpreted cautiously as it seems not make sense to strongly argue that the two 
generations have no heterogeneity and no unobserved factors which motivate return 
migration.  
The results on hourly wage and number of friends differ from the conventional 
view that the new generation migrants are less willing to return than the old generation 
migrants. Although there is an opportunity cost to returning, the new generation 
migrants may still find it is difficult for them to stay in cities permanently. A potential 
barrier is their rural household registration status. For example, it limits them from 
obtaining equal social welfare as the urban residents and adds difficulty to solve the 
housing problem if they want to stay in cities permanently. Even though the new 
generation migrants have a stronger desire to be integrated in city life, these invisible 
barriers between the rural and urban people make them disappointed and thus motivate 
their return.  
Table 4-9 presents the Cox survival analysis results when the dummy of being a 
local migrant is included in the estimation. However, the hazard ratios of this dummy 
variable are insignificant at 5% level when both excluding (first column) and including 
(second column) interaction terms in the analysis, meaning that whether the individual 
is a local migrant or not has no impact on the return decision. It also reveals that 
migration distance has no impact on the return decision. 
Finally, in terms of the discussion on whether return migration in China is due to 
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Table 4-9 Cox survival analysis results with local migrant control 
  1 2 Haz.Ratio Std.Err. Haz.Ratio Std.Err. 
Personal         
Male 0.7950*** 0.0458 0.8614** 0.0506 
Age at migration 1.0642*** 0.0186 1.3184*** 0.0281 
Age at migration squared 0.9997 0.0003 0.9972*** 0.0003 
Years of schooling 1.1524*** 0.0610 1.1261** 0.0603 
Years of schooling squared 0.9918*** 0.0031 0.9896*** 0.0031 
New generation migrants   13.11*** 2.4389 
Employment         
Service worker 0.5019*** 0.0493 0.5139*** 0.0503 
Construction worker 0.9000 0.0877 0.9794 0.0954 
Manufacturing worker 1.4989*** 0.1357 1.4080*** 0.1278 
Agricultural & self-employed 0.6896** 0.1029 0.7325** 0.1090 
Natural log of hourly wage 0.8494*** 0.0311 1.0463 0.0547 
Natural log of hourly wage*new generation     0.7080*** 0.0520 
Household         
Number of children 0.8752*** 0.0298 1.1244*** 0.0398 
Size of farm land 1.0298*** 0.0051 1.0192*** 0.0053 
Natural log of annual saving 1.0994*** 0.0073 1.0965*** 0.0097 
Natural log of annual saving*new generation     1.0250* 0.0137 
Network         
Number of other migrants in household 0.2506*** 0.0202 0.2674*** 0.0208 
Number of friends in cities 0.9893*** 0.0027 0.9943* 0.0034 
Number of friends in cities*new generation     0.9888** 0.0055 
Location  
Local migrant  0.9383 0.0556 1.0361 0.0617 
Obs. 4,830 
***1%  **5%  *10% 
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failure or success, the tabulation of return reasons among return migrants can provide 
evidence (Table 4-10). 1,454 return migrants reported their return reasons, which 
account for 86.96% of return migrants in the sample. The return reasons are failure, 
success and household reasons in this table. It can be seen that only 18.64% of return 
migration is due to failure. By contrast, 32.88% of return migration is due to success. 
Therefore, return migration in China is a combination of both failure and household 
reasons.  
Table 4-10 Tabulation of return reasons 
Return reasons Percent 
Failure   
Own illness 2.13 
Did not like city or current job 5.71 
Fired, cannot find another job 10.80 
Success   
Help family business or farming 24.21 
Wedding/marriage/building house 8.67 
Household   
Family member's illness 3.99 
Look after children 7.02 
Others 
Other reasons 37.48 
Obs. 1,454 
Source: 2009 RHS, RUMiC 
4.6 Conclusions 
Return migration has become a new trend in China. This chapter argues that return 
migration is a combination of institutional barriers in cities, household reasons, and also 
because the movement of the economic activity to inland China requires migration. 
Therefore, this chapter identifies and examines the factors that motivate return 
migration in China, adopting an empirical model based on the NELM, which states that 
return migration is a life-cycle event and also a household decision. Using two 
sub-surveys from the 2009 RUMiC, return migrants and migrant workers are included 
in the sample. The censoring status of the migration duration is used to distinguish 
between return migrants and current migrants.  
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The results suggest that different occupations have different hazard of returns. To 
be specific, manufacturing workers experience more return migration compared with 
management personnel. By contrast, service workers as well as agricultural or 
self-employed workers experience less return migration compared to management 
personnel. In terms of household factors, farm land in rural hometowns attracts migrants 
to return.  
Results for hypotheses 1 to 3 show that higher hourly wages in cities contribute to 
less return migration while return migration is more likely to occur if there are high 
annual household savings. The argument for these findings is that on the one hand, 
Chinese migrant workers are working long hours and being lower paid, so a wage rise 
may not reduce their working hours and shorten their migration duration. On the other 
hand, return migration will occur once they have achieved their savings target. 
Meanwhile, a wide social network in cities is able to prolong the migration duration.  
The heterogeneities between the new and old generation migrants are tested by 
hypotheses 4 to 6. The new generation dummy is interacted with the variables of hourly 
wage, annual household saving and the number of friends respectively. However, the 
interaction terms suggest that the new generation migrants are more willing to return 
than the old generation migrants given a higher hourly wage and more friends in cities. 
This finding is contrary to the conventional view that the new generation migrants are 
more willing to stay in cities permanently. Therefore, findings from this chapter may 
imply that the rural registration status of migrant workers is still a barrier for them to 
stay in cities permanently even though the new generation migrants have such strong 
expectations. By contrast, when there is a higher annual household saving, the new 
generation migrants are less willing to return than their old generation counterparts. 
Finally, when the local migrant dummy is controlled for in the analysis, it can be seen 
that migration distance has no impact on return decision making. 
One limitation of the data used in this chapter is that the origin or destination of the 
migration is unavailable. For the return migrants, their origins can be obtained from the 
dataset but not their migration destinations. By contrast, for the migrant workers, data 
on their migration destinations are available but not their place of origin. If both the 
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places of origin and destination were available from the dataset, it would indicate where 
migrants return from and to, enabling an illustration of routes of migration and return 
migration in China.  
China proposed an urbanisation plan in 2012, which aims to either move the rural 
population to urban areas or entitle them to urban registration (Xinhua News, 2012). 
One of the reforms under the urbanisation plan is to allow migrant workers to 
permanently settle in cities, enabling them to get the same public services as their urban 
counterparts. Meanwhile, a specific guideline on return migrants’ employment was 
announced in June 201540, which encourages migrant workers to return to hometowns 
and start businesses. Therefore, these policies may help to narrow the urban and rural 
divide and provide assistance to return migrants.  
                                                        
40 Retrieved on October 9 2015 from http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-06/21/content_2882326.htm. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The thesis investigates the impact of labour market reforms in China. Chinese 
society is a dual society segregated between urban and rural areas by the household 
registration system. China’s labour market and people have been potentially influenced 
by this dual system. Therefore, when investigating the labour market in China, this dual 
characteristic of the society should be taken into consideration.  
Three conclusions can be drawn from this thesis. Firstly, since the 1978 policy of 
reform and opening up, the Chinese labour market became more mobile in terms of both 
job turnover and internal migration. In Chapter two, descriptive statistics from the 2008 
China General Social Survey reveal that respondents changed jobs 0.82 times on 
average with a maximum at 7. The discrete-time survival analysis results show that 
urban and rural residents do not differ significantly in job turnover behaviours. In 
particular, job turnover is reduced when social insurances are provided, which suggests 
that employees concern about the welfare associated with their jobs. Findings from the 
analysis also suggest that job turnover is common in both the public and non-public 
sectors. This is because over time employment in the public sector may have lost the 
reputation of being secure and life-long in the post-reform Chinese labour market.  
In addition, findings from chapter four confirm that the geographical mobility in 
China is not only from rural to urban areas, but also from urban to rural areas. Return 
migration implies that permanently staying in cities is difficult for Chinese migrants. 
Therefore, once migrant workers have met their income targets in urban areas, return 
migration would occur. In addition, the high willingness to return among the new 
generation migrants may imply that integrating into urban life is difficult for migrant 
workers even if they have a strong desire to stay in cities.  
The second conclusion that can be drawn from this thesis is that employment 
benefits in China do not have a substitution effect for wages among both urban 
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employees and migrant workers. Unlike employment benefits such as in-kind payment 
which was used to compensate the deliberated low wages before the 1990s, benefits are 
still paid to employees in the Chinese urban labour market even if the wages are 
increasing after the 1990s. However, the benefits after the 1990s are more likely to be 
bonuses and social insurances rather than in-kind payment. In addition, it can be found 
that urban employees have higher wages, bonuses and the number of social insurances 
than migrant workers. By contrast, migrant workers have higher housing subsidies than 
urban employees. This finding implies that rurally registered migrant workers are 
unable to receive the same benefits as their urban counterparts in the urban labour 
market.   
The final conclusion is that the household registration system is still having an 
impact on Chinese society and its labour market. People with different types of 
registration may have different concerns in terms of employment and welfare even if 
operating in the same labour market. In particular, rurally registered workers may not 
receive the same level of wage payment and welfare as their urban counterparts as well 
as facing more barriers of staying in cities.  
5.2 Policy Implications  
The policy implication of this thesis is that China not only needs a transition from a 
planned economy to a market one, but also needs to transit from a dual economy or 
society to an integrated one.  
China has been undergoing a comprehensive reform since 2013, which aims to 
advance the modernisation in the State governance system and in governance capability 
(Xinhua News, 2013). The reform plan emphasises the decisive role of the market in 
resource allocation, implying that labour and wages should also be decided by the 
market as well. On the one hand, the development of the non-public sector provides 
more employment opportunities and diversifies the economy. Hence, the labour force 
may move to places where the skills can get higher returns and better matched. 
Although job turnover is not necessarily bad for the society, it is associated with costs 
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which both employees and employers may need to be responsible for. On the other hand, 
industries are moving to inland areas of China which will induce the movement of the 
migrant labour as well. The return migration in China can be regarded as a reallocation 
of labour when industry resources are reallocated. Meanwhile, the wage system is 
becoming market-oriented rather than administratively decided. Therefore, the market is 
playing a decisive role in production resources as well as labour reallocation in China. 
Findings from this thesis may provide evidence and insights to these changes.  
In addition, the 2013 reform plan also aims to balance the development between 
rural and urban areas, allowing rural people to benefit and share the outcomes of 
economic development as well as urban people. Findings from this thesis reveal that 
even if operating in the same urban labour market, rurally registered people are facing 
different situations compared with their urban counterparts. From the institutional side, 
reforms on the household registration system are needed. The system should not divide 
the labour market and society. Moreover, coordinated rules and policies such as social 
insurances should be applied to people with different types of registration. Particularly 
when more rural registered people are moving into urban areas under an urbanisation 
plan since 2012 (Xinhua News, 2012), support should be given to help these people to 
integrate into urban life rather than making them feel as an outsider to cities.  
5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
The limitation of this thesis should be the dataset used for this research. In chapter 
two, as only a few migrant workers can be identified from the 2008 China General 
Social Survey, it is not possible to discuss employment of migrant workers and job 
turnover experienced by them. By contrast, migrant workers’ employment histories 
were asked in the 2012 China Labour-force Dynamics Survey, which was released in 
July 2015. Therefore, the availability of new dataset enables future job turnover study to 
focus on migrant workers in China.  
In addition, as chapter three does not justify the compensating wage differentials 
hypothesis, it might be interesting to examine the hypothesis by using panel data to 
125 
capture the changes of the relationship between wages and employment benefits as well 
as the changing characteristics of the respondents. However, Chinese panel data are 
uncommon and unable to provide all necessary information to examine this 
hypothesis41.  
In terms of chapter four, using interaction terms in the Cox model should be a 
feasible solution to find the heterogeneity between the new and old generation migrants. 
However, the proportional hazard assumption behind the Cox model may be weak, 
which implies that the two generations do not share the same shape of the hazard. 
Therefore, it might be necessary to consider other hazard specifications for the duration 
model and strongly argue that it can best fit the duration data. In addition, it is worth 
considering the time-varying characteristics of some covariates in the analysis if such 
information is available. In this case, a time-varying covariate can be split into several 
intervals and to see how the hazard of return migration changes among different 
intervals.  
                                                        
41 China Nutrition and Health Survey is an ongoing panel survey started in 1989. However, this panel dataset is 
unable to offer all essential information to examine the compensating wage differentials hypothesis.  
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